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Abstract
Supply chain management has been described as an integration of business process
that is associated with operational management and marketing problems, such as in-
ventory control, information sharing and supply chain coordination. Over the last few
decades, researchers in the area of supply chain management have been very active in
seeking optimal policies for supply chain members in order for them to achieve effective
and efficient outcomes. Game theory is generally described as the study of mathematical
models concerning how rational individuals or organizations make decisions in a compet-
itive environment. Due to competition and cooperation existing amongst supply chain
members, the theory of non-cooperative and cooperative game became a natural choice
used for studying supply chain related problems, especially in analyzing the interactions
and coordination between supply chain members. This has resulted in a substantial body
of works aimed at providing further insights into how game theory can be used to elucidate
the nature of the problems that can arise in basic and complex supply chains.
Many existing studies on supply chain management made the somewhat unrealistic
assumptions that demand is deterministic and shortages are not permitted. In reality, due
to factors such as irregular production capacity or unanticipated demands, shortages will
occur and both the supplier and retailer’s decisions will be influenced by the occurrences
of these periodic events. Moreover, these studies totally ignored the consumer who is
the terminal member of the chain. However, due to the advent of World Wide Web
which provides a platform for exchanging information between supply chain members,
consumer’s preference and purchasing behavior are very influential in determining supplier
and retailer’s decisions. Conversely, the consumer’s welfare will be affected by supplier
and retailer’s decisions, such as in pricing of products and planning of inventories.
Most supply chain games assume symmetric information, which are games whereby
each player has the same information on other players’ characteristics such as their cost
structures, payoffs, decisions or beliefs. When this is not the case, we have game with
asymmetric information. Considering supply chain with asymmetric information necessi-
tate the construction of a type space for each player which comprises the player’s private
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information known only to himself but not to the other players. One player’s uncertainty
over other players’ types is then expressed as a probability distribution over the other
players’ type spaces. Such uncertainty will cause inefficient outcomes to supply chain
members and in order to improve supply chain performances, the application of mecha-
nism design deserves more studies. In mechanism design, different types of contracts or
mechanisms, are offered by the principal to agents with the objective of obtaining private
information held by the latter. In addition, with three or more players, a comprehensive
investigation into how one can obtain the joint probability distribution of players’ types
when these types are correlated and each has a different marginal distribution is lacking.
Motivated by the above issues, this thesis aims to address these problems and fill up
research gaps that currently exist in the area of supply chain management using a game
theoretical approach.
The first research problem addressed in this thesis concerns the effect of shortage on
supply chain members’ decisions and performance under a symmetric information struc-
ture. Shortage as a decision variable is incorporated into an existing two-echelon seller–
buyer supply chain model. The interaction between the players is investigated using a
Stackelberg equilibrium in the non–cooperative situation and Pareto optimality in the co-
operative situation. The effect that shortages have on players’ profits is examined through
several examples and the advantages/disadvantages of a player’s leadership position in the
Stackelberg games are also discussed.
The second research problem addressed in this thesis concerns the application of mech-
anism design in an asymmetric information environment. We consider a two-echelon
seller–buyer supply chain model where seller and buyer hold private information regard-
ing their operations. Several mechanism designs, based on the incentive compatibility and
individual rationality conditions, are proposed in order to improve seller’s profit. We re-
define the problem as an optimal control problem, then obtain the optimal strategies by
invoking the Pontryagin Maximum Principle to solve the resulting Hamiltonian system.
The third research problem addressed in this thesis concerns a three–person supply
chain game comprising of a supplier, a retailer and a consumer under symmetric informa-
tion structure. There are very few supply chain papers that have included the consumer
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as a player in a supply chain game. This is an unfortunate omission as a consumer’s
preferences and decisions will directly affect market demand and total supply chain per-
formance. A further complication that arises in a three–person game is the possibility that
each player may act individually as a self maximizer or may wish to join in a coalition with
one other player to achieve a better outcome. Both non-cooperative and cooperative game
scenarios are considered in this thesis. Under a non–cooperative scenario, we show that
both supplier’s profit and consumer’s utility will rely on retailer’s preference whether to
work alone or enter into a coalition with the other players. Under a cooperative scenario,
we devise an allocation scheme based on the Shapley values.
Under the fourth research problem, we reconsider the third research problem but this
time under an asymmetric information environment. A significant issue facing a player
under this scenario is how to assess one player’s uncertainty over other players’ types
and not ignoring the fact that the types may be dependent and have different marginal
distributions. In order to overcome this hurdle, we employ copula method to model one
player’s uncertainty over other players types. As far as we are aware, the use of copulas in
this context has never been attempted before and is a novel approach introduced in this
thesis. A selection of copulas under the Archimedean family are used and the numerical
results suggest that the players’ expected profits depend on the choice of copula functions,
the marginal distributions and measures of dependency between players’ types.
Finally, we consider two further applications to some related supply chain problems. In
the first application we look at the seller–buyer supply chain with a credit option policy
and in the second, the celebrated Newsvendor problem incorporating a loss function.
Both applications are considered under both a symmetric and an asymmetric information
structure, with numerical examples comparing the results obtained under both of these
scenarios.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 General review of game theoretic approach in
supply chain management
In the literature of supply chain management, a supply chain is commonly defined as
“a system of suppliers, manufacturers, and customers where materials flow downstream
from suppliers to customers and the information flows in both directions” [50]. There are
also other similar definition of supply chain, for example Stevens [142] defines it as “a
connected series of activities which is concerned with planning, coordinating and control-
ling materials, parts, and finished goods from supplier to customer. It is concerned with
two distinct flows (material and information) through the organizations”. Mentzer et al.
[105] proposed that the supply chain is “a set of three or more entities (organizations or
individuals) directly involved in the upstream and downstream flows of products, services,
finances, and/or information from a source to a customer”. Note that all these definitions
included the consumer as a member of the supply chain. On the other hand, supply chain
management is defined as the integration of business process or business functions. For
example, in Cooper et al. [30], the authors adopted the definition developed by members
of The International Center for Competitive Excellence in 1994 which stated that “supply
chain management is the integration of business processes from end user through original
suppliers that provides products, services and information that add value for customers”.
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Mentzer et al. [105] proposed a definition which encompasses various aspects of supply
chain management, and described it as “the systemic, strategic coordination of the tradi-
tional business functions and the tactics across these business functions within a particular
company and across businesses within the supply chain, for the purposes of improving the
long-term performance of the individual companies and the supply chain as a whole”. Re-
viewing these definitions suggests that most research related to supply chain management
have some common characteristics which are associated with operational management
and marketing planning problems, such as inventory control, production and price com-
petition, service and product quality competition, marketing effort, information sharing,
cooperation and coordination, investment capability and new product introduction.
Over the last few decades, research in the field of supply chain management has been
very active and has reached its broadest level. Several review papers have appeared
in the literature. For instance, Wilcox et al. [166] presented a brief survey of papers
with issues related to price quantity discount. Goyal and Gupta [59] provided a survey
on integrated inventory models that achieve coordination between buyer and vendor.
Weber et al. [164] provided review from the supplier’s viewpoint related to criteria such
as prices (net prices, discounts, payment conditions), quality and supplier service (delivery
time, lead time variability, reliability, flexibility). Thomas and Griffin [149] provided a
review on research of supply chain management coordination. Tayur et al. [147] have
edited a book which emphasized the essential role of quantitative models in supply chain
management. Tsay et al. [153] provided a review which summarized model-based research
on contract in a supply chain setting. Ganeshan et al. [50] presented a broad taxonomic
review with demonstrated framework which provides an insight for academic researchers
and practitioners to have a better understanding of supply chain management research.
Recently, Cachon [15] offered reviews and extends supply chain literatures on coordination
with contracts. Minner [106] reviewed inventory supply chain models with multiple supply
options and discussed their contributions to supply chain management. Arshinder et al.
[6] reported various perspectives on issues related to supply chain coordination, and Peidro
et al. [120] conducted a survey on quantitative models for supply chain planning under
uncertainty.
5
Game theory can be generally described as the study of mathematical models con-
cerned with how rational individuals or organizations make decisions in a competitive
environment. As such, game theory is a powerful tool in analyzing conflict situations. It
has and is widely applied to diverse disciplines such as biology, economics, environment
management, political science, psychology, sports and warfare analysis. It is generally
agreed upon that modern game theory began with the impact of works by Zermelo [171],
Borel [12] and a pioneering paper by von Neumann [157]. The seminal book of von Neu-
mann and Morgenstern [158] established the modern era of game theory. This book led to
widespread interest in game theory among the scientific community, and many new and
fundamental concepts were developed by successive game theorists through 1950s to 1970s
such as Nash equilibrium [112], Shapley value [135], games with incomplete information
[65] and mechanism design [68].
Based on several decades’ of research works, supply chain management theory has
recognized that a supply chain process consists of several enterprises, each making deci-
sions to maximize their own profit. As the operational decisions by different entities will
also impact on each others’ profit, this will affect the performance of the whole supply
chain. This has resulted in a great deal of interest in modeling and analyzing the con-
flict and cooperation among supply chain members, so that a better understanding of
the interaction between supply chain members can be gained through an examination of
the strategic operational decisions made by the individual players. With this viewpoint,
game theory is a natural choice used in analyzing conflict and cooperation among partic-
ipants of supply chains. However, game theory is not suitable for analyzing a centralized
supply chain since in such chain, the final unanimous decision is made by a single player.
In a decentralized supply chain, competition and cooperation exist among supply chain
members; for example, suppliers may compete on resources and price in order to attract
orders from retailers, and retailers may compete on price, service quality and product
quality to increase demand from consumers. The different approaches of game theory
in supply chain management may be divided in two categories: a non-cooperative and a
cooperative approach. The non-cooperative approach is concerned with what one might
expect players to do, and the details of how they would achieve their objectives when
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there is no cooperation between them. On the other hand, the cooperative approach is
interested in the outcomes players can achieve if they act cooperatively and how profits
can be allocated to members in a fair and equitable manner.
Beginning with the work of Parlar [118], game theory has been extensively applied
in the field of supply chain management in analyzing conflict and cooperation between
decision makers. This has resulted in a body of works implementing various game theo-
retical approaches to a variety of supply chain related problems. Cachon and Netessine
[16] surveyed the application of game theory in supply chain management and outlined
some game-theoretic concepts which are currently applied or have potential for future
application. The authors classified supply chain from a game-theoretical viewpoint as a
non-cooperative game or a cooperative game, and discussed each of these categories in
both static and dynamic settings. Leng and Parlar [94] surveyed literatures which fo-
cus on supply chain management viewpoint and are related to the application of game
theory. Sarmah et al. [131] presented a survey on buyer vendor coordination models
where quantity discount has been used as an incentive mechanism. The authors classified
various models and provided discussions based on topics of supply chain management
and techniques of game theory. Recently, Nagarajan and Sosˇic´ [110] provided review
and extensions on game-theoretic analysis of cooperation among supply chain agents.
Moreover, there are several books providing a review on supply chain management with
game theoretical related topics, such as Chatterjee and Samuelson [19], Simchi-Levi et al.
[138], Kogan and Tapiero [83], Wang et al. [163] and Albrecht [4].
From the aforementioned review articles, it is seen that game theory has been exten-
sively applied in the field of supply chain management. Many important game theoretic
concepts such as Nash equilibrium solution concept, Stackelberg game, Mechanism Design,
Shapley value allocation scheme and incomplete information game theory have been im-
plemented to model the interactions between players. Recent works have concentrated on
issues concerned with (i) asymmetric information and (ii) multiple-echelon supply chain.
This is because asymmetric information pattern causes uncertainty for predicting players’
motives and behaviors, while multiple players (more than two) increase the complexity
of interaction between supply chain members. In this thesis, we proposed several models
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comprising (i) two–echelon, i.e. seller and buyer, supply chain and (ii) three-person supply
chain. These models will be investigated by using both non-cooperative and cooperative
approaches, under both symmetric and asymmetric information scenarios.
1.2 Supply chain problems using game theoretical
approach addressed in the thesis
Most research applying game theory to supply chains assumed that shortages are not per-
mitted. In practice, shortages will inevitably occur at some points during the production
cycle and will affect supply chain members’ decisions and profits accordingly. In order to
investigate the effect of shortages to supply chain members’ profits as well as consumer’s
welfare, we include shortage as a decision variable. We also investigate how this addi-
tional feature impacts on the profits of supply chain members allowing for competition
and cooperation between members.
Asymmetric information led to inefficiency in a supply chain due to a player’s uncer-
tainty of other players’ characteristics, commonly known as types. Compare to a symmet-
ric information situation, this uncertainty can result in a player, specifically the seller,
receiving a lower profit. Motivated by this observation, we propose a mechanism design
game to improve the seller’s profit by designing an incentive contract in order to extract
information from the buyer. Two contracts based on different types of the buyer are
studied in this thesis. The results show that both contracts have mutually improve both
players’ profits in this two–echelon supply chain.
The consumer is the terminal member of any supply chain, whose influence on supplier
and retailer’s decisions are vital. In this thesis, we propose a three–echelon supply chain
model by adding the consumer into the two–echelon seller–buyer model. The presence of
the consumer introduces another layer of interaction and permits members to establish
coalitions between themselves. Another interesting question that is raised concerns the
“fair” allocation of the profits if they work together in a cooperative environment.
We also introduce a three-echelon supply chain model with asymmetric information
and introduce Copula method to solve the problem of how to construct a distribution for
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the uncertainty that a player has of another player’s type. This method provides the best
way as far as we are aware of constructing a joint probability distribution by taking into
consideration that the associated type variables may be dependent and follow different
marginal distributions.
Finally, to demonstrate the practical applications of the game–theoretic approached
developed in this thesis, we apply them to analyze supply chains with credit option and
the Newsvendor problem incorporating a loss function for quality.
In summary, this thesis addresses the following research questions which I had at the
beginning of my PhD study:
Research Question 1: What is the effect of shortage to players’ strategies in two-
echelon supply chain games under symmetric information structure, based on rele-
vant assumptions about the demand?
Research Question 2: How to implement mechanism design in two-echelon supply chain
game with incomplete information? Can mechanism design improve supply chain
members’ profits?
Research Question 3: What is the effect of shortages to consumer’s welfare in three-
person supply chain games? How do coalitions among players and their Leader/Follower
positions in a non-cooperative Stackelberg game scenario affect supply chain mem-
bers’ decisions and profits?
Research Question 4: How to develop a Shapley value allocation scheme for three-
person supply chain members using a characteristic function that incorporates both
Nash and Pareto optimal solution concepts?
Research Question 5: How to assess player’s uncertainty over other players’ types by
applying Copula method in a three–person game, under an asymmetric information
environment?
Research Question 6: How to implement Stackelberg equilibrium concept in supply
chain related problems such as credit option policy by incorporating both symmetric
as well as an asymmetric information structure?
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1.3 Contributions
The major contributions met by this thesis are:
• Introduction of shortages into supply chain modeling.
We introduced shortage as a decision variable into our proposed models where two
scenarios have been considered: (i) seller-buyer supply chain, which consists of a
seller (or supplier) and a buyer (or retailer), and (ii) three-person supply chain,
which involves a supplier, a retailer and a consumer. The impact of shortages on
seller and buyer’s decisions and profits on each others as well as on consumer’s
welfare are studied through an investigation of non-cooperative Stackelberg game
and cooperative game.
• A study of mechanism design problem under asymmetric information.
We investigated a seller-buyer supply chain model under asymmetric information,
and proposed a mechanism design where the seller offers an incentive contract to
the buyer in order to extract information on the latter’s type. To carry out this
mechanism design, a direct revelation mechanism satisfying both incentive compat-
ibility and individual rationality conditions were employed. In order to obtain an
optimal contract based on decision variables, the Pontryagin Maximum Principle
was applied to solve a Hamiltonian system arising from the mechanism design.
• Introduction of consumer as an additional participant in the supply chain.
We incorporated the consumer as a player into the supply chain creating a three-
person game in the process. The consumer’s preference and purchasing decision
will influence both supplier and retailer’s decisions, and these decisions will affect
the consumer’s welfare. The interaction between players is investigated under both
a non-cooperative and cooperative game scenarios. In the cooperative situation,
a Shapley value allocation scheme is developed based on a characteristic function
constructed by incorporating both Nash and Pareto optimality solution concepts.
• Introduction of Copulas in coalitional games under asymmetric information.
The Bayesian game of incomplete information [65] dictates that the assessment
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of one player’s uncertainty over other players’ types can be described by a joint
probability distribution of the unknown types. We introduced Copula method to
model joint probability distribution functions of types in a three-person supply
chain game under an asymmetric information environment. These types are usually
correlated variables and could have different marginal distributions. The use of
copulas provides a method of constructing a joint distribution while not ignoring
these two important characteristics.
1.4 Structure of the thesis
We provide a brief outline of each chapter in the thesis not including Chapter 1.
Chapter 2 briefly describes some game theory concepts which will be employed to
solve the problems addressed in this thesis. We are only concerned in this thesis with one-
stage games where renegotiation is not allowed; therefore, repeated game is not included
as part of the discussion. This chapter also provides brief literature review of game
theoretical approaches in supply chain management by categorizing them into two classes,
ie. two–echelon and multiple–echelon supply chain, and by considering both symmetric
and asymmetric information structure.
Chapter 3 is concerned with a seller–buyer/supplier–retailer supply chain model, where
shortage is introduced as an additional decision variable. The demand is assumed to be
sensitive to both selling price and marketing expenditure. Under a symmetric information
structure, two non-cooperative Leader–Follower Stackelberg games are introduced, where
each takes turn assuming the leadership role. A cooperative game based on Pareto optimal
solution is also considered. The effect of shortages on supply chain members’ decisions and
profits are examined, and the advantages/disadvantages of players’ leadership position are
discussed.
Chapter 4 considers the implementation of mechanism design in a seller–buyer supply
chain game with asymmetric information. Here, demand is only known to the buyer
through price and marketing elasticity, the setup and production cost are only known to
the seller, and each player knows their own unit shortage cost. Due to uncertainty of the
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buyer’s type, the seller does not benefit from his leadership position in the Stackelberg
game under asymmetric situation. The mechanism design problem is one where the
seller proposes a contract in order to extract information on the buyer’s type. Two
types of contract are considered: one is based on buyer’s demand type and the other
is based on buyer’s unit shortage cost type. In order to obtain an optimal contract,
a direct revelation mechanism is employed by the seller incorporating both incentive
compatibility and individual rationality constraints. The mechanism design problem is
then an optimal control problem by introducing a Hamiltonian system and applying the
Pontryagin Maximum Principle to solve it.
Chapter 5 initiates the study of a three–person supply chain model consisting of a
supplier, a retailer and a consumer, where the consumer is a new figure in the supply
chain. The new member introduces several layers of interaction among the participants
due to the likelihood of coalitions between the players. The interaction between supply
chain members’ are considered under two scenarios: (i) no coalition is formed among the
players and each acts non-cooperatively, and (ii) a selection of two players act coopera-
tively by forming coalition against the third player. Several non-cooperative Stackelberg
games are modeled under a symmetric information structure, and both analytical and
numerical results obtained. The welfare of the consumer is examined analytically as well
as numerically in cases where she assumes the leadership position or in a coalition with
the retailer.
Chapter 6 provides several allocation schemes for three–person supply chain under
symmetric information. A non-cooperative game solution based on Nash equilibrium
concept and several coalitional games solution based on Pareto optimality concept are
provided. The novelty of this chapter is the construction of a characteristic function
incorporating both Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimal solution concepts in such a
manner that the power structure of members of the coalitions can be properly described.
An allocation scheme based on Shapley values is also developed using this characteristic
function.
Chapter 7 concerns the three–person supply chain game under asymmetric informa-
tion structure. A novel feature of this chapter is the introduction of Copulas in order to
12
construct a joint probability distribution for assessing one player’s uncertainty over other
players’ types, where these types may be correlated and have different marginal distribu-
tions. Several non-cooperative Stackelberg games are introduced in cases where (i) there
is no coalition among players, and (ii) two (any two) of three players form a coalition
against the remaining player. A selection of copulas within the Archimedean family are
used in numerical examples to illustrate our approach. The results suggest that players’
expected profits depend on the choice of copula function, marginal distributions and the
scale of dependency between players’ types.
In Chapter 8, we discuss two applications of game theory to current problems in
supply chain management. In the first application, we consider two scenarios where, in
the first scenario, the seller offers a credit period option to the buyer in order to induce
the buyer to increase her order quantity and, in the second scenario, the buyer extends
the length of existing credit period in order to ease her financial pressure by offering to
share stock holding cost incurred by the seller. The interaction between the seller and
buyer are investigated through several Stackelberg games under both symmetric as well
as asymmetric information structure. In the second application, a manufacturer produces
a single product and sells it to a buyer/retailer at a fixed price. At the beginning of
each production period, the buyer is interested in determining her order quantity in order
to meet the demand. The manufacturer faces uncertainty regarding to the quality of
the product, which is assumed to be normally distributed with unknown process mean.
The manufacturer’s objective is then to determine the unknown process mean such that
the required quality standard can be satisfied. If a product is not in conformance to
the required quality standard, the manufacturer will lose profit, and the buyer will lose
customer’s good will which is described by a loss function. Stackelberg game concepts
are applied to investigate the interaction between manufacturer and buyer/retialer under
both symmetric and asymmetric information scenarios.
Chapter 9 concludes this thesis where we discuss possible future works arising out of
the thesis which can be investigated using various approaches and techniques developed
here.
Overall, the supply chain games studied in this thesis can be classified into two cate-
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gories: non-cooperative game and cooperative game and by considering the information
structure under symmetric and asymmetric pattern. Chapter 3 and 4 focus on two-player
(seller and buyer) supply chain games, and this is then extended to three-player supply
chain games by letting the consumer joins the chain as a player. These three-person
games are investigated from Chapter 5 to Chapter 7. In addition to the games studied,
in Chapter 8 we also investigate two different supply chain games to demonstrate the
application of Stackelberg game in supply chain management.
All notations, including decision variables, are collected in the Appendix where the
page numbers when they first appear are also mentioned.
All numerical works are implemented using the Optimization and DEtools subroutines
in the mathematical software Maple 16.
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mentable with a mechanism design (under review).
3. Zhang, X. and Zeephongsekul, P., 2013. Shapley value and other allocation schemes
for three-person supply chain games (under review).
4. Zhang, X. and Zeephongsekul, P., 2013. Game theoretical models of two-level sup-
ply chain with a strategic consumer. International Journal of Inventory Research,
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5. Zhang, X. and Zeephongsekul, P., 2013. Asymmetric information supply chain
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264–273.
14
6. Zhang, X., Zeephongsekul, P. and Esmaeili, M., 2012. Seller-buyer supply chain
games where shortages are permitted. Journal of Management and Strategy, 3(4),
1–14.
Conference proceedings:
1. Chen, C.H., Zhang, X. and Zeephongsekul, P., 2014. A game-theoretic approach to
the Newsvendor supply chain, in: Proceedings of the 8th IMA International Confer-
ence on Modelling in Industrial Maintenance and Reliability (MIMAR), Wadham
and St Catherine’s College, University of Oxford, UK, pp. 49–55.
2. Zhang, X. and Zeephongsekul, P., 2013. Reliability for three-level supply chain, in:
Proceedings of the 19th ISSAT International Conference on Reliability and Quality
in Design, International Society of Science and Applied Technologies, Honolulu,
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Chapter 2
Game Theory Concepts and Their
Applications in Supply Chain
Management
As we discussed in Chapter 1, game theory is an essential tool for analyzing situations
involving conflict and collaboration between different rational players. The approaches
of game theory in application can be broadly classified as non-cooperative or cooperative
depending on the nature of interaction among players. Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium
are the most used solution concepts in non-cooperative game situation, whereas, the
Pareto optimality solution and allocation solution concepts such as Nash bargaining,
core, nucleolus and Shapley values are the most popular solution concepts for cooperative
games. Games with incomplete information pattern can be solved by using the Bayesian
game approach due to Harsanyi, and mechanism design may be employed to deal with
the uncertainty of players’ types, in order to achieve better outcomes. In this chapter, we
provide brief description of these and other game-theoretical concepts which have been
commonly applied in supply chain management. We also provide a literature review of
game theory application on supply chain related problems under two categories: two-
echelon supply chain and multiple-echelon/multiple-player supply chain.
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2.1 Preliminary concepts of game theory
2.1.1 Nash equilibrium concept
Nash equilibrium, introduced by Nash [112], is a fundamental solution concept in the
theory of non-cooperative game and the most widely applied game theoretical method in
economics. The theory is used to predict player’s behavior in static game when players
simultaneously chosen their strategies and do not communicate with each other. For the
convenance of describing this concept, we will use the following notations. Suppose that
for any player i ∈ N , where N = {1, 2, · · · , n} is the set of players, let Si be the set of
strategies available for player i, and S−i denote the Cartesian product set
∏
j∈N,j 6=i Sj.
Thus, S−i is the set of all possible combinations of strategies for all players except player
i. Using s−i denote a typical member of S−i, then, a member s of S =
∏
j∈N Sj can be
represented by s = (si, s−i), where si is a strategy in Si. The Nash equilibrium can be
defined as follows:
Definition 2.1. A combination of strategies s∗ = (s∗1, s
∗
2, · · · , s∗n) ∈ S is a Nash equilib-
rium point if it satisfies the following property
ui(s
∗
i , s
∗
−i) ≥ ui(si, s∗−i) ∀i (2.1)
In words, the Definition 2.1 says that if a combination of strategy s∗ is a Nash equi-
librium point, then no single player can gain higher payoff by deviating unilaterally from
Nash strategy if all the other players adhere to their Nash strategies.
Another way of expressing the inequality (2.1) is
ui(s
∗
i , s
∗
−i) = argmaxsiui(si, s
∗
−i) ∀i (2.2)
which can be treated as an optimization problem.
Equation (2.2) states that a Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies such that each player’s
Nash strategy is the best response to other players’ Nash strategies in the sense of opti-
mality.
It is well known that there are games where a Nash equilibrium point does not exist
in pure strategies. A pure strategy refer to a single action that is selected by player from
17
available set of actions. However, if we enlarge the space of available strategies to include
mixed strategies, which is a probability distribution over player’s pure strategies, then the
Nash equilibrium point will always exist within this larger set. The following theorem is
one of most celebrated result of game theory due to J. Nash.
Theorem 2.1. In any finite noncooperative game, there is at least one Nash equilibrium
point in mixed strategies.
Consider a two-person non-cooperative game with u1(x1, x2) and u2(x1, x2) as the
utility function of player 1 (P1) and player 2 (P2) respectively. x1 ∈ S1 and x2 ∈ S2
represent the strategies chosen by P1 and P2 over their respective feasible strategy set S1
and S2. Each player’s objective is to determine their strategy in order to maximize their
utility. Suppose P1 chooses the strategy x1 = x
∗
1 and P2 chooses the strategy x2 = x
∗
2,
then, according to equation (2.2) in Definition 2.1, assuming u1 and u2 differentiable,
then the necessary conditions for the pair (x∗1, x
∗
2) is to be a Nash equilibrium are:
∂u1(x1, x
∗
2)
∂x1
|x1 =x∗1 = 0 (2.3)
∂u2(x
∗
1, x2)
∂x2
|x2 =x∗2 = 0 (2.4)
The following example (taken from Binmore [10] and Rasmusen [124] with modification)
demonstrates how to obtain the Nash equilibrium for a nonzero-sum two-person non-
cooperative game.
Example 1. (Cournot duopoly game)
Suppose two firms playing Cournot (quantity) competition of producing product at cost
of $c per item. Each firm would determine its optimal quantity Qi, i = 1, 2, where each
Qi is selected from the interval [0,M ], M is a fixed value much larger than c. Assume
that the supply is equal to the demand d, ie., d = Q1 + Q2, thus, the price per item is
given by p = M − d = M −Q1 −Q2. The payoffs to firms are their profits which can be
expressed as:
ui(Q1, Q2) = (M −Q1 −Q2 − c)Qi i = 1, 2 (2.5)
To obtain the Nash equilibrium strategy for Firm 1 and Firm 2 who attempt to maximize
their profits, we notice that u1(Q1, Q2) is concave in Q1 for a fixed Q2, and u2(Q1, Q2) is
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concave in Q2 for fixed Q1, then by referring equations (2.3) and (2.4), the derivative
of u1(Q1, Q2) with respect to Q1, and u2(Q1, Q2) with respect to Q2 yield the following
equations:
∂u1
∂Q1
= M − 2Q1 −Q2 − c = 0 (2.6)
∂u2
∂Q2
= M −Q1 − 2Q2 − c = 0 (2.7)
Solve equations (2.6) and (2.7) simultaneously, we obtain the Nash equilibrium point as
Q∗1 = Q
∗
2 =
M−c
3
. Substituting this equilibrium into firms’ profit function (2.5) yield the
optimal profit for Firm 1 and Firm 2 respectively as u1 = u2 =
(M−c)2
9
.
It is easy to check that if one firm moves away from the equilibrium strategy while the other
firm does not, then the profit for the firm who moved away from the Nash equilibrium will
get worse. Therefore, the Nash equilibrium is a stable solution concept for non-cooperative
game, and it is acceptable for all players.
2.1.2 Stackelberg equilibrium concept
Another commonly used solution concept in non-cooperative game is the Stackelberg
equilibrium due to von Stackelberg [159], where for a nonzero-sum two-person game, one
of the players is more dominant than the other player. Such game can be modeled as two-
stage hierarchical game known as a Stackelberg game, where the dominant player, the
leader, is allowed to make the first move; the weaker player, the follower, who retaliates
by playing the best move consistent with available information initiated by the leader’s
move. The leader then responds by selecting the best decision based on the follower’s
decision.
The classical two-player version of Stackelberg game is described as following:
Let Si (i = 1, 2) be the admissible strategy set of player 1 (P1) and player 2 (P2) with
corresponding utility function ui(s1, s2) respectively. Each player desires to maximize
their own utility function whose value depends on both players’ strategies. The two-
stage of Stackelberg game proceeds as follows: (i) the leader announces his strategy, the
follower then responds rationally by choosing a strategy that results in maximizing his
utility function; and (ii) the leader then selects a strategy that results in maximizing his
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own utility function. A generalized Stackelberg equilibrium solution can be obtained as
follows [93, 102]:
Let R2(s1) be the reaction set of P2, ie.,
R2(s1) = {s2 ∈ S2 : u2(s1, s2) ≥ u2(s1, s′2) ∀s
′
2 ∈ S2}
then, for any given strategy s1 ∈ S1 of P1, P2 selects his best response from the reaction
set, such that
s2(s1) = argmins2 ∈R2(s1) u1(s1, s2) (2.8)
further, P1 then selects his best strategy s∗1, such that
s∗1 = argmaxs1 ∈S1u1(s1, s2(s1)) (2.9)
then, (s∗1, s
∗
2) with s
∗
2 = s2(s
∗
1) is a generalized Stackelberg strategy pair with P1 as the
leader and P2 as the follower.
This provides a general solution for a Stackelberg game when the follower’s reaction set
to the leader’s announced strategy is not necessary a singleton. However, if the follower’s
optimal response to leader’s strategy is unique, ie., the follower’s reaction set is singleton
or a function of leader’s strategy, then the generalized Stackelberg equilibrium reduced to
a special case which is defined as follows:
Definition 2.2. If there exists a mapping T : S1 → S2 such that for any given s1 ∈ S1
u2(s1, T (s1)) ≥ u2(s1, s2) ∀s2 ∈ S2 (2.10)
and if there further exists a s∗1 ∈ S1 such that
u1(s
∗
1, T (s
∗
1)) ≥ u1(s1, T (s1)) ∀s1 ∈ S1 (2.11)
then, (s∗1, s
∗
2) with s
∗
2 = T (s
∗
1) is a Stackelberg strategy pair with player 1 as the leader and
player 2 as the follower.
Definition 2.2 provides a recipe for obtaining Stackelberg equilibrium when the fol-
lower’s reaction set can be expressed as a function of leader’s announced strategy. We
will apply this solution concept to solve Stackelberg games which are addressed in this
thesis.
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The following example illustrates the process of how to obtain a equilibrium solution
of Stackelberg game when the follower’s reaction set is singleton.
Example 2.(Cournot duopoly Stackelberg game)
Consider the Cournot duopoly game described in Example 1. We apply the Stackelberg
game by assuming Firm 1 is the leader who makes the initial move, and Firm 2 is the
follower who responses with its best strategy. For an announced strategy Q1 of Firm
1, Firm 2’s reaction set is determined by equation (2.7), which yields Q2 =
M−c−Q1
2
, a
singleton. Therefore, by using Definition 2.2, the Stackelberg equilibrium can be obtained
by solving leader’s maximization problem subject to the follower’s reaction function as
max u1(Q1, Q2) = (M −Q1 −Q2 − c)Q1
subject to Q2 =
M − c−Q1
2
.
The solution for this problem is (Q∗1, Q
∗
2) = (
M−c
2
, M−c
4
), which is the Stackelberg equilib-
rium solution with Firm 1 as the leader and Firm 2 as the follower. The corresponding
profits for the two firms are: u1 =
(M−c)2
8
and u2 =
(M−c)2
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.
By comparing the results with those obtained from Example 1, we see that the Stackel-
berg equilibrium differs from the Nash equilibrium, where Firm 1’s optimal quantity has
increased whereas Firm 2’s has decreased. This results in increasing Firm 1’s profit but
decreasing Firm 2’s profit, which suggests that the leader has the first move advantage in
Stackelberg game when information is available to all players.
2.1.3 Bayesian-Nash equilibrium concept
In the previous sections, we have defined Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium under sym-
metric information structure, where the rule of game and relevant information related
to game are known to all players. However, in many situations, some players may not
know the relevant characteristics of their opponents such as payoffs, strategies or even
their beliefs. Such game is said to have incomplete information. Games of incomplete
information could not be analyzed until 1967 when Harsanyi [65] proposed, in a series
papers written during 1967 and 1968, that any game of incomplete information could be
remodeled as a game of complete but imperfect information with a initial move chosen
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by Nature between different sets of rules, in such way that the transformed game can be
analyzed with standard techniques without changing the essentials of the game.
A game of incomplete information or equivalently the Bayesian game is normally
described by the following representation:
Γi = (N, (Ai)i∈N , (Ti)i∈N , (pi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N) (2.12)
The components which constitute games of incomplete information are:
1. A set of players N = {1, 2, · · · , n};
2. A set of actions Ai available to each player i ∈ N ;
3. A set of possible types Ti for each player i ∈ N ;
4. A probability function (or density function) pi over Ti;
5. A payoff or utility function ui(·) for each player i ∈ N .
Let T−i represent the set of all possible combinations of types for all players except player
i, then the probability pi(t−i|ti), t−i ∈ T−i is the conditional probability representing the
assessment of player i’s beliefs about other players’ types if his own type was ti. Define
the Cartesian product set A =
∏
i∈N Ai and T =
∏
i∈N Ti, ie., the set of combinations of
actions and types of the n players respectively, then the payoff function ui(·) is defined
over the set A × T . For example, given a typical member a˜ = (a1, a2, · · · , an) of A and
t˜ = (t1, t2, · · · , tn) of T , ui(a˜, t˜) is the payoff to player i if players’ actions are determined
by a˜ and their types are specified by t˜. Note that in a game of incomplete information,
nature reveals ti to player i but not to any other players. Moreover, players’ actions
(strategies) are functions of their types, ie., player i’s strategy s(ti) = ai is a function
from Ti to Ai.
The following definition provides the prescription for determining an equilibrium point
for games of incomplete information (Bayesian games).
Definition 2.3. In a game of incomplete information or Bayesian game given by (2.12),
the strategies (s∗1, s
∗
2, · · · , s∗n) are a (pure strategy) Bayesian-Nash equilibrium if for each
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player i and with type ti, s
∗
i (ti) is the solution of
maxai∈Ai
∑
t−i∈T−i
ui(s
∗
1(t1), s
∗
2(t2), · · · , s∗i−1(ti−1), ai, s∗i+1(ti+1), · · · , s∗n(tn); t)pi(t−i|ti)
(2.13)
The existence of Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is an immediate consequence of the ex-
istence Nash equilibrium. However, in a game with incomplete information, since each
player is uncertain of other players’ types, each player’s own beliefs about the distribution
of other players’ types and their type-contingent strategies are essential for determining
the equilibrium, hence the weighting of the player’s payoff or utility functions. As a con-
sequence, each player must optimize his payoff or utility as an expected value which based
on these weights.
Consider a non-cooperative game of incomplete information involving two players,
where N = {1, 2} with density function pi(·), i = 1, 2, then (2.13) in Definition 2.3
reduce to:∫
t2∈T2
u1(s
∗
1(t1), s
∗
2(t2); t1, t2)p1(t2|t1)dt2 ≥
∫
t2∈T2
u1(a1, s
∗
2(t2); t1, t2)p1(t2|t1)dt2
∀a1 ∈ A1, ∀t1 ∈ T1 (2.14)
and∫
t1∈T1
u2(s
∗
1(t1), s
∗
2(t2); t1, t2)p2(t1|t2)dt1 ≥
∫
t1∈T1
u2(s
∗
1(t1), a2; t1, t2)p2(t1|t2)dt1
∀a2 ∈ A2, ∀t2 ∈ T2 (2.15)
In the following, we provide an example to illustrate the application of Definition 2.3 for
obtaining the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in game of incomplete information.
Example 3. (Cournot duopoly with incomplete information pattern)
Consider the Cournot duopoly game described in Example 1 with incomplete information
pattern where each firm is uncertain of its opponent’s unit cost of production. Suppose
that Firm 1’s true cost of production is $a per item, and Firm 2’s is $b per item, thus,
the payoff function for Firm 1 and Firm 2 is given by
u1(Q1, Q2) = (M −Q1 −Q2 − a)Q1 (2.16)
and u2(Q1, Q2) = (M −Q1 −Q2 − b)Q2 (2.17)
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respectively.
Assume that each firm only knows its own cost of production which determines firm’s
type, ie., Firm 1’s type is a ∈ T1 and Firm 2’s type is b ∈ T2. We remark here that
Q1 = Q1(a) and Q2 = Q2(b), the strategy of each firm is the function of its type. Also,
Firm 2’s assessment of Firm 1’s true cost is expressed by the probability density function
f(a), and Firm 1’s assessment of Firm 2’s type is given by the same probability density
f(b). Thus, Firm 2 would expect that Firm 1’s cost of production to be the expected
value of a, ie., a¯ =
∫
T1
af(a)da. Similarly, Firm 1 would believe that Firm 2’s cost of
production is the expected value of b given by b¯ =
∫
T2
bf(b)db. Therefore, each firm would
expect its profit to be the expected value based on other firm’s type.
Firm 1’s expected profit can be calculated as:
pia(Q1, Q2) =
∫
T2
(M −Q1(a)−Q2(b)− a)Q1(a)f(b)db (2.18)
and Firm 2’s expected profit is given by
pib(Q1, Q2) =
∫
T1
(M −Q1(a)−Q2(b)− b)Q2(b)f(a)da (2.19)
By referring equations (2.14) and (2.15), the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is determined
by the following two equations
∂pia(Q1, Q2)
∂Q1
=
∫
T2
(M − 2Q1(a)−Q2(b)− a)f(b)db = 0 (2.20)
∂pib(Q1, Q2)
∂Q2
=
∫
T1
(M −Q1(a)− 2Q2(b)− b)f(a)da = 0 (2.21)
Solving equation (2.20) gives
Q∗1(a) =
M − a− Q¯2
2
(2.22)
where
Q¯2 =
∫
T2
Q2(b)f(b)db (2.23)
Similarly, solving equation (2.21) gives
Q∗2(b) =
M − 2b+ Q¯2 + a¯
4
(2.24)
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Substituting (2.24) into (2.23) will result in
Q¯2 =
M + a¯− 2b¯
3
(2.25)
Putting (2.25) back into equations (2.22) and (2.24) yield
Q∗1(a) =
2M − 3a− a¯+ 2b¯
6
and Q∗2(b) =
2M − 3b+ 2a¯− b¯
6
which is the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium.
From the above result, we notice that the optimal outcome for each firm is depending
on its assessment or belief to other firm’s type. However, if information are symmetric, ie.,
it is common knowledge that Firm 1’s unit cost is the same as Firm 2, then a = b = a¯ = b¯
and the results reduce to those obtained from Example 1 in Section 2.1.1.
If one party consists of two or more players in a coalition, the joint probability dis-
tribution of the types of the members of the coalition can be determined using Copula
method. This will be discussed in Chapter 8.
2.1.4 Mechanism design
Mechanism design is a contract in games of incomplete information. Its formal treat-
ment begins with Hurwicz [68] dealing with problems often raised in economic and social
interactions, where certain rules are created by individuals or organizations in order to
achieve certain desirable objectives. Examples of such games include design of auctions,
government taxation rule, design insurance contracts, monopolistic price discrimination
and design for provision public goods. All these games are characterized by a player called
“principal” who would like to condition his actions on some information privately held by
the other player (or players), called “agent(s)”. The principal could simply ask the agent
to reveal her information, but the agent will not report it truthfully unless the principal
can provide incentive for the agent to do so, either through monetary payment or some
instruments that he controls. Since providing an incentive is costly, the principal will face
a tradeoff which often results in an inefficient outcome.
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Mechanism design is typically studied as a three-step game of incomplete information,
where the agents’ types are private information, whereas the principal is assumed to
choose the mechanism which is conditional on agents’ types that maximizes his expected
utility [49]. In step 1, the principal design a “mechanism” or “contract” where agents send
costless messages, and “allocation” which depend on the realized messages. The messages
announced by the agents can have many types as we can imagine. In step 2, the agents
simultaneously accept or reject the mechanism. An agent who reject the mechanism
receives some specified “reservation utility”, usually a type-independent constant. In step
3, the agents who accept the mechanism will be expected to play the game specified by
the mechanism.
Because a game of mechanism design can have many stages with numerous agents’
types, also the type-dependent contract that the principal can offer will be huge, therefore
using standard Bayesian equilibrium concept, it would be impossible to obtain the optimal
contract that maximize the principal’s expected utility. Fortunately, a simple but funda-
mental result called the Revelation Principle shows that to obtain the highest expected
utility, the principal can restrict his attention to direct revelation mechanism, which only
required that all agents accept the mechanism at step 2, and truthfully announce their
types at step 3. The Revelation Principle basically tells us that any objective that can
be achieved by any mechanism can actually be achieved by direct revelation mechanism
which is individual rational and incentive compatible.
In the following, we will consider a game with mechanism design by considering a single
agent problem (taken from Fudenberg and Tirole [49] with modification) where a seller
produces a product at constant marginal cost c, and sell quantity q ≥ 0 of this product to
a potential buyer. The buyer’s utility is θv(q) − t, where θv(q) is buyer’s gross revenue,
and t is the monetary transfer from the buyer to the seller. Thus, the seller received the
payoff t− cq. We assume that v(0) = 0, v′ > 0, v′′ < 0. v(·) is common knowledge, but θ
is the private information of the buyer which is unknown to the seller. In order to extract
the buyer’s private information about θ, the seller would like to design a mechanism (or
contract) [q(θ), t(θ)], which is conditional on buyer’s type, specifying how much the buyer
need to pay if her order quantity is q. The parameter θ reflects consumer’s preference of
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the product, and it can take any value between θ and θ¯. The seller’s beliefs about θ are
given by a cumulative distribution function F (θ) with a density function f(θ) > 0 for all
θ ∈ [θ, θ¯]. Assume that the buyer accepts the mechanism, then the game can proceed by
following the direct revelation mechanism provided that it satisfies incentive compatibility
and individual rationality conditions. The optimal mechanism then can be obtained by
maximizing seller’s expected utility
E(u0(q(θ), t(θ), θ) =
∫ θ¯
θ
[t(θ)− dq(θ)]f(θ)dθ (2.26)
The buyer’s utility function is
u1(q(θ), t(θ), θ) = θv(q(θ))− t(θ) (2.27)
Given a direct mechanism, before the buyer accepts the offer from the seller, the two
conditions, ie., incentive compatibility and individual rationality, must be satisfied. Us-
ing buyer’s utility function (2.27), we define the incentive compatibility and individual
rationality conditions for a type θ buyer, which the seller has to respect when obtaining
the optimal contract. A type θ buyer will find that it is a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium to
report her type truthfully.
Incentive Compatibility–IC condition
A direct mechanism is incentive compatible if for every reported type, truth–telling is a
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, that is, if:
θv(q(θ))− t(θ) ≥ θv(q(θˆ))− t(θˆ) ∀θ, θˆ ∈ [θ, θ¯] (2.28)
For a rational buyer who will voluntarily participate in the game only if her utility no
less than her reserved utility, say zero. The following definition of individual rationality
captured this condition.
Individual Rationality–IR condition
A direct mechanism is individual rational if the buyer’s utility conditional on her type is
nonnegative, that is, if:
θv(q(θ))− t(θ) ≥ 0 ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ¯] (2.29)
In order to solve this mechanism design problem, it is also required that the single
crossing condition hold. The single crossing condition is simply a requirement that the
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decision variable q(θ), conditional on type θ, is monotonic on θ. It turns out that condition
(2.28) implies q(θ) is increasing in θ. To see this, suppose there are two types θ and θ
′
,
where θ > θ
′
. The incentive compatibility condition required that
θv(q(θ))− t(θ) ≥ θv(q(θ′))− t(θ′)
θ
′
v(q(θ))− t(θ) ≤ θ′v(q(θ′))− t(θ′)
Subtracting these two inequalities yield v(q(θ)) ≥ v(q(θ′)). Since v′ > 0, hence q(θ) ≥
q(θ
′
), which implies q(θ) is increasing in θ.
Based on direct revelation mechanism, the seller’s problem then can be formulated as:
maxq(·),t(·) E(u0(q(θ), t(θ), θ)) =
∫ θ¯
θ
[t(θ)− cq(θ)]f(θ)dθ (2.30)
subject to (IC) θv(q(θ))− t(θ) ≥ θv(q(θˆ))− t(θˆ) ∀θ, θˆ ∈ [θ, θ¯] (2.31)
(IR) θv(q(θ))− t(θ) ≥ 0 ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ¯] (2.32)
For a type θ buyer who reports her type as θˆ with utility written as u1(θ, θˆ), Laffont and
Tirole [87] have proved that the necessary and sufficient condition for IC constraint to
hold is:
∂u1(θ, θˆ)
∂θˆ
|θˆ=θ = 0 (2.33)
That is:
t˙(θ) = θ
∂v(q(θ))
∂θ
(2.34)
where the dot on t represent the derivative of t with respect to θ.
By considering only the IC constraint (2.31), using equation (2.34), the seller’s problem
can be written as
maxq(·),t(·) E(u0(q(θ), t(θ))) =
∫ θ¯
θ
[t(θ)− cq(θ)]f(θ)dθ (2.35)
subject to t˙(θ) = θ
∂v(q(θ))
∂θ
(2.36)
The IR constraint need to be checked after obtaining the optimal contract to ensure that
it has been satisfied.
The seller’s problem (2.35) can now be solved as an optimal control problem by con-
structing a Hamiltonian system and applying the Pontryagin Maximum Principle. For
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more detail of analyzing mechanism design and the technique of obtaining the optimal
mechanism, we refer reader to Fudenberg and Tirole [49] and Laffont and Tirole [87].
The above method will be employed in Chapter 4, where we will introduce several mech-
anism designs in our supply chain models.
2.1.5 Shapley value allocation and core in cooperative game
Considering cooperative games involving three or more players, communication is allowed
between players so that they could work together to achieve an outcome better than those
from non-cooperative situation. To analyze such cooperative games, we must take into
account the possibility that all players or some subset of players might form a cooperative
coalition so that the player’s contribution to coalitions which he joined as a member
can be realized. The power or worth of the coalition usually described by a characteristic
function, such cooperative coalition games are often solved by implementing concepts such
as Shapley value [135], core [54] and nucleolus [132], in such way that the joint payoff
obtained by a coalition is “fairly” distributed among its members, so that no member
would feel compel to leave the coalition. The assumption of transferable utility is often
used in cooperative games, that is, players’ payoff can freely transfer among themselves
in the usual separable way, like money.
A cooperative game in coalitional form is a pair (N, v), where N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is
a finite set of players, and v : 2N → R is a characteristic function which satisfies the
following conditions:
1. v(∅) = 0
2. v(A ∪B) ≥ v(A) + v(B)
for A,B ⊆ N, such thatA ∩B = ∅.
Note that 2N is the set of all possible subset of N . The value v(A) can be interpreted as
a joint utility such as worth, power and profit which the coalition A is guaranteed if the
members of coalition work together cooperatively regardless what players in the counter–
coalition N−A does. The second condition is commonly referred to as the superadditivity
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property, which states that the worth of a larger coalition is guaranteed to be greater than
or equal to sum of worths of smaller coalitions.
The representation of the payoffs to the players in a coalition game is denoted by
the vector X = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) and is admissible if the components satisfy the following
properties:
1. xi ≥ v(i), ∀i (individual rationality)
2.
∑n
i=1 xi = v(N) (group rationality).
An admissible X is also known as an imputation of the cooperative game.
In a cooperative game, an optimal allocation scheme can be achieved by finding the
best set of imputations for the game. Among the many available methods that can be
used to accomplish this task, the Shapley value concept is appealing since it is simple to
apply and is based on a set of reasonable axioms.
The Shapley value assigned to a player i ∈ N is given by
ϕi(v) =
∑
J⊆N−i
|J |!(|N | − |J | − 1)!
|N |! [v(J ∪ i)− v(J)] (2.37)
where |A| refers to the number of players in a coalition A. If v is superadditive, the
Shapley values are easily shown to be admissible.
Example 4. (Shapley value allocation for three-person cooperative game) Consider a
three-person game with N = {1, 2, 3} where the characteristic functions are given as
v(∅) = v({1}) = v({2}) = v({3}) = 0, v({1, 2}) = 2, v({1, 3}) = 4, v({2, 3}) = 6 and
v({1, 2, 3}) = 10. The coalitions that exclude player 1 are: J1 = ∅, J2 = {2}, J3 = {3}
and J4 = {2, 3}. Using formula (2.37), the Shapley value for player 1 is calculated as:
ϕ1(v) =
1
3
(v(∅)− v(∅)) + 1
6
(v({1, 2})− v({2}))
+
1
6
(v({1, 3})− v({3})) + 1
3
(v({1, 2, 3})− v({2, 3}))
= 0 +
1
3
+
2
3
+
4
3
=
7
3
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Similarly, we can calculate the Shapley value for player 2 and 3, yeild
ϕ2(v) =
10
3
and ϕ3(v) =
13
3
respectively.
Thus, the Shapely value for players are found as ϕ = (ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3) = (
7
3
, 10
3
, 13
3
), where
a larger value has been assigned to player 3. This reflects the importance of player 3’s
contribution to the coalition that he participated in as a member.
The Shapley value provides an allocation scheme that balances negotiation power with
fairness. This leads to the situation in which the allocation scheme suggested by Shapley
value may be unstable, ie., the Shapley value may not be in the core of the cooperative
game (defined below) even though the core provides a set of allocation that consists exactly
those imputations which are acceptable to all players in a coalition.
The core is usually defined base on the characteristic function of cooperative game.
Let S 6= ∅ be a coalition of players and X = (x1, x2, · · · , xn) be an imputation. Denote
X (S) =
∑
i∈S
xi.
If S = ∅, we let X (∅) = 0.
Definition 2.4. Let C be a cooperative game with characteristic function v. The set C(C)
of imputation X such that
X (N) = v(N) (2.38)
and
X (S) ≥ v(S) (2.39)
for all S ⊆ N is called the core of C.
The definition of the core of cooperative game is very closely related to the concept of
domination which is well-known in game theory. Based on the notion of domination, we
have the following result [53].
Theorem 2.2. Let C be a cooperative game with characteristic function v. Then
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• (a) Every core allocation x ∈ C(C) is an undominated imputation.
• (b) If v is superadditive, then x ∈ C(C) if and only if x is undominated.
The fundamental existence theorem of core imputations, found independently by Bon-
dareva [11] and Shapley [136] known as Bondareva-Shapley theorem, is based on the con-
cept of a balanced collection of coalitions. For game with N players, let B ⊂ 2N\{∅} be
a collection of non-empty coalitions. The collection B is balanced if there exist numbers
λS > 0 for S ∈ B such that for every player i ∈ N :∑
S∈B:i∈S
λS = 1 (2.40)
In the following we state the Bondareva-Shapley theorem and a corollary related to a
three-player game according to Gilles [53].
Theorem 2.3. For any game v to have that C(v) 6= ∅ if and only if for every balanced
collection B ⊂ 2N with balancing coefficients {λS|S ∈ B} it holds that∑
S∈B
λS v(S) ≤ v(N) (2.41)
Corollary 2.1. Let v be a superadditive three-player game. Then C(v) 6= ∅ if and only if
v(12) + v(13) + v(23) ≤ 2v(123) (2.42)
In Example 4, since v({1, 2}) = 2, v({1, 3}) = 4, v({2, 3}) = 6 and v({1, 2, 3}) = 10, we
have v({1, 2})+v({1, 3})+v({2, 3}) < 2v({1, 2, 3}), therefore, according to Corollary 2.1,
this three-person game has a nonempty core. Furthermore, the imputation suggested by
Shapley value (ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3) = (
7
3
, 10
3
, 13
3
) is in the core, since for every coalition S ⊂ N ,
condition
∑
i∈S ϕi ≥ v(S) holds.
2.1.6 Pareto optimality solution concept
In the theory of cooperative game, apart from games that utilize the characteristic func-
tions, Pareto optimality is one of the solution concepts that is usually applied to solve
cooperative games. Pareto optimality was introduced by the prominent economist Pareto
32
[117]. An outcome of a game is Pareto efficient if and only if there is no other outcomes
that make every players at least well off and at least one player strictly better off. Let
N = {1, 2, · · · , n} be a set of players, and S = ∏i∈N Si be the set of all possible combina-
tions of strategies for all players. A typical member of S denote as s = (s1, s2, · · · , sn).
ui(s) be the utility function for player i defined on S. A strategy that is Pareto optimal
can be defined as follows [109, 103]:
Definition 2.5. A strategy, s∗ ∈ S, is Pareto optimal iff there is no other strategy, s ∈ S,
such that ui(s) ≥ ui(s∗) for every i ∈ N , and ui(s) > ui(s∗) for at least one i ∈ N .
Weakly Pareto optimal strategy is defined by:
Definition 2.6. A strategy, s∗ ∈ S, is weakly Pareto optimal iff there is no other strategy,
s ∈ S, such that ui(s) > ui(s∗) for every i ∈ N .
A strategy is weakly Pareto optimal if there does not exist other strategies that increase
all players’ utility. In contrast, a strategy is Pareto optimal if there is no other strategies
that will improve a player’s utility function with at least one that will do better. Thus,
based on Pareto optimal strategy, one player’s utility cannot be improved upon at least
one of the other players.
The most commonly used approach in multi-objective optimization is known as the
weighting method [18, 123], where a scale objective function is formulated using a weighted
sum of the individual objective functions. This method is also used to obtain Pareto
optimal strategy for players who work cooperatively. A Pareto optimal strategy for a
cooperative game applying the weighting method is defined as follows:
Definition 2.7. A strategy s = (s1, s2, · · · , sn) is Pareto optimal if s is the solution of
maxs∈S
n∑
i=1
ωi ui(s) (2.43)
provided that ωi > 0 for all i ∈ N , and
∑n
i=1 ωi = 1.
Therefore, in a cooperative game, the weighting method provides an approach which
can be used to obtain Pareto optimal solutions for players who participate in the game.
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2.2 Literature review of game theory application in
supply chain management
2.2.1 Two–echelon supply chain
Over the last few decades, game theory has been extensively applied in supply chain
management, which provide insight to a better understanding of the interaction and
coordination among supply chain members. There are huge body of works that have been
done in this area, especially on two-echelon supply chain comprising only two players. In
this section, we provide literature review on game theoretical approach to two-echelon
supply chain related problems, by considering players’ operations under a symmetric and
an asymmetric information pattern.
(a) Two-echelon supply chain with symmetric information
Most studies of game theoretical approach in supply chain management are based on
symmetric information assumption. For instance, Abad [1] studied a coordination prob-
lem between a vendor and a buyer for making decisions on lot sizing and pricing when
demand is price sensitive. The author formulated this problem as two-person fixed threat
bargaining game, and provided solutions based on Pareto efficient and Nash bargaining
solution concepts; Parlar and Wang [119] investigated a discounting and ordering deci-
sions problem involving a seller and a group of buyer in a game theoretical setting. In the
paper, the initial selling price of the seller and order quantity of the buyer are determined
based on Stackelberg equilibrium concept. A discount policy is then developed based on
this Stackelberg equilibrium. Cachon and Zipkin [17] considered a supply chain inventory
problem involving a single supplier and a single retailer in a competitive market facing
a stochastic demand. The authors studied two different inventory games for determining
base stock polices to minimize players’ costs. Using the response function, the authors
showed that each game has a unique Nash equilibrium solution, but it is not optimal
for the whole supply chain performance. Further, they showed that the system optimal
solution can be achieved as a Nash equilibrium by using a linear transfer payment. Abad
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and Jaggi [2] considered a seller-buyer supply chain where the seller offers a trade credit
option to the buyer. The authors considered both non-cooperative and cooperative situa-
tions among players for determining the trade credit policy. In the non-cooperative case,
the credit policy is determined by applying Stackelberg game. Under the cooperative
case, the credit policy is obtained based on Pareto efficient solution. Also, the authors
provide a credit policy using Nash bargaining solution with a fixed threat which is the
outcome resulted from Stackelberg game. Viswanathan and Wang [156] studied quantity
discounts and volume discounts problems in a supply chain that consists a single vendor
and a single retailer. In the paper, Stackelberg game has been employed to determine the
initial equilibrium that specifies the vendor and retailer’s inventory and pricing policy.
Recently, Esmaeili et al. [42] studied a seller-buyer supply chain with demand assumed
sensitive to both selling price and marketing expenditure. The interactions between seller
and buyer have been investigated by implementing Stackelberg equilibrium to several non-
cooperative games, and Pareto efficient solution to a cooperative game. Zhou et al. [175]
considered a two-echelon supply chain where a supplier sells a single product to a retailer,
who faces an inventory-dependent demand. Due to the retailer having a limited displaying
space and stocking capacity, the supplier offers trade credit to the retailer as an incentive
for increasing the order quantity from the latter. The authors formulated a supplier-
Stackelberg game to obtain the conditions for the supplier to design a trade credit policy,
which increases all supply chain members’ profits as well as overall chain profit. Aviv and
Pazgal [7] studied a supply chain concerning optimal pricing of seasonal goods with pres-
ence of strategic consumers. Two classes of pricing strategies have been discussed in this
paper: inventory contingent discounting strategy and announced fixed-discount strategy.
Under both strategies, the authors showed that it is optimal for consumers to purchase ac-
cording to thresholds which depend on personal valuations and arrival times to the store.
Levin et al. [97] considered a dynamic pricing problem involving a monopolistic company
and a group of strategic consumers. The authors modeled this problem as a stochastic
dynamic game, and proved the existence of a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium pricing
policy. The authors also provided equilibrium optimality conditions for both seller and
consumer.
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(b) Two-echelon supply chain with asymmetric information
In addition to the aforementioned literature, researchers have studied supply chain games
under an asymmetric information environment. For example, Corbett and deGroote [31]
studied a quantity discount policy problem of a supplier-buyer supply chain, where buyer
holds private information about her cost structure. The authors considered this sup-
ply chain game as a mechanism design problem, where the supplier designs an incentive
contract conditional on buyer’s unknown cost structure, in order to induce the latter in
revealing the information about her holding cost. The optimal contract derived by incor-
porating both incentive compatibility and individual rationality conditions. Furthermore,
the authors compare the optimal contract obtained under asymmetric information with
the one obtained under full information. Corbett [32] investigated several incentive con-
tract design problems concerning inventory stocks for a supply chain involving a supplier
and a buyer. In the paper, two cases of inventory contracting policies have been con-
sidered: (i) buyer designs an incentive contract when supplier has private information
about setup cost; (ii) supplier designs an incentive contract when buyer holds private
information about backorder cost. Using mechanism design of the principal-agent mod-
els, the author showed that the buyer’s optimal contract on consignment stock reduces
the impact of uncertainty regarding supplier’s setup cost, whereas the supplier’s optimal
contract on consignment stock level reveals that the supplier has to overcompensate the
buyer for the cost of stockout. Corbett et al. [33] investigated several incentive contracts
from supplier’s viewpoint in order to extract private information from the buyer. The
authors analyzed three general contracts, ie., wholesale-price, two-part linear and two-
part nonlinear schemes. Each of these schemes are investigated under full and incomplete
information regarding the buyer’s cost structure.
Moreover, Lau and Lau [88] studied some two-echelon supply chain games where
market demand is assumed to be dependent on retail price. The authors investigated
several Stackelberg games under both symmetric and asymmetric information structure
for determining players’ decisions on pricing and batch-size. Lau et al. [89] extend the
asymmetric information framework proposed in Lau and Lau [88], and provide a profit-
maximizing volume-discount scheme which is designed by the dominant manufacturer
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based on stochastic and asymmetric demand information. Sucky [145] proposed a co-
ordination of joint order quantity and lot size in a single buyer-single supplier system
as a bargaining solution. The author considered the case that the buyer has the mar-
ket power to implement his optimal policy, thus, to achieve a joint optimal policy, the
supplier designs an incentive contract with asymmetric information on the buyer’s cost
structure. The joint optimal policy derived through a bargaining process by employing the
screening model and incorporating both incentive-compatibility and individual-rationality
conditions. Chu and Lee [27] considered a voluntary information sharing problem between
a retailer and a vendor, where the information about the market demand is only known
to the retailer. The authors formulated the problem as a Bayesian game, and found that
in equilibrium, whether the retailer should reveal or withhold the information depends on
the cost of revealing the information and the nature of market demand signal that the
retailer receives. Burnetas et al. [14] investigated several quantity discount problems in
a supply chain model consisting of a single supplier and a single buyer, where demand is
only known to the buyer. The authors provide an optimal discount schedule as a solu-
tion to a mechanism design problem, along with an all-unit and an incremental quantity
discount policies.
Later, Esmaeili and Zeephongsekul [43] extended several symmetric information seller-
buyer supply chain models, which was proposed in Esmaeili et al. [42], to asymmetric
information case, where the seller’s setup/purchase costs are unknown to the buyer and
the buyer withholds certain information about the demand. In the paper, the interactions
between seller and buyer have been investigated through several non-cooperative Stack-
elberg games. In addition, the authors proposed a semi-cooperative game, where sharing
marketing effort has been used as an incentive scheme by the seller for extracting demand
information from the buyer. Ha et al. [63] studied an information sharing problem in a
manufacturer-retailer supply chain, where the retailer possesses private information about
the demand and the manufacturer offers a payment as an incentive strategy to extract de-
mand information from the retailer. The authors considered two cases of games, ie., retail
quantity competition in Cournot game, and retail price competition in Bertrand game.
Both games have been solved through the application of backward induction techniques.
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2.2.2 Multiple–echelon and multiple–player supply chain
In recent years, research on supply chain management has focused on multiple-echelon and
multiple-player supply chain. The relationship between supply chain members in multiple-
echelon/palyer supply chain are more complex than in two-echelon supply chain, due to
possible coalitions existing among the participants. In addition, asymmetric information
structure introduces an extra layer of complexity. Most studies on multiple-echelon/player
supply chain are mainly concerned with the interaction between supplier, manufacturer
and retailer. In the following, we provide literature review on multiple-echelon/player
supply chain in cases of symmetric as well as asymmetric information structure.
(a) Multiple-echelon and multiple-player supply chain with symmetric infor-
mation
An early investigation of game theoretical approach in supply chain involving more than
two players is provided by Wang and Parlar [162]. The authors considered a single-period
inventory problem in supply chain involving three retailers as a three-person game. Each
of them attempts to determine their own optimal order quantity. In non-cooperative
game, the optimal decision for each retailer is obtained by using Nash equilibrium so-
lution concept. For the cooperative game, retailers’ optimal strategies are determined
by considering whether the side payments are allowed or are not allowed. Viswanathan
and Piplani [155] studied a one-vendor, multiple-buyer supply chain coordination prob-
lem through the use of common replenishment time periods strategy. The vendor offers
a price discount as an incentive devise to induce all buyers to accept the strategy. The
optimal replenish period and price discount are obtained by applying Stackelberg game.
Slikker et al. [140] studied a supply chain with n retailers, each retailer facing a news-
vendor problem, where the selling product has a short life cycle. The authors considered
situations that retailers may coordinate their orders and transshipment to improve the
expected joint profit. The authors formulated several cooperative games, and applied the
coalition game theory to analyze these situations. They conclude that these news-vendor
cooperative games have non-empty cores. Quigley and Walls [121] investigated a supply
chain reliability problem involving multiple suppliers, where each supplier has been allo-
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cated a reliability target as part of whole chain reliability requirement. Based on Shapley
value, the authors proposed a mechanism for deriving a fair price for trading reliability
targets among suppliers. O¨zen et al. [115] studied a news-vendor problem involving mul-
tiple retailers with number of warehouses. The authors considered both cooperative and
non-cooperative situations among players, and applied core and Nash equilibrium solution
concepts respectively, for deriving allocation schemes for the participants.
Recently, Leng and Parlar [96] considered a multiple-supplier, single manufacturer
assembly supply chain, where the suppliers produce components of a product that is as-
sembled by the manufacturer. The authors analyzed several non-cooperative games based
on Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium solution concepts. Also, the authors introduced a
number of contracts to coordinate the supply chain, and developed an allocation scheme
based upon Shapley value method. Huang et al. [66] considered coordinating pricing and
inventory decisions making problem in a multi-level supply chain consisting of multiple
suppliers, a single manufacturer and multiple retailers. The authors formulated this prob-
lem as a three-level dynamic non-cooperative game. The optimal decisions are determined
through the application of Nash equilibrium solution concept. Zhang and Liu [172] stud-
ied a three-level green supply chain system involving a supplier, a manufacturer and a
retailer, where market demand correlated with product green degree. The authors con-
sidered the game under both cooperative and non-cooperative cases. Under cooperative
situation, Shapley value method has been employed to develop a revenue sharing mecha-
nism, and for the non-cooperative case, Stackelberg equilibrium was applied to derive the
optimal decisions for the participants.
(b) Multiple-echelon and multiple-player supply chain with asymmetric infor-
mation
For multiple-echelon/player supply chain games under asymmetric information structure,
sharing information among supply chain members is the key factor in improving whole
chain performance, and developing a “fair” allocation scheme is necessary to prevent
players from leaving the coalition. Raghunathan [122] considered the value of information
sharing problem among a manufacturer and multiple retailers, in which demand at the
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retailers may be correlated during a time period. Using Shapley value concept, the author
analyzed the expected allocation of the surplus generated from information sharing. The
impact of correlation among retailer demands on incentives and value of sharing infor-
mation are also discussed. Rosenthal [125] studied the problem of setting transfer prices
in a vertically integrated supply chain, in which the subsidiaries or divisions of a firm
share technology and transactions cost. By developing a cooperative game, the transfer
prices have been generated using Shapley value method in symmetric information case.
For games under asymmetric information case, the transfer prices have been obtained
from the solution to a linear program. Leng and Parlar [95] investigated an allocation
cost savings problem in a three-level supply chain, where the cost savings are achieved
from sharing demand information among a manufacturer, a distributor and a retailer.
The authors constructed a three-person cooperative game in characteristic function form
and derived the necessary stability conditions for each of five possible coalitions. Various
optimal allocation schemes have been obtained by implementing Nash arbitration, core,
Shapley value and nucleolus solution concepts of cooperative game theory. Ding et al.
[39] considered a three-level supply chain which consists of a manufacturer, multiple ho-
mogeneous distributors and multiple homogeneous retailers for sharing information and
allocating profits, due to cooperation among the participants. The optimal allocation
schemes have been derived by applying τ -value method of cooperative game theory.
In addition to the above literature, Nagarajan and Sosˇic´ [110] and Fiestras-Janeiro et al.
[46] provide literature review and extensions on application of cooperative game theory
to supply chain management.
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Chapter 3
Seller-Buyer Supply Chain Games
Where Shortages Are Permitted
3.1 Introduction
A seller - buyer supply chain, also refers to as a manufacturer (supplier) - retailer supply
chain [99], represents an idealized refinement of a process whereby the manufacturer
wholesales a product to a retailer, who then retails it to the consumer [21, 34, 168].
The supply chain system has been discussed and developed by many researchers during
the last few decades and they incorporated strategies such as seller - buyer coordination,
information sharing and business process management [79]. Much research have also gone
into finding the optimal seller’s and buyer’s policies related to variables such as selling
prices, order quantities and marketing expenditures.
In recent years, several supply chain mechanisms have been discussed in the liter-
ature such as quantity discount, credit option, return policies, quantity flexibility and
commitment of purchase quantity and they are all related to pricing. For example, a
model where demand is price sensitive has been proposed by Abad [1] who provided a
procedure of finding the optimal policy for both seller and buyer under a cooperative
structure. Similarly, the models used by Freeland [48], Lee and Kim [92], Kim and Lee
[81] and Sadjadi et al. [128] assumed that demand is influenced by marketing expenditure
and price. Corbett and deGroote [31] and Viswanathan and Wang [156] have shown that
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under a non–cooperative structure, coordination can be achieved through quantity dis-
counts. Abad and Jaggi [2] have considered the possibility of using trade credit to achieve
coordination in the seller–buyer supply chain and introduced a procedure for determin-
ing the buyer’s lot size and retail price. Recently, Esmaeili et al. [42] and Esmaeili and
Zeephongsekul [43] investigated interaction between seller and buyer in a supply chain
using both a non–cooperative and a cooperative game–theoretical approach, with sym-
metric and an asymmetric information pattern respectively. However, it is noticeable in
all the papers referenced that shortages are not permitted. But in reality, shortages will
inevitably occur at some points in the production cycle due to irregular production or
increased demand. The presence of shortages will force the buyer to order larger quantity
to offset the loss of profit and customers’ good will but this will increase her holding cost.
On the other hand, if the buyer faces a large shortage, she might seek alternative sources
of supply which will have an impact on the seller’s profit. Therefore, it is important to
control the shortage size at an optimal level, especially when facing a strategic consumer,
as a device to maintain price level and avoid having to salvage products [45, 144, 167].
In this chapter, we will present several seller-buyer supply chain models under a sym-
metric information structure based on the game–theoretical models introduced in Esmaeili
et al. [42]. In the models, demand is assumed sensitive to price and marketing expen-
diture, and lot size is determined by the buyer. A novel feature which is different from
current existing models, is the introduction of shortage as a decision variable. We will
explore the consequences of adding this new element into the existing models. Under
the umbrella of a non–cooperative game, we consider the interaction between seller and
buyer under two scenarios: (i) Buyer–Stackelberg game where the buyer is the leader
and the seller is the follower; (ii) Seller–Stackelberg game where the role is switched and
the seller becomes the leader and the buyer the follower. We also consider a cooperative
game approach where the buyer and seller work together to increase their profit and a
Pareto–efficient solution will be obtained for this case.
In Section 3.2 of this chapter, we provide some assumptions underlying the models. We
also provide discussion of model formulation from both the buyer’s and seller’s perspective.
In Section 3.3, the non–cooperative Seller–Stackelberg and Buyer–Stackelberg games will
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be discussed including their solutions and Section 3.4 is devoted to the cooperative game.
In Section 3.5, we present numerical examples illustrating the models, and also to compare
between the results obtained when shortages are allowed and when they are not allowed.
Section 3.6 is devoted to a sensitivity analysis involving price and marketing elasticities
and shortage costs. Finally, we conclude this chapter in Section 3.7 with some suggestions
for future work.
3.2 Assumptions and model formulation
All notations including decision variables and input parameters that are used in this
chapter can be found in Appendix A.
Assumptions
The proposed models in this chapter are based on the following assumptions:
1. Planning horizon is infinite.
2. Parameters are deterministic and known in advance under symmetric information
structure.
3. Lot size is determined by the buyer.
4. The annual demand depends on the selling price and marketing expenditure accord-
ing to Lee and Kim [92].
D(P,M) = kP−αMβ (α > β + 1, 0 < β < 1) (3.1)
5. Shortages are permitted due to irregular production capacity or unanticipated de-
mand, it is controlled by the seller in order to reduce its effect on the supply chain
system.
6. The production rate r is greater than demand rate d, and we assume that they are
linearly related according to the following equation:
r = ud, (u > 1). (3.2)
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3.2.1 The buyer’s model formulation
The buyer’s objective is to determine the ordering quantity Q (lot size), selling price P
and marketing expenditure M so that her net profit is maximized. The buyer’s annual
profit function is
Buyer’s profit = Sales Revenue - Purchase Cost - Market Cost - Ordering
Cost - Holding Cost - Shortage Cost.
The holding cost is expressed as a percentage of average positive inventory cost i.e. iVI
and shortage cost is expressed as a negative inventory cost, i.e. C1B. I and B can
be derived using the idea described by Johnson and Montgomery [78] according to the
inventory fluctuation diagram in Figure 3.1 below:
Q Im
      S
t1
t2
t3 t4
T=Q/d
Time (t)
Slope=d
Slope=r-d
Figure 3.1: Inventory fluctuation diagram
We remark that Figure 3.1 is a general inventory fluctuation diagram, so it can be
used for both buyer and seller to derive the positive inventory and negative inventory
during the time span of the inventory process.
According to Figure 3.1, the positive area on time span t1 and t4 represent the positive
inventory and, the negative area on t2 and t3 correspond to negative inventory. The
total period length is given by T = Q/d, and the purchasing (production) period is
Tp = t3 + t4 = Q/r. Thus, the positive inventory level Im can be calculated as
Im = Tp (r − d)− S = Q(1− u−1)− S
where u = r/d from assumption 6. Further, since
t1 =
Im
d
, t2 =
S
d
, t3 =
S
r − d, and t4 =
Im
r − d
44
then, the positive inventory area is:
1
2
t1 Im +
1
2
t4 Im =
[Q(1− u−1)− S]2
2d(1− u−1)
and the negative inventory area is:
1
2
t2 S + 1
2
t3 S = S
2
2d(1− u−1)
Therefore, dividing by the total period of duration T = Q/d to both positive and negative
inventory area, we obtain the average positive inventory and negative inventory as
I =
[Q(1− u−1)− S]2
2Q(1− u−1) and B =
S2
2Q(1− u−1)
respectively. Therefore the buyer’s profit function can be expressed mathematically as:
Πb(M,P,Q) = PD − VD −MD − AbD
Q
− iVI − C1B
= kP−α+1Mβ − kVP−αMβ − kP−αMβ+1 − AbkP−αMβQ−1
− [Q(1− u
−1)− S]2
2Q(1− u−1) iV −
C1 S2
2Q(1− u−1) . (3.3)
Lemma 3.1. The buyer’s profit function Πb(M,P,Q) in (3.3) is strictly Pseudoconcave
function with respect to P for fixed Q and M and, concave with respect to M and Q.
Proof
(i) Show that Πb(M,P,Q) is strict Pseudoconcave in P for fixed M and Q
In order to prove that function f is strict Pseudoconcave, let function f : S → En be
differentiable on S, where S is a nonempty set in En (Euclidean space). The function f is
said to be strict Pseudoconvex if for each distinct x1, x2 ∈ S with ∇f(x1)(x2 − x1) ≥ 0,
the inequality f(x2) > f(x1) holds. That is if f(x2) ≤ f(x1), then ∇f(x1)(x2 −x1) < 0
holds. Further, if −f is a Pseudoconvex function, then f is a Pseudoconcave function [9].
We want to prove that for fixed M and Q, Πb(M,P,Q) is a Pseudoconcave function
of P . That is −Πb(M,P,Q) is a Pseudoconvex of P .
Suppose that −Πb(M,P2, Q) ≤ −Πb(M,P1, Q), using equation (3.3), this is equivalent
to
D2 (V +M + AbQ−1 − P2) ≤ D1(V +M + AbQ−1 − P1) (3.4)
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where
Di = kP
−α
i M
β, i = 1, 2
We need to show that (3.4) implies
∇Πb(M,P1, Q)(P2 − P1) < 0
That is
D1
[
(α− 1)P1 − α(V +M + AbQ−1)
]
(P2 − P1) < 0 (3.5)
If we can show that
(a) P2 − P1 > 0
(b) V +M + AbQ−1 − P1 > 0
then (3.5) holds.
To show this is true, if (b) holds, ie.,
V +M + AbQ−1 − P1 > 0
since 0 < α− 1 < α (due to assumption of α in Section 3.2), then we have
P1 (α− 1) < α(V +M + AbQ−1)
which implies
(α− 1)P1 − α(V +M + AbQ−1) < 0
Since P2 − P1 > 0 and Di > 0, hence (3.5) holds.
Now, we will prove (a) and (b) by contradiction.
Suppose P2 ≤ P1, since Di = kP−αi Mβ, implies D2 ≥ D1. Further since
V +M + AbQ−1 − P2 ≥ V +M + AbQ−1 − P1
thus implies
D2 (V +M + AbQ−1 − P2) ≥ D1 (V +M + AbQ−1 − P1)
which is contradicting to (3.4), hence (a) holds.
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Next, suppose V +M +AbQ−1 −Pi ≤ 0 where i = 1, 2. Since P2 > P1 which proved
by (a), then D2 < D1, and
V +M + AbQ−1 − P1 ≤ V +M + AbQ−1 − P2 ≤ 0
this implies
D2 (V +M + AbQ−1 − P2) ≥ D1 (V +M + AbQ−1 − P1)
this is contradicting to (3.4), hence (b) holds.
Therefore, (3.5) holds, which complete the proof of (i).
(ii) Show that Πb(M,P,Q) is a concave function of M for fixed P and Q
This can be done by taking second derivative on Πb(M,P,Q) with respect to M , which
gives
∂2Πb(M,P,Q)
∂M2
=
βD
M2
[
(1− β)(V + AbQ−1 − P )− (1 + β)M
]
Since the buyer will never gain negative profit, therefore P > V + AbQ−1. By the
assumption of β in Section 3.2, we have 0 < β < 1, hence
(1− β)(V + AbQ−1 − P )− (1 + β)M < 0
which implies
∂2Πb(M,P,Q)
∂M2
< 0
proof of (ii) is complete.
(iii) Show that Πb(M,P,Q) is a concave function of Q for fixed P and M
Taking second derivative on Πb(M,P,Q) with respect to Q, yields
∂2Πb(M,P,Q)
∂Q2
= −2(u− 1)AbD + uS
2(iV + C1)
(u− 1)Q3
Since u > 1 from assumption 6, implies
−2(u− 1)AbD + uS
2(iV + C1)
(u− 1)Q3 < 0
hence
∂2Πb(M,P,Q)
∂Q2
< 0
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which complete the proof of (iii).
Therefore, by combining the proofs of (i), (ii) and (iii), we complete the proof.
Hence, the first order condition on Πb(M,P,Q) with respect to P,Q and M will
determine the unique P,Q and M that maximize the profit function, which results the
following proposition:
Proposition 3.1. Buyer’s optimal strategy for maximizing her profit function can be
obtained by solving the following equations:
P ∗(Q) = α(QV+Ab)
Q(α−β−1) (3.6)
M∗(Q) = β(QV+Ab)
Q(α−β−1) (3.7)
and
[i(1−u−1)2VQ2−(iV+C1)S2](V+AbQ−1)α−β = 2k(1−u−1)Abα−αββ(α−β−1)α−β. (3.8)
Proof By applying the first order condition with respect to P and M on profit function
Πb(M,P,Q), yield:
P (M,Q) = α[Q(V+M)+Ab]
Q(α−1) (3.9)
M(P,Q) = β[Q(P−V)−Ab]
Q(β+1)
(3.10)
Solving (3.9) and (3.10) simultaneously gives
P ∗(Q) = α(QV+Ab)
Q(α−β−1)
and M∗(Q) = β(QV+Ab)
Q(α−β−1)
Similarly, since Πb(M,P,Q) is a concave function of Q for fixed M and P , the first
order condition with respect to Q yields
Q∗(M,P ) =
√(
uS
u− 1
)2(
1 +
C1
iV
)
+
2uDAb
(u− 1)iV (3.11)
where D is the demand function (3.1). Alternatively, substituting (3.6) and (3.7)
into (3.3) and using first order condition with respect to Q yields
[i(1− u−1)2VQ2 − (iV + C1)S2](V + AbQ−1)α−β = 2k(1− u−1)Abα−αββ(α− β − 1)α−β.
(3.12)
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To obtain the optimal solution for buyer, we solve equation (3.12) for the largest positive
root as the optimal Q∗, then use (3.6) and (3.7) to obtain the optimal P ∗ and M∗. This
complete the proof.
3.2.2 The seller’s model formulation
The seller’s objective is to determine the optimal price V∗ and allowable shortage S∗ such
that his net profit is maximized. The annual profit function of the seller is
Seller’s profit = Sales Revenue - Production Cost - Setup Cost - Holding Cost
- Shortage Cost
or, mathematically
Πs(S,V) = VD − CsD − AsD
Q
− i Cs I − C2B
= kVP−αMβ − k CsP−αMβ − k AsP−αMβQ−1
− [Q(1− u
−1)− S]2
2Q(1− u−1) i Cs −
C2 S2
2Q(1− u−1) . (3.13)
Note that we have expressed the holding cost as a percentage of average positive
inventory of the production cost, i.e. iCs I and the shortage cost as an average negative
inventory of unit shortage cost i.e. C2B.
Since u > 1, the function defined by (3.13) is concave in S as
∂2Πs(S,V)
∂S2 = −
i Cs + C2
(1− u−1)Q < 0
Therefore, the first order condition with respect to S yields the unique S∗ that maximize
Πs(S,V) for fixed V which is given by
S∗ = Cs iQ(1− u
−1)
Cs i+ C2
. (3.14)
Substituting (3.14) into (3.13) gives
Πs(V) = VD − CsD − AsD
Q
− Cs iI∗s − C2B∗s (3.15)
where
I∗s =
C22Q(1− u−1)
2(Cs i+ C2)2
and B∗s =
C2s i
2Q(1− u−1)
2(Cs i+ C2)2
49
are the optimal positive and negative inventory respectively corresponding to S∗. Solving
Πs(V) = 0, we obtain a zero profit for the seller at
V0 = Cs + AsQ−1 + Cs iI∗s D−1 + C2B∗s D−1. (3.16)
where V0 is seller’s minimum selling price. Since equation (3.13) is a linear increasing
function of V , the optimal V∗ occurs at the highest price it is possible for the seller to
charge the buyer. Therefore, the seller may impose his marginal selling price W on V0 to
obtain optimal selling price as:
V∗ = WV0 = W (Cs + AsQ−1 + Cs iI∗s D−1 + C2B∗s D−1) (3.17)
The seller can obtain a suitable value for W through negotiation with the buyer, which the
former can bear while allowing the latter to make a profit. Therefore, for any given Q,P
and M , the optimal shortage and the price charged by the seller is S∗ and V∗ respectively.
We summarize the result in the following proposition:
Proposition 3.2. Seller’s optimal strategy for maximizing his profit function is given by
equations
S∗ = Cs iQ(1− u
−1)
Cs i+ C2
(3.18)
V∗ = W (Cs + AsQ−1 + Cs iI∗s D−1 + C2B∗s D−1) (3.19)
for W > 1.
3.3 The non-cooperative Stackelberg game
In this section, the seller and buyer interacts with each others through a non–cooperative
Stackelberg game, where one player acts as a leader and the other the follower. As we
described in Chapter 2, Section 2.1.2, the leader has the power to make the first move
and can enforce her strategy based on the follower’s best response. Based on the follower’s
best strategy, the leader will design a best strategy to maximize her profit.
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3.3.1 The Seller-Stackelberg model
In the Seller-Stackelberg model, the seller is the leader and the buyer the follower. For
a given V and S set by the seller, the buyer obtains the best lot size Q∗, marketing
expenditure M∗ and selling price P ∗ given by Proposition 3.1, which are the solutions
obtained by solving (3.6), (3.7) and (3.8) simultaneously. The seller then maximize his
profit with respect to V and S based on the triple Q∗, P ∗ and M∗. Thus the problem
becomes:
Max Πs(S,V) = VD − CsD − As D
Q
− i Cs I − C2B (3.20)
Subject to P ∗(Q) =
α(QV + Ab)
Q(α− β − 1)
M∗(Q) =
β(QV + Ab)
Q(α− β − 1)
and
[
i (1− u−1)2 VQ2 − (iV + C1)S2
]
(V+AbQ−1)α−β = 2 k(1−u−1)Ab α−α ββ(α−β−1)α−β
where α > β + 1.
Substituting P ∗(Q) and M∗(Q) into (3.20) reduces the problem to
Max Πs(S,V) = kα−αββ(α− β − 1)α−β(V + AbQ−1)−α+β(V − Cs − AsQ−1)
− i Cs Is − C2Bs (3.21)
Subject to
[
i (1− u−1)2VQ2 − (iV + C1)S2
]
(V + AbQ−1)α−β
= 2 k(1− u−1)Abα−αββ(α− β − 1)α−β (3.22)
transforming the problem into a constrained nonlinear optimization problem with three
variables V , S and Q(V ,S). The optimal solution can be found using any nonlinear
programming search tools such as Precondition Conjugate Gradient (PCG) method or
Sequential Quadratic Programming (SQP) method. We will use the nonlinear program-
ming subroutine in the Maple package to solve this problem and a numerical example will
be given in Section 3.5.
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3.3.2 The Buyer-Stackelberg model
Power has shifted from the seller to buyer in a Buyer-Stackelberg model where the buyer
is leader and makes the first move. For a given set of decision variables M,P and Q
selected by the buyer, the seller obtains the optimal shortage S∗ and the best selling
price V∗ given by (3.18) and (3.19) respectively from Proposition 3.2. The buyer then
maximize her profit with respect to M,P and Q based on the pair S∗ and V∗. Thus the
problem becomes:
Max Πb(M,P,Q) = PD − VD −MD − AbD
Q
− iVI − C1B (3.23)
Subject to S∗ = Cs i Q(1− u
−1)
Cs i+ C2
(3.24)
V∗ = W (Cs + AsQ−1 + Cs i I∗s D−1 + C2B∗s D−1). (3.25)
Substituting (3.24) and (3.25) into (3.23) reduces the problem to an unconstrained non-
linear optimization problem. A closed form solution derived through an application of
Geometric Programming with a 2nd degree of difficulty is given as following.
Geometric Programming Solution of the Buyer–Stackelberg Game
We show how Geometric Programming can be used to obtain a closed form solution
for Buyer-Stackelberg game.
Substituting (3.24) and (3.25) into (3.23), and after some algebra simplifications, the
problem becomes:
max Πb(M,P,Q) = kP
−αMβ
[
P −M −WCs − (WAs + Ab)Q−1
]
− A1Q− A2Q2 PαM−β − A3 (3.26)
where
A1 =
0.5iCs[C
2
2(W + 1) + iCs(C1 + C2)](1− u−1)
(iCs + C2)2
A2 =
0.25i2WCsC
3
2(1− u−1)2k−1
(iCs + C2)3
and A3 =
0.5iWAsC
2
2(1− u−1)
(iCs + C2)2
.
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We next transform this Signomial Problem with 2nd degree of difficulty into a Posino-
mial Problem by using the method developed by Duffin et al. [40]. The solution of the
Posinomial Problem can then be obtained by solving its Dual Problem. Ignoring the last
term which is constant in (3.26), the Posinomial Problem is:
maxZ = Πb or minZ
−1 (3.27)
subject to k−1 ZPα−1M−β + P−1M +WCs P−1 + (WAs + Ab)P−1Q−1
+ k−1A1 Pα−1M−β Q + k−1A2 P 2α−1M−2β Q2 < 1. (3.28)
Therefore the Dual Problem (DPZ)is:
max
(
1
ω0
)ω0 (k−1
ω1
)ω1 ( 1
ω2
)ω2 (WCs
ω3
)ω3 (WAs + Ab
ω4
)ω4 (k−1A1
ω5
)ω5 (k−1A2
ω6
)ω6
λλ
(3.29)
subject to 1 = ω0
0 = −ω0 + ω1
0 = (α− 1)ω1 − ω2 − ω3 − ω4 + (α− 1)ω5 + (2α− 1)ω6
0 = −βω1 + ω2 − βω5 − 2βω6
0 = −ω4 + ω5 + 2ω6
λ = ω1 + ω2 + ω3 + ω4 + ω5 + ω6.
The first constraint above is the normality constraint and the other constraints are the
orthogonality constraints. Since the degree of difficulty is 2, we can rewrite the constraints
in term of ω5 and ω6, i.e.
ω0 = 1
ω1 = 1
ω2 = β + βω5 + 2βω6
ω3 = (α− β − 1) + (α− β − 2)ω5 + (2α− 2β − 3)ω6
ω4 = ω5 + 2ω6
and λ = α(1 + ω5 + 2ω6).
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Substituting these constrains into (3.29), then taking logarithm, we can find the optimal
ω5 and ω6 through a line search. Finally, we obtain the optimal solution for P,M and Q
in term of ω5 and ω6 as follow:
P ∗ = WCs
α + αω5 + 2αω6
(α− β − 1) + (α− β − 2)ω5 + (2α− 2β − 3)ω6 (3.30)
M∗ = WCs
β + βω5 + 2βω6
(α− β − 1) + (α− β − 2)ω5 + (2α− 2β − 3)ω6 (3.31)
and Q∗ =
WAs + Ab
WCs
(α− β − 1) + (α− β − 2)ω5 + (2α− 2β − 3)ω6
ω5 + 2ω6
. (3.32)
3.4 The cooperative game
In this section, we apply a cooperative game approach to the seller-buyer supply chain
problem and examine whether both players can increase their profit if they work together
to jointly determine the optimal S,V ,M, P and Q. A Pareto-efficient solution, defined
as the outcome in which there is no other preferable outcome for both players, will be
obtained through the joint optimization of the weighted sum of the seller’s and buyer’s
objective functions according to Chapter 2, Section 2.1.6. The set of Pareto-efficient
solution can be derived by maximizing
Zsb = λΠs + (1− λ)Πb (0 < λ < 1)
That is
Zsb = λ(VD − CsD − AsD
Q
− i Cs I − C2B)
+ (1− λ)(PD − VD −MD − AbD
Q
− iVI − C1B). (3.33)
The first order condition with respect to V yields
λ∗ =
D + iI
2D + iI
(3.34)
which gives λ ∈ (0, 1) as is required.
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Next, using the first order condition with respect to Q,P,M and S yield the following
equations:
Q∗ =
√(
uS
u− 1
)2(
1 +
λC2 + (1− λ)C1
i(λCs + (1− λ)V)
)
+
2uD(λAs + (1− λ)Ab)
(u− 1)i(λCs + (1− λ)V)(3.35)
P ∗ =
α[(1− λ)(VQ+ Ab) + λ(As + (Cs − V)Q)]
Q(α− β − 1)(1− λ) (3.36)
M∗ =
β[(1− λ)(VQ+ Ab) + λ(As + (Cs − V)Q)]
Q(α− β − 1)(1− λ) (3.37)
and
S∗ = i Q(u− 1)[(1− λ)V + λCs]
u[(1− λ)(C1 + iV) + λ(C2 + i Cs)] . (3.38)
Pareto-efficient solution can be obtained by solving (3.34) to (3.38) simultaneously for
a fixed V , which can be determined through negotiation between seller and buyer.
Since the seller would never operate at a loss, using the negotiated V approach, it
is reasonable to expect that V > Cs + AsQ−1 + CsiI∗sD−1 + C2B∗sD−1 (from equation
(3.19) by assuming W > 1). Under this condition, by comparing (3.35), (3.36), (3.37)
and (3.38) with (3.6), (3.7), (3.8) and (3.18), we obtain the following interesting results:
1. The optimal selling price in a cooperative game is less than in a non-cooperative
game.
Proof : Let P ∗C and P
∗
N be the optimal selling price in a cooperative and a non-
cooperative game respectively. Note that P ∗C is given by (3.36) and P
∗
N by (3.6),
hence
P ∗C = P
∗
N −
αλ(V − Cs − AsQ−1)
(α− β − 1)(1− λ) . (3.39)
By equation (3.19) and since α > β + 1, 0 < λ < 1 and V > Cs + AsQ−1,
equation (3.39) implies P ∗C < P
∗
N .
2. Optimal marketing expenditure in a cooperative game is less than in a non-cooperative
game.
Proof : Let M∗C and M
∗
N be the marketing expenditure in a cooperative and a
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non-cooperative game respectively, i.e., M∗C is given by (3.37) and M
∗
N by (3.7).
Then
M∗C = M
∗
N −
βλ(V − Cs − AsQ−1)
(α− β − 1)(1− λ) (3.40)
and by equation (3.19), α > β+1, 0 < λ < 1 and V > Cs+AsQ−1, equation (3.40)
implies M∗C < M
∗
N .
3. Optimal lot size in cooperative game is greater than in Seller-Stackelberg game if
C2 ≥ C1 and As ≥ Ab.
Proof : Let Q∗C and Q
∗
s be the lot size in cooperative and Seller-Stackelberg game
respectively, i.e. Q∗C is given by (3.35) and Q
∗
s by (3.8). Equating the two terms
given by these two equations result in(
uS
u− 1
)2 (
1 +
C1
i (λCs + (1− λ)V)
)
+
2uDAb
(u− 1)i(λCs + (1− λ)V)
+
(
uS
u− 1
)2
λ (C2 − C1)
i(λCs + (1− λ)V) +
2uDλ (As − Ab)
(u− 1)i(λCs + (1− λ)V)
From the assumptions that Cs < V , it follows that when C2 ≥ C1 and As ≥ Ab,
this will imply Q∗C > Q
∗
s.
4. Optimal shortage in cooperative game is less than in a Buyer–Stackelberg game if
C1 >
V
Cs
C2.
Proof : Let S∗C and S∗b be the optimal shortage in a cooperative and a Buyer–
Stackelberg game respectively, i.e. S∗C is given by (3.38) and S∗b by (3.18). We
obtain
S∗C = S∗b −
iQ(u− 1)(1− λ)(C1Cs − C2V)
u[(1− λ)(C1 + iV) + λ(C2 + iCs)](C2 + iCs) (3.41)
Since Cs < V , 0 < λ < 1 and u > 1, when C1 > VCsC2, (3.41) implies S∗C < S∗b .
3.5 Numerical examples
This section presents numerical examples to illustrate some significant features of the
models established in the previous sections. A comparison between the results of the
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model with and without shortages (by letting S = 0) will also be made to reveal its effect
on both seller and buyer’s profit.
3.5.1 Numerical examples for non-cooperative and cooperative
game
Examples 1−3 below illustrate the Seller–Stackelberg, Buyer–Stackelberg and cooperative
model respectively. In these examples, we set k = 3500, α = 1.7, β = 0.15, i = 10%, Ab =
40, As = 140, u = 1.1,W = 1.25, C1 = 1, C2 = 1 and Cs = 1.5.
Example 1. The Seller–Stackelberg model produces the following optimal values for the
decision variables: S∗ = 28.54,V∗ = 4.60, Q∗ = 622.24,M∗ = 1.27 and P ∗ = 14.42. The
corresponding seller’s and buyer’s profit are Π∗s = 103.52 and Π
∗
b = 319.28 respectively.
Example 2. The Buyer–Stackelberg model produces the following optimal values for the
decision variables: S∗ = 16.83,V∗ = 2.07, Q∗ = 1419.10,M∗ = 0.55 and P ∗ = 6.26. The
corresponding seller’s and buyer’s profit are Π∗s = 58.71 and Π
∗
b = 499.72 respectively.
Comparing the two models, the marketing expenditure M∗ and selling price P ∗ are
smaller but the buyer has a higher profit Π∗b in the second model. The shortage is also
less indicating that the second model is better for the buyer. Since production capacity is
linearly related to the demand, the buyer is better informed about the end demand and
the lot size will be adjusted accordingly, so the buyer would gain more if he is the leader.
Also, a larger lot size Q∗ is preferred by the seller when she is the follower but her profit
will be less.
Example 3. We will obtain Pareto–efficient solution by assuming that seller and buyer
has negotiated an agreement on seller price V = 3. Using equation (3.35), (3.36), (3.37)
and (3.38), the optimal values are Q∗ = 2136.97, P ∗ = 4.88,M∗ = 0.43 and S∗ = 16.67.
From equation (3.34), λ = 0.5096 and finally we obtain Z∗sb = 290.61 using equation (3.33).
As expected from the results of the previous section, the selling price P ∗ and the
marketing expenditure M∗ of the cooperative game are less than in the non-cooperative
games. The profit obtained is more than the profit of the seller for both the Seller–
Stackelberg and Buyer–Stackelberg models. The lot size is also greater than in the non-
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cooperative games. Therefore, the seller would prefer the cooperative model to the non–
cooperative models. On the other hand, the buyer might also prefer the cooperative model
since the shortage in the cooperative game is less than in the non-cooperative games.
3.5.2 Numerical results from models with and without short-
ages
To obtain some understanding of the effects to both seller and buyer’s decision variables
and profits caused by shortages, it is worthwhile to compare the numerical results obtained
from the two cases. In the following, the symbol NS represents no shortage and all
parameters are the same as the ones used in the previous examples.
In the Seller–Stackelberg game, the optimal decision variables in the NS case are
VNS = 4.41, QNS = 284.02, PNS = 14.06 and MNS = 1.24. The seller’s profit is ΠNSs =
97.61 and the buyer’s profit is ΠNSb = 328.55. Compare with the corresponding results
from the shortage model, both buyer’s and seller’s selling prices are smaller in the NS
case as a consequence of the absence of shortage. Also, the order quantity and marketing
expenditure are larger than in the NS model. The seller’s profit in the shortage model
is larger than in the NS model, whereas the buyer’s profit is smaller in the NS model.
Hence, in the Seller–Stackelberg game, the seller has an advantage of being the leader and
controlling the shortage whereas for the buyer, the shortage has a negative impact on his
profit.
In the Buyer–Stackelberg game the corresponding results for theNS models are VNS =
2.09, QNS = 1303.71, PNS = 6.29 and MNS = 0.56. The buyer’s profit is ΠNSb = 496.07
and the seller’s profit is ΠNSs = 58.66. Comparing the results with the shortage model
show that the buyer has a lower selling price and large order quantity than in the NS
model. Both the seller and the buyer’s profit in the shortage model is higher than in
the NS model. This is due to the presence of shortage which induces the buyer to order
larger quantity in order to satisfy demand and avoid a loss of profit, which in turn would
favor the seller.
In the Cooperative game, the following results were obtained for the NS game: PNS =
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4.92,MNS = 0.43 and QNS = 1354.03. The optimal weight is λ = 0.5074 and the profit is
ZNSsb = 279.65. Comparing these results with the shortage case indicate that the buyer’s
selling price in the shortage model is less than in the NS model, resulting in a larger order
quantity as well as a larger profit. This further emphasizes the value of cooperation since
both seller and buyer can do better by cooperating with each others even in the presence
of shortages.
3.6 Sensitivity analysis
Since both seller and buyer’s profit will be influenced by demand function, which depend
on parameters α and β, thus, changes in α and β will affect both seller and buyer’s
decision and profit, either in non-cooperative game or cooperative game. Similarly, the
unit shortage cost C1 incurred to the buyer and C2 to the seller, also will directly affect
both players’ decisions and profits. Therefore, in this section, we provide a sensitivity
analysis by looking at the effectiveness of these parameters on players’ decisions and
profits. In the following, we will set W = 1.25 in the Buyer-Stackelberg model and the
negotiated selling price V = 3 in the cooperative model.
3.6.1 Sensitivity analysis with respect to α and β
In this section, we investigate the effects of parameters α and β on S∗,V∗, P ∗, Q∗,M∗,Π∗b
and Π∗s in the non–cooperative games through a sensitivity analysis. Similarly, the ef-
fects of parameters α and β on P ∗, Q∗,M∗,S∗ and Z∗sb will also be investigated in the
cooperative game. The input parameters will be the same as in the previous examples
but we allow α and β to vary. The results of these sensitivity analysis are summarized in
Table 3.1 to Table 3.6.
The effect of parameter α on decision variables S∗, Q∗, P ∗ and M∗ are displayed in
Figure 3.2. In each figure, the number 1, 2 and 3 refers to the Seller-Stackelberg, the
Buyer-Stackelberg and the cooperative game, respectively.
From the graphs, by increasing the parameter α, the buyer’s decision variables P ∗ and
M∗ decrease, regardless of whether the buyer is a leader or follower. So, the buyer’s deci-
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Table 3.1: Sensitivity analysis of the Seller-Stackelberg model with respect to α
α 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.5
P ∗ 14.42 9.75 8.44 6.75 5.71 5.34
V∗ 4.60 3.79 3.53 3.17 2.92 2.83
Q∗ 622.24 701.36 726.44 754.32 763.90 762.16
M∗ 1.27 0.77 0.63 0.46 0.36 0.32
S∗ 28.54 29.31 29.85 29.57 28.84 28.37
Π∗s 103.52 84.71 76.14 61.18 48.96 43.75
Table 3.2: Sensitivity analysis of the Seller-Stackelberg model with respect to β
β 0.07 0.09 0.15 0.19 0.21 0.25
P ∗ 11.40 12.06 14.42 16.47 17.67 20.55
V∗ 4.17 4.27 4.60 4.87 5.02 5.36
Q∗ 746.12 711.45 622.24 569.80 545.40 498.84
M∗ 0.47 0.64 1.27 1.84 2.18 3.02
S∗ 32.89 31.67 28.54 26.73 25.89 24.28
Π∗s 122.32 116.56 103.52 97.13 94.39 89.62
Table 3.3: Sensitivity analysis of the Buyer-Stackelberg model with respect to α
α 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.5
P ∗ 6.26 5.13 4.78 4.27 3.93 3.80
V∗ 2.07 2.08 2.08 2.09 2.10 2.11
Q∗ 1419.07 1392.12 1366.01 1300.27 1224.67 1185.03
M∗ 0.55 0.41 0.36 0.29 0.25 0.23
S∗ 16.83 16.51 16.20 15.42 14.52 14.05
Π∗b 499.72 347.32 292.83 211.33 154.61 132.67
sion variables P ∗ and M∗ are independent of his position as leader or follower. However,
the buyer’s decision variable Q∗ is dependent on his position as leader or follower. For
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Table 3.4: Sensitivity analysis of the Buyer-Stackelberg model with respect to β
β 0.07 0.09 0.15 0.19 0.21 0.25
P ∗ 5.42 5.61 6.26 6.77 7.06 7.72
V∗ 2.05 2.06 2.07 2.08 2.09 2.10
Q∗ 1593.72 1543.80 1419.07 1349.76 1317.95 1258.52
M∗ 0.22 0.30 0.55 0.76 0.87 1.13
S∗ 18.90 18.31 16.83 16.01 15.63 14.92
Π∗b 543.32 528.18 499.72 490.78 488.67 488.60
Table 3.5: Sensitivity analysis of the cooperative game with respect to α
α 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.5
P ∗ 4.9 4.0 3.7 3.3 3.0 2.9
V∗ 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Q∗ 2137.0 2176.8 2170.5 2157.3 2100.9 2068.9
M∗ 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2
S∗ 16.7 16.0 15.3 15.1 15.6 15.1
Z∗sb 290.6 214.2 186.2 143.2 112.1 99.7
Table 3.6: Sensitivity analysis of the cooperation game with respect to β
β 0.07 0.09 0.15 0.19 0.21 0.25
P ∗ 4.2 4.4 4.9 5.3 5.5 6.0
V∗ 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Q∗ 2400.4 2347.6 2137.0 2013.5 1953.3 1842.8
M∗ 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.9
S∗ 17.6 17.7 16.7 15.9 15.2 14.4
Z∗sb 322.1 311.7 290.6 282.5 279.9 276.9
instance, by increases α, the order quantity Q∗ increases in the Seller-Stackelberg model,
but decreases in the Buyer-Stackelberg model. Similarly, the seller’s decision variables V
61
  
 
 
Figure 3.2: The effect of parameter α on P ∗, Q∗,M∗,S∗ and V∗
and S∗ are dependent on her position as leader or follower.
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: The effect of parameter β on P ∗, Q∗,M∗,S∗ and V∗
The effect of parameter β on P ∗, Q∗,M∗,S∗ and V for each of the three models are
graphically displayed in Figure 3.3. As β increases, P ∗,M∗ and V increase, and Q∗,S∗
decrease. Therefore, with increasing β, the seller’s and buyer’s decisions are independent
62
of their leadership position. According to (3.39), (3.40) and (3.41), we would expect that
selling price P ∗, marketing expenditure M∗ and the shortage S∗ in the cooperative game
to be less than in non-cooperative game. We also notice that the lot size in cooperative
game is greater than non-cooperative game. This again points to the fact that the seller
would prefer the cooperative to non-cooperative game.
3.6.2 Sensitivity analysis with respect to C1 and C2
In the following, we will carry out the investigation of how the changes in buyer’s or
seller’s unit shortage cost, C1 or C2, will affect their decisions and profits for the different
models through a sensitivity analysis. Again, the input parameters will be the same as
in the previous examples but we allow C1 and C2 to vary from small to large. The effects
of parameters C1 and C2 on decision variables S∗,V∗, P ∗, Q∗,M∗ and profits Π∗b and Π∗s
will be investigated in the non–cooperative games, and on P ∗, Q∗,M∗,S∗ and Z∗sb will
also be investigated in the cooperative game. The results of the analysis are displayed in
Table 3.7 to Table 3.12.
Table 3.7: Sensitivity analysis of the Seller-Stackelberg model with respect to C1
C1 0.1 0.5 1.0 5.0 10 15
P ∗ 14.86 14.66 14.43 14.34 14.42 14.47
V∗ 4.69 4.66 4.60 4.60 4.63 4.64
Q∗ 343.7 489.29 621.87 972.49 1051.68 1072.52
M∗ 1.31 1.29 1.27 1.26 1.27 1.28
S∗ 18.18 25.87 28.53 24.61 19.42 16.35
Π∗s 97.56 100.79 103.53 108.92 109.84 110.05
Π∗b 322.45 321.13 319.14 302.99 295.83 292.78
The results show that varying C1 and C2 will affect both seller and buyer’s profit
in different ways for different models. For instance, increasing C1 (or C2) in the Seller–
Stackelberg game results in the buyer’s profit Π∗b (or seller’s profit Π
∗
s) declining, whereas
the seller’s profit Π∗s (or the buyer’s profit Π
∗
b) will increase. Increasing either C1 or C2
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Table 3.8: Sensitivity analysis of the Seller-Stackelberg model with respect to C2
C2 0.1 0.5 1.0 3.0 5.0 10
P ∗ 14.08 14.25 14.43 14.49 14.42 14.43
V∗ 4.53 4.56 4.60 4.56 4.52 4.52
Q∗ 1628.65 891.11 621.87 312.30 277.03 274.94
M∗ 1.24 1.26 1.27 1.28 1.27 1.27
S∗ 81.45 43.12 28.53 7.74 1.73 0.52
Π∗s 114.26 108.04 103.53 96.46 95.83 95.74
Π∗b 304.76 316.29 319.14 324.26 324.57 324.03
Table 3.9: Sensitivity analysis of the Buyer-Stackelberg model with respect to C1
C1 0.1 0.5 1.0 5.0 10 15
P ∗ 6.24 6.25 6.26 6.31 6.36 6.41
V∗ 2.07 2.07 2.07 2.08 2.09 2.10
Q∗ 1454.44 1438.43 1419.10 1286.74 1161.48 1065.03
M∗ 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.56 0.57
S∗ 17.25 17.06 16.83 15.26 13.77 12.63
Π∗s 58.91 58.84 58.78 58.25 57.68 57.22
Π∗b 500.72 500.27 499.72 495.54 490.82 486.53
will result in both seller’s and buyer’s profit in the Buyer–Stackelberg game and the joint
profit in the cooperative game to decline.
The effect of parameter C1 on decision variables V∗,S∗, Q∗, P ∗ and M∗ are demon-
strated in Figure 3.4. The number 1, 2 and 3 in each figure again refers to the Seller–
Stackelberg, the Buyer–Stackelberg and the cooperative game respectively.
From the graphs, by increasing C1 in the Seller–Stackelberg game, the seller’s short-
age size S∗ increases before C1 reaches C2, and decreases when it exceeds C2 which cause
seller’s selling price V∗ and buyer’s selling price P ∗, marketing expenditure M∗ to decrease
and then increase accordingly. This indicate that in the Seller–Stackelberg game, the de-
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Table 3.10: Sensitivity analysis of the Buyer-Stackelberg model with respect to C2
C2 0.1 0.5 1.0 3.0 5.0 10
P ∗ 6.36 6.25 6.26 6.28 6.28 6.29
V∗ 2.05 2.06 2.07 2.08 2.08 2.09
Q∗ 1185.15 1457.84 1419.10 1351.94 1333.83 1319.20
M∗ 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55
S∗ 64.64 30.58 16.83 5.85 3.53 2.09
Π∗s 56.77 58.62 58.78 58.76 58.72 58.68
Π∗b 492.06 500.84 499.72 497.66 497.08 496.59
Table 3.11: Sensitivity analysis of the cooperative game with respect to C1
C1 0.1 0.5 1.0 5.0 10 15
P ∗ 4.87 4.88 4.88 4.89 4.90 4.89
V∗ 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Q∗ 2206.70 2161.15 2136.97 2063.22 2047.14 2025.29
M∗ 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43
S∗ 28.72 21.53 16.67 5.88 3.04 1.93
Z∗sb 291.14 290.83 290.61 290.13 290.02 289.96
Table 3.12: Sensitivity analysis of the cooperative game with respect to C2
C2 0.1 0.5 1.0 3.0 5.0 10
P ∗ 4.88 4.88 4.88 4.89 4.89 4.88
V∗ 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Q∗ 2214.53 2160.60 2136.97 2081.44 2051.88 2033.32
M∗ 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43
S∗ 28.44 21.35 16.70 8.58 5.20 3.09
Z∗sb 291.15 290.83 290.61 290.25 290.12 290.01
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Figure 3.4: The effect of parameter C1 on P
∗, Q∗,M∗,S∗ and V∗
cision variables S∗,V∗, P ∗ and M∗ will be affected by both C1 and C2. However, in the
Buyer–Stackelberg game, when the buyer is the leader, as C1 increases, the shortage size
S∗ decreases whereas V∗, P ∗ and M∗ increase. Therefore, by varying C1, it is seen that
the behavior of the decision variables S∗,V∗, P ∗ and M∗ are dependent on the players’
leadership position. Also, the buyer’s order quantity is dependent on his leadership posi-
tion, i.e. his order quantity is decreasing in the Buyer–Stackelberg game and increasing
in the Seller–Stackelberg game.
The effect of parameter C2 on P
∗, Q∗,M∗,S∗ and V∗ are graphically displayed in
Figure 3.5. As C2 increases, the seller’s decision variable S∗ decreases regardless of whether
the seller is the leader or the follower. However, the changes in variables P ∗,M∗, Q∗ and V∗
are dependent on the leadership position of the participant. For instance, as C2 increases,
P ∗ decreases and then increases in the Seller–Stackelberg but show the reverse trend in
the Buyer–Stackelberg game.
Finally, the graphs also indicate that the shortage in a cooperative game is less than
in the non-cooperative game when C1 >
V
Cs
C2. Also, the order quantity Q
∗ is greater,
and the selling price P ∗, marketing expenditure M∗ is smaller in the cooperative game
66
  
 
 
 
Figure 3.5: The effect of parameter C2 on P
∗, Q∗,M∗,S∗ and V∗
than in the non-cooperative games. These observations are consistent with the results
obtained in Section 3.4.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have extended the seller–buyer supply chain management problem
under a symmetric information structure considered in Esmaeili et al. [42] by incorporating
the likelihood of shortages into the models. This is an essential generalization due to
the presence of irregular production capacity or unanticipated demands. In the non-
cooperative game scenario, two types of games are discussed: Seller–Stackelberg game
and Buyer–Stackelberg game. Optimal solutions of the decision variables were obtained
for both of these cases. In the cooperative game, Pareto–efficient solutions were obtained
by optimizing the weighted sum of the seller’s and buyer’s profit functions. Among several
conclusions reached, it was shown that both selling price and marketing expenditure are
smaller in cooperative game than in non–cooperative games and demand is larger. In
addition, shortages are smaller in a cooperative game than in a non–cooperative games
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when the buyer’s unit shortage cost is larger than the seller’s unit shortage cost, which
is the case most likely to be encountered in practice. Numerical examples were presented
to illustrate the results from the models and to compare between non–cooperative and
cooperative games, with and without shortages. Furthermore, sensitivity analysis was
carried out to investigate the effects of price elasticity, marketing elasticity and the unit
shortage costs on the optimal solutions. One observation from the numerical outcomes
show that in non-cooperative Stackelberg game, both the seller and the buyer have the
leadership advantage, which the player will gain more profit in the game when he/she is
in the leadership position.
The extension of present work can be considered in several ways. For example, the
two–person game scenario investigated in this chapter can be extended to a three–person
game by adding the consumer as the third person to assess how the effect of shortage
will affect the welfare of the latter. This will lead to many interesting sets of interactions
between the players. Also, all input parameters in the models of this chapter are assumed
known to both players whereas, in reality, costs such as shortage cost, setup cost and
demand are often not common knowledge and should not be assumed as such. In this
case, asymmetric information rules the game and incentive strategies or designs may have
to be devised for the players to share or reveal their private information. Theses issues
will be addressed in the following two chapters.
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Chapter 4
Asymmetric Supply Chain Models
Implementable With a Mechanism
Design
4.1 Introduction
There has been much research done in supply chain systems during the last few decades
and at its broadest level. In general, researchers in this area aim to find optimal strategies
involving decision variables such as selling price, order quantity and marketing expenditure
so that efficient outcomes will be achieved by the participants of the supply chain. There
have been a number of mechanisms to achieve these favorable outcomes discussed in the
literature, such as quantity discount, credit option, return policies, quantity flexibility
and commitment of purchase quantity [26, 165, 131]. Among the many models proposed,
such as we mentioned in Chapter 2 and 3, information available to the players of the
supply chain game are assumed symmetric, i.e., they are common knowledge to both
seller (supplier) and buyer (retailer). This assumption is often contravened in practice,
where information concerning certain elements of the model are only known to one player
and not revealed to the other player. For example, the buyer often holds information
about the market demand privately, and the seller may not reveal his cost structure
to the buyer. There have been many papers which investigated supply chain under an
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asymmetric information structure. To name a few, Lau and Lau [88], and Lau et al.
[89] investigated supply chain model as a non-cooperative game with symmetric and
asymmetric information pattern where demand is a function of price and not known
to both seller and buyer. Corbett and deGroote [31] suggested offering a discount as an
inducement to reveal information and Chu and Lee [27] suggested paying a cost to extract
information. All of these models assumed that certain information concerning the model
parameters are unknown to one of the players while the other is fully aware of their values.
By contrast, Esmaeili and Zeephongsekul [43] formulated several seller-buyer supply chain
models as a non-cooperative asymmetric game where the seller is ignorant of the demand
and the buyer is not aware of the seller’s setup and production cost.
In this chapter, we will investigate several seller-buyer supply chain models based on
the model proposed in Chapter 3, but with an asymmetric information pattern. Infor-
mation are asymmetric for both seller and buyer in the sense that demand is only known
to the buyer through price and marketing elasticity, the setup and production cost are
known only to the seller and the players know their own individual unit shortage cost.
This private information is then used to obtain the optimal strategies in various Stackel-
berg games where the seller and buyer alternate their roles as leader and follower. Since
the shortages are permitted in the models due to irregular production or increased de-
mand, therefore, with an asymmetric information about the demand, it is critical for the
seller to control the shortage size at optimal level, for satisfying demand and avoiding
salvage the products, so that his profit can be maximized.
In recent years, mechanism design in supply chain has captured some researchers’ in-
terest. Mechanism designs are contracts designed by individuals or organizations in order
to help achieve certain objectives. Its formal treatment began with Hurwicz [68] and it
provides players in asymmetric games with the means of obtaining information through
implementing incentive schemes inducing other players to reveal their private informa-
tion. Lim [100] studied a contract design problem in a quality control situation where the
quality of a product is unknown and provided an incentive scheme which involve price
rebate and product warranty to obtain information on the quality of the product. Corbett
[32] investigated several contracts concerning cycle stock, safety stock and consignment
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stock under asymmetric information structure. Two mechanism designs were studied, de-
pending upon when the supplier has private information about setup cost and when the
supplier is unable to observe the buyer’s backorder cost. Wang et al. [160] extended the
model proposed by Cachon and Zipkin [17] from single supplier/single retailer situation
to a single supplier/multiple retailers scenario. They studied the local inventory policy
and echelon inventory policy separately, and provided a contract based on each inventory
policy in order to achieve an optimal cooperative solution. However, the information in
their model is assumed to be symmetric. O¨zer and Wei [116] studied an information
sharing problem between a supplier and a manufacturer, where the manufacturer holds
private information about the forecast of demand, and this information are unknown to
the supplier. The authors developed two contracts to assure credible forecast information
sharing. One contract depends on a monetary commitment, and the other bases on a quan-
tity commitment. Burnetas et al. [14] investigated several quantity discount schedules in
single-period supply contracts with asymmetric demand information and found that the
supplier can earn larger profits with an all-unit discount than with an incremental dis-
count schemes. Recently, Taylor and Xiao [146] considered demand-forecast information
problem in supply chain involving a manufacturer and a newsvendor retailer, where the
retailer possesses superior information concerning the demand forecasting. Two contracts
have been proposed and studied in this paper, one is the wholesale price contract, and
the other is the procurement contract or a quantity discount contract. The impact of
retailer’s forecasting accuracy to manufacturer’s expected profit was investigated in that
paper.
It can be seen from the above referenced articles that mechanism design can be used
as an incentive device for extracting a variety of information regarding quality control,
cost structure, demand information and inventory planning, so that players can achieve
the best outcomes.
Demand information is critical for supply chain to achieve an efficient outcome. A
huge cost of inventory and stockout can occur due to uncertain demand or inaccurate
demand forecast. A potential saving cost due to sharing information among supply chain
members has been documented, ranging from $ 14 billion for the food service industry
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[152] to $ 30 billion for the grocery industry [86]. An untruthful reported demand can also
cause huge cost to supplier, for example, Solectron, a major electronics supplier, had $ 4.7
billion in excess inventory due to inflated demand forecasts reported by its customers [41].
In contrast, cost due to shortage is another issue that the managers should be concerned
since it causes lost sale opportunities and leads to dissatisfied consumers. For example,
Sport Obermeyer, a major supplier of fashion skiwear, experienced high costs in the form
of missed sale opportunities due to stockout [47]. One way to reduce costs and enhance
the efficiency of the supply chain is to obtain credible information that best to match the
market demand and reflect supply chain members’ characteristics. This can be achieved
through the design of incentive contracts.
In this chapter, we also will investigate a mechanism design scenario where the seller
has more power, i.e. the Seller-Stackelberg game, and he offers the incentive of sharing
part of the marketing cost incurred by the buyer in order to extract information on market
demand and unit shortage cost from the buyer. We will consider two cases of a mechanism
design contract, one of them is based on the demand type (thereafter abbreviated as
the MD case) and the other is based on the buyer’s unit shortage cost type (thereafter
abbreviated as the MC case). Numerical results provided in Section 4.4.3 show that for
both players, their profits increase and the shortage sizes decrease. However, the buyer
will prefer the contract based on the unit shortage cost type, since she will gain more by
revealing information on unit shortage cost while the seller’s preference will depend on
whether he would like to achieve a larger order quantity or gain more profit. Overall, the
results indicate that offering incentives through a mechanism design provide both seller
and buyer with more profits than those obtained from an asymmetric information game
where this is not provided. This is a direct consequence of the exchange of information
that ensues with a mechanism design.
In this chapter, we embark upon the study of supply chain models under asymmetric
information structure. Investigation of non-cooperative Stackelberg games reveal that
asymmetric information can introduce inefficiency in the supply chain which, as a conse-
quence, the leadership advantage is lost resulting in a lower profit for the leader (in our
case, the seller). Furthermore, the two proposed mechanisms provide some insights on
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how to design an incentive contract to extract information from their opponents in order
to achieve an efficient outcome. It shows in particular, that the type that an opponent
belongs to is an important factor that the designer should always take into account in
practice.
We organize the rest of this chapter as follows. In Section 4.2, we give assumptions rel-
evant to asymmetric information and mechanism design problem, also present models for
both seller and buyer under asymmetric information environment. The non-cooperative
Stackelberg game models for both seller and buyer under an asymmetric information
structure are presented in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 is devoted to the mechanism design
problem, where the MD and MC cases will be presented and investigated, with numerical
results to illustrate the proposed contracts and reveal their effects on each player’s profit.
Finally, we conclude this chapter in Section 4.5.
4.2 Assumptions and model formulation
In this section, we will provide assumptions for our model, and discuss the models from
both the seller and the buyer’s standpoint, and formulate the Seller-Buyer supply chain
problem as a non-zero sum two person game with asymmetric information. All notations
that are used in this chapter are listed in Appendix A.
Assumptions
The proposed models in this chapter are based on the same assumptions which we made
in Chapter 3 with the following additional assumption related to asymmetric information:
The demand D = kP−αMβ is known to the buyer through α and β but not to the
seller. The buyer is unaware of the seller’s setup cost As and production cost Cs, which
are both known to the seller. The buyer’s unit shortage cost C1 and seller’s unit shortage
cost C2 are only known to themselves but not to each other. All other parameters are
common knowledge to both parties.
Based on this assumption, the models to be introduced are games with an asymmetric
information since each player has private information on certain model parameters. Under
such asymmetric information structure, we can apply the incomplete information game
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theory framework pioneered in Harsanyi [65], which have been described in Chapter 2,
Section 2.1.3, to formulate the Seller-Buyer supply chain problem as a non-zero sum two
person game with asymmetric information.
4.2.1 Model formulation under asymmetric information
The components of incomplete information games in this chapter are described as follow-
ing:
• The number of players in our models is N = {1, 2}, ie., the buyer and the seller.
• Recall from Chapter 3, the buyer’s decision variables are the selling price P , mar-
keting expenditure M and the order quantity Q; the seller’s decision variables are
the selling price V charged by the seller to the buyer, and the shortage size S. Thus,
the buyer’s strategy or action set A1 and seller’s set A2 can be described by their
decision variables as:
A1 = {(P,M,Q) : (P,M,Q) ∈ R3+} and A2 = {(V ,S) : (V ,S) ∈ R2+}
respectively, where R3+ = R+ ×R+ ×R+, R2+ = R+ ×R+ and R+ ∈ [0,∞).
• In addition, each player belongs to a type space consisting of private information
known only to the player concerned. The buyer’s type space T1 is identified by
the elasticity parameters and unit shortage cost, and the seller’s type space T2 is
described by his setup, production and unit shortage cost, ie.,
T1 = {(α, β, C1) : α > β + 1, 0 < β < 1, C1 > 0}
T2 = {(As, Cs, C2) : (As, Cs, C2) ∈ R3+}
We denote a typical element of T1 by µ and of T2 by c.
• A probability distribution expressing one player’s uncertainty regarding to the other
player’s type. The seller’s uncertainty of the buyer’s type is encapsulated through a
probability distribution with probability density function (pdf) f1(µ),µ ∈ T1, and
the buyer’s uncertainty of the seller’s type through the pdf f2(c), c ∈ T2.
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• The payoff functions as functions of the decision variables for the buyer and seller
over type space will be denoted by
Πb(P,M,Q,V ,S : µ, c) = Πb(P,M,Q)
Πs(P,M,Q,V ,S : µ, c) = Πs(V ,S)
respectively.
Notice that these decision variables are functions of the player’s type. The objective
of the game is to seek optimal strategies (M∗(µ), P ∗(µ), Q∗(µ)) and (S∗(c),V∗(c)) which
are the best responses to each other’s optimal decisions, in such way that their profit will
be maximized.
The buyer’s model formulation
Recall that the buyer’s annual profit function under symmetric information formulated
in Chapter 3 is expressed mathematically as:
Πb(P,M,Q)
= PD − VD −MD − AbDQ−1 − iVI − C1B
= kP−α+1Mβ − kVP−αMβ − kP−αMβ+1 − AbkP−αMβQ−1
− [Q(1− u
−1)− S]2
2Q(1− u−1) iV −
C1 S2
2Q(1− u−1) (4.1)
Therefore, for a given decision variables (S(c),V(c)) of the seller based on his type,
the buyer’s objective is to seek (M∗(µ), P ∗(µ), Q∗(µ)) which will maximize her expected
profit over seller’s type, ie.,
Ec (Πb(M,P,Q)) =
∫
T2
Πb(M,P,Q) f2(c) dc. (4.2)
The solution for this is provided in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1. The buyer’s optimal decision variables based on unknown seller’s type
are solutions of the following equations:
P ∗(µ) =
α(Ec(V) + AbQ−1)
α− β − 1 (4.3)
M∗(µ) =
β(Ec(V) + AbQ−1)
α− β − 1 (4.4)
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and
[i(1− u−1)2Ec(V)Q2 − (i Ec(S2V) + C1Ec(S2))](Ec(V) + AbQ−1)α−β
= 2kAb(1− u−1)α−α ββ(α− β − 1)α−β (4.5)
Proof Since Πb(M,P,Q) is strictly Pseudoconcave with respect to P and concave
with respect to M and Q (according to Lemma 3.1, Chapter 3), thus, applying the first
order condition with respect to P and M on equation (4.2) yield
(−α + 1)P + αEc(V) + αM + αAbQ−1 = 0 (4.6)
β P − β Ec(V)− (β + 1)M − β AbQ−1 = 0. (4.7)
solving equations (4.6) and (4.7) resulting equations (4.3) and (4.4). Finally, substituting
equations (4.3), (4.4) into (4.2) and applying the first order condition with respect to Q
yields equation (4.5). Therefore, a unique optimal strategy of the buyer under asymmetric
information can be determined by solving equations (4.3), (4.4) and (4.5) simultaneously.
Proof complete.
The seller’s model formulation
The seller’s objective is to determine the optimal price V∗ and allowable shortage S∗ such
that his profit is maximized. His annual profit function developed in Chapter 3 expressed
mathematically is
Πs(S,V)
= VD − CsD − AsDQ−1 − i Cs I − C2B
= kVP−αMβ − k CsP−αMβ − k AsP−αMβQ−1
− [Q(1− u
−1)− S]2
2Q(1− u−1) i Cs −
C2 S2
2Q(1− u−1) (4.8)
For the given decision variables (M(µ), P (µ), Q(µ)) of the buyer based on her type, the
seller seeks S∗(c) and V∗(c) which maximizes his expected profit over the buyer’s type,
i.e.
Eµ(Πs(S,V)) =
∫
T1
Πs(S,V) f1(µ)dµ. (4.9)
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and the solution for this is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2. The seller’s optimal decision variables based on unknown buyer’s type
are solutions of the following equations:
S∗(c) = i Cs(1− u
−1)
(i Cs + C2)Eµ
(
1
Q
) (4.10)
V∗(c) = W V0 (c) (4.11)
where W > 1 is seller’s marginal selling price and
V0 (c) = Cs + AsEµ
(
1
Q
)
+
1
2
(1− u−1) i Cs Eµ(Q)
Eµ(D)
− i
2C2s (1− u−1)
2(i Cs + C2)Eµ
(
1
Q
)
Eµ(D)
(4.12)
is the threshold price where a zero profit is obtained by the seller.
Proof First note that ∂
2Πs(P,M,Q,S,V)
∂S2 = − i Cs+C2(1−u−1)Eµ( 1Q) < 0, hence Πs(S,V) is con-
cave in S. Applying the first order condition with respect to S to the seller’s profit
function gives equation (4.10) as the unique optimal solution. Since Πs(S,V) in equa-
tion (4.9) is linear in V and therefore unbounded with respect to this variable, the seller
will impose the marginal selling price W by incorporating it with the minimum selling
price V0(c), which is the threshold price corresponding to a zero profit for the seller, to
obtain his optimal selling price as
V∗(c) = W V0 (c).
where W > 1. Therefore, equations (4.10) and (4.11) yield the unique optimal decision
variables for the seller. Proof complete.
4.3 The non–cooperative Stackelberg game with asym-
metric information
The optimal strategies that were derived in the previous section ignore any possible in-
teraction between the players. In most competitive environments however, there are both
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strong and weak players, and the stronger player often takes the initiative by making
the first move while the weaker player then follows by playing the best strategy that is
consistent with known or incomplete information. Finally, the stronger player would then
select the strategy that will optimize his profit after considering all strategies that can
be made by the weaker player. Games that exhibit such correlated interaction are known
in game theory as Stackelberg Games [159, 8]. In this section, we will investigate the
interaction between the seller and the buyer as a non-cooperative Stackelberg game under
an asymmetric information structure. We will consider two scenarios: Seller-Stackelberg
game where the seller takes the lead and the buyer follows; the Buyer-Stackelberg game
where the buyer is the leader and the seller is the follower. We will provide the numerical
examples to illustrate and compare between the different models at end of this section.
4.3.1 The Seller–Stackelberg model with asymmetric informa-
tion
The seller’s objective is to determine the selling price V and shortage S in an uncertain
market environment so that his profit will be maximized. The seller makes the initial
move by selecting S and V , and since the buyer knows her own type, the buyer will select
the best response, which is
arg max
(M,P,Q)
Πb(M,P,Q).
The solution to this is unique, and is given by equations (3.6), (3.7) and (3.8) from
Proposition 3.1 in Chapter 3. Since the seller is uncertain over the buyer’s type, the
problem requiring solution is therefore
MaxEµ(Πs(S,V)) =
∫
T1
Πs (S,V)f1(µ)dµ (4.13)
Subject to P (Q) =
α(V + AbQ−1)
α− β − 1 (4.14)
M(Q) =
β(V + AbQ−1)
α− β − 1 (4.15)
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2k(1− u−1)Abα−αββ
[
α− β − 1
V + AbQ−1
]α−β
= i(1− u−1)2VQ2 − (iV + C1)S2. (4.16)
Substituting this P (Q) and M(Q) into equation (4.13) produces the following nonlinear
optimization problem
MaxEµ(Πs(S,V))
=
∫
T1
[kα−αββ(α− β − 1)α−β(V + AbQ−1)−α+β
(V − Cs − AsQ−1)− 1
2
i Cs(1− u−1)Q+ i Cs S
− S
2
2Q(1− u−1)(i Cs + C2)]f1(µ)dµ (4.17)
constrained by equation (4.16). This problem can be solved, given f1(µ), by any appro-
priate Nonlinear Programming search tool.
4.3.2 The Buyer–Stackelberg model with asymmetric informa-
tion
Here, the buyer makes the first move and her objective is to determine the selling price
P , marketing expenditure M and lot size Q, based on the seller’s response, in such a way
that her profit will be maximized. Since the seller knows his own type, his best response
to the buyer’s decision is obtained by finding
arg max
(S,V)
Πs(S,V).
The solution of this is given by equations (3.18) and (3.19) which obtained from Proposi-
tion 3.2 in Chapter 3. Due to the uncertainty that the buyer has regarding to the seller’s
type, she will seek the solution to the following optimization problem:
MaxEc(Πb(M,P,Q)) =
∫
T2
Πb(M,P,Q)f2(c)d(c) (4.18)
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Subject to S = i CsQ(1− u
−1)
i Cs + C2
(4.19)
V = W
[
Cs + AsQ
−1 +
i CsC2Q(1− u−1)
2D(Csi+ C2)
]
. (4.20)
Substituting equations (4.19) and (4.20) into equation (4.18) transforms the problem into
the following unconstrained nonlinear optimization problem:
MaxEc(Πb(M,P,Q))
=
∫
T2
(PD − VD −MD − AbDQ−1
− [Q(1− u
−1)− S]2
2Q(1− u−1) iV −
C1 S2
2Q(1− u−1))f2(c)dc (4.21)
The problem can be solved, once f2(c) is determined, by using an appropriate Nonlinear
Programm search tool.
4.3.3 Numerical examples
The following examples are aimed at illustrating the Stackelberg models under an asym-
metric information structure discussed in the previous sections. Here, the parameters
known to both players are set as k = 3500, Ab = 40, i = 10%, u = 1.1 and W = 1.25. The
Seller’s true type values are set as As = 140, Cs = 1.5 and C2 = 1 while the Buyer’s true
type values at α = 2.043, β = 0.179 and C1 = 0.5. We will assume that the seller’s un-
certainty concerning the buyer’s type is encapsulated by independent random variables α
and C1, uniformly distributed with mean and standard deviation α¯ = 2.050, σα = 0.5 and
C¯1 = 1.5, σC1 = 0.8, respectively. This information are known to both players. To simplify
calculations, we will assume that α and β are related by β = K α. There are empirical ev-
idence [134] to indicate that price and marketing expenditure elasticities are often related
by this simple relationship. Here, we let K = 0.088. The buyer’s uncertainty regarding
the seller’s type will be encapsulated by independent random variables As, Cs and C2
which will be assumed uniformly distributed with means A¯s = 140, C¯s = 1.5, C¯2 = 1 and
corresponding standard deviations σAs = 1.5, σCs = 0.8, σC2 = 0.5, respectively.
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Example 1. The seller makes the first move in the Seller-Stackelberg model but is
uncertain of the market demand and the buyer’s unit shortage cost. Solving (4.17) gives
V∗ = 3.43 and S∗ = 18.09, leading to the values Q∗ = 456.94, P ∗ = 8.33 and M∗ = 0.73
using equations (4.14), (4.15) and (4.16) respectively. The seller’s expected profit is
Eµ(Πs) = 46.08 obtained from equation (4.17), and the buyer’s profit is Π
∗
b = 173.23
from equation (4.1).
Example 2. In the Buyer-Stackelberg model, power has shifted to the buyer but she
is uncertain about the seller’s setup cost, production cost and the unit shortage cost.
Solving (4.21) gives the buyer’s expected profit as Ec(Πb) = 265.92 from P
∗ = 4.80,M∗ =
0.42 and Q∗ = 1367.85. The seller’s profit is Π∗s = 57.09 from (4.8) using V∗ = 2.08 and
S∗ = 16.22 obtained from equations (4.19) and (4.20).
It is noteworthy in the above examples that the Buyer–Stackelberg model consumes
less marketing expenditure M∗, has a smaller selling price P ∗ charged by the buyer to
customer and yet has a higher profit Π∗b than the Seller–Stackelberg model. This indicates
that the Buyer–Stackelberg model is better for the buyer even though she has to order
a larger lot size Q∗ when she is the leader. But on the other hand, a smaller shortage
size would result when compared with the situation where she is the follower. Notice
that the seller’s profits as leader or follower are much smaller than those of the buyer’s in
both situations. Moreover, the seller’s profit as a leader is even less than when he is the
follower, which indicates that under asymmetric information, the position as leader confers
no advantage to the seller. This provides a motivation for the seller to use implementation
device such as mechanism design to improve his profit when he has power. This topic will
be explored in the next section.
4.4 Mechanism design
Recall that a buyer’s type consists of information related to the demand and unit shortage
cost and these information are vital for the seller to determine his strategy in order to
improve his profit which, as can be seen from the numerical examples, could be inferior
to that of the buyer’s profit. Therefore, it is important for the seller to have information
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regarding the buyer’s type µ = (α, β, C1). In this section, we will consider a mechanism
design problem, as we described in Chapter 2, Section 2.1.4, where the seller offers an
incentive contract to the buyer for extracting information from the latter. This contract
comprises several parts: an offer to set the shortage at a fixed value δ, fixing the per unit
price charged to the buyer V and offering a side payment t to the buyer to share marketing
cost. The incentive - compatibility (IC) and individual rationality (IR) constraints, to be
described later, will have to be fulfilled before the buyer would be willing to enter into
the contract offered by the seller.
The seller initiates the mechanism by asking the buyer to announce her type µ. A
mechanism whereby a buyer announces her type directly to the seller is known as a direct
mechanism [124]. The mechanism is typically studied as a three-step game of incomplete
information [49]. In the first step, in exchange for information on the buyer’s type µ, the
seller offers the contract (V(µ), δ(µ), t(µ)), (or just (V , δ, t) for simplicity). The buyer’s
true type is only known to her and she does not reveal it to the seller. In the second step,
the buyer may accept or reject the contract. If she rejects the contract, her payoff will
be some reserved value which we will set as 0 for convenience. In the last step, the buyer
who accepts the contract will then be expected to fulfil her part of the contract.
To simplify the ensuing discussion, we will assume, as we did in the previous section,
that β = Kα where K is a known constant. There are empirical evidence [134] indicating
that, due to factors such as the product’s life cycle and whether the product is perishable
or nonperishable, the elasticity parameters do follow a fixed ratio. We will assume that
K is common knowledge to both parties. Therefore, the type space of the buyer can be
reduced to two parameters (α,C1).
From a managerial viewpoint, providing an incentive contract to extract information
from the buyer could be costly, therefore the seller should get a better understanding
of which type of contract is more important for him to achieve his goals, ie. increase
order quantity and improve profit. In order to assess the effect of buyer’s types on profit,
the seller would be interested in measuring his own profit under the constraint of his
incomplete information on buyer’s demand and unit shortage cost. Therefore, we will
investigate two mechanism design contracts designed by the seller, one based on the
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demand through α (the MD case) and another based on unit shortage cost C1 (the MC
case). The results obtained from those two cases and from the Seller-Stacklberg models
considered earlier will be compared using numerical results.
4.4.1 Mechanism design – MD case
Consider the buyer’s type described by the unknown parameter α and we will assume
that the seller’s uncertainty on α is described by a distribution with cumulative proba-
bility function (cdf) F (α) and probability density function (pdf) f(α) over the interval
[α, α¯]. Recall that demand function is related to the buyer’s selling price and marketing
expenditure according to
D(α) = kP−α(α)Mβ(α) (4.22)
with β = Kα. Therefore, demand D(α) is function of α. It can be shown (which we will
show later in this section) that demand D(α) is decreasing in α, which implies that buyer’s
order quantity and profit will also be decreasing in α. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that
seller’s selling price V(α) is increasing and the shortage size δ(α) is decreasing in buyer’s
type α due to the decreased demand. Furthermore, as buyer’s order quantity decreases,
to sustain the demand, the seller will have to increase her side payment t(α) to the
buyer, which will increase as α increases. This assumption will guarantee that the single -
crossing condition holds, which is equivalent to saying that the players’ decision variables
are monotonic in their types, and ensuring that the decision variables are implementable
in this mechanism design problem. This standard assumption is made in almost all
applications [49].
Given the innumerable number of possible types that the buyer can assume, the list
of possible optimal contracts that the seller can offer from all the possible contracts will
be huge and unwieldy. Fortunately, this problem can be resolved by invoking the well
known Revelation Principle[108, 49, 87] whereby the seller can restrict his attention to
direct mechanism, which only requires that the buyer submitting an honest claim about
her type. The Revelation Principle ensures that for every optimal contract (V(·), δ(·), t(·))
where the buyer does not reveal her true type, there is an incentive-compatible contract
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with the same payoff where the buyer announces her type truthfully [68, 124]. This
truth-telling direct mechanism allows us to formulate the problem mathematically and
enables the seller to optimize his expected profit function constrained by the incentive-
compatibility (IC) and individual rationality (IR) conditions.
If the buyer’s true type is α but announces her type as αˆ, then from (4.1) her profit
function is given by
Πb(αˆ, α) = D(α)[P (α)− V(αˆ)−M(α)− AbQ−1(α)]
− iV(αˆ) [Q(α)(1− u
−1)− δ(αˆ)]2
2Q(α)(1− u−1)
− C1 δ
2(αˆ)
2Q(α)(1− u−1) + t(αˆ). (4.23)
From (4.8), the seller’s profit function based on the announced type αˆ is
Πs(αˆ) = D(αˆ)[V(αˆ)− Cs − AsQ−1(αˆ)]
− i Cs [Q(αˆ)(1− u
−1)− δ(αˆ)]2
2Q(αˆ)(1− u−1)
− C2 δ
2(αˆ)
2Q(αˆ)(1− u−1) − t(αˆ) (4.24)
Using buyer’s optimal strategy when information is symmetric, which provided by
Proposition 3.1 in Chapter 3, by referring equations (3.6), (3.7) and (3.8), we obtain the
following lemma for determining buyer’s optimal strategy if she accepts the contract and
announces her type truthfully.
Lemma 4.1. A type α buyer’s optimal strategy if the contract is accepted with a truthful
announcement regarding her type is determined by the following equations:
P (α) = α[V(α)+AbQ
−1(α)]
α−Kα−1 (4.25)
M(α) = Kα[V(α)+AbQ
−1(α)]
α−Kα−1 (4.26)
2Ab (1− u−1)k
[
1−K − 1
α
V(α) + AbQ−1(α)
]α(1−L)
= i (1− u−1)2Q2(α)V(α)− [C1 + iV(α)]δ2(α) (4.27)
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Further to the results of Lemma 4.1, based on buyer’s truthfully announcement, the
following lemma holds.
Note: in the following, a dot on top of a variable signals that it is the derivative of that
variable.
Lemma 4.2. The demand function D(α) which expressed in equation (4.22) is a de-
creasing function in α.
Proof If the buyer accepts the contract and announces her type truthfully, then buyer’s
optimal selling price and marketing expenditure will be determined by equations (4.25)
and (4.26) from Lemma 4.1. Thus, demand function can be expressed as:
D(α) = kKKα
[
1−K − 1
α
V(α) + AbQ−1(α)
]α(1−K)
(4.28)
The derivative of lnD(α) with respect to α gives
D˙(α)
D(α)
= K lnK + (1−K)
[
ln
(
1−K − 1
α
V(α) + AbQ−1(α)
)
+
1
α−Kα− 1
]
− α(1−K) V˙(α)− AbQ
−2(α)Q˙(α)
V(α) + AbQ−1(α) (4.29)
Since V(α) + AbQ−1(α) always being positive, then V˙(α) − AbQ−2(α)Q˙(α) > 0. From
assumption α > β+1 and β = Kα, we have K < 1, implies that the third term of (4.29)
is negative. We choose a small positive number a = (1 − K − 1
α
) exp 1
α−Kα−1 such that
V(α) + AbQ−1(α) > a, then the second term of (4.29) is also negative. Obviously, since
K < 1, the first term of (4.29) is negative, this implies D˙(α)
D(α)
< 0. Since D(α) > 0,
therefore, D˙(α) < 0. This complete the proof.
A type α buyer has no incentive to pretend to be a type αˆ buyer if the following
incentive-compatibility (IC) constraint is satisfied:
Πb(α, α) ≥ Πb(αˆ, α). (4.30)
Following the approach outlined in Laffont and Tirole [87], a necessary condition for IC
constraint to hold is:
∂Πb(αˆ, α)
∂αˆ
∣∣∣∣
αˆ=α
= 0 (4.31)
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This condition is also sufficient for the IC constraint to hold. The proof of sufficient
condition for IC constraint provide as following:
Proof We apply the idea developed in Laffont and Tirole [87] to show that condition
equation (4.31) is also sufficient for the IC constraint to hold.
Assume that there is αˆ 6= α, such that Πb(αˆ, α) > Πb(α, α), i.e.,∫ αˆ
α
∂Πb(x, α)
∂x
dx > 0. (4.32)
From the first-order condition (4.31), ∂Πb(x,x)
∂x
= 0 for all x, therefore equation (4.32)
can be rewritten as ∫ αˆ
α
(
∂Πb(x, α)
∂x
− ∂Πb(x, x)
∂x
)dx > 0
which is equivalent to ∫ αˆ
α
∫ α
x
∂Π2b(x,y)
∂y ∂x
dy dx > 0. (4.33)
For a buyer’s type y and an announced type x, it is easy to verify that
∂2Πb(x,y)
∂y ∂x
= D(y)[y
P˙ (y)
P (y)
−Ky M˙(y)
M(y)
+ lnP (y)M−K(y)]V˙(x)
− i[(1− u
−1)2Q2(y)− δ2(x)]
2(1− u−1)Q2(y) V˙(x)Q˙(y)
+
(iV(x) + C1)δ(x)
(1− u−1)Q2(y) δ˙(x)Q˙(y). (4.34)
Recall that D˙(α) ≤ 0. This will lead to
y
P˙ (y)
P (y)
−Ky M˙(y)
M(y)
+ lnP (y)M−K(y) ≥ 0. (4.35)
for a given type y.
Using the assumptions that V is non-decreasing in buyer’s type and condition (4.35),
the first term in equation (4.34) is nonnegative. Using equation (4.27), for the true type
y and announced type x of the buyer, we have (1− u−1)Q(y) > δ(x), with assumptions
that V˙(y) ≥ 0 and Q˙(y) ≤ 0, we can easily verify that the second term in equation
(4.34) is also nonnegative. Since Q˙(y) ≤ 0 will implies δ˙(y) ≤ 0, hence the last term in
equation (4.34) is nonnegative as well. Therefore, ∂
2 Πb(x,y)
∂y ∂x
> 0 and if α > αˆ, then for any
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x ∈ [αˆ, α], the double integral in equation (4.33) is non-positive, which contradicts (4.33).
Similarly, if α < αˆ, then for any x ∈ [α, αˆ], and the same contradiction will result. These
contradictions complete the proof of the sufficient condition.
From equation (4.23), we obtain
∂Πb(αˆ, α)
∂αˆ
∣∣∣∣
αˆ=α
= −V˙(α)D(α)− iV˙(α) [Q(α)(1− u
−1)− δ(α)]2
2Q(α)(1− u−1)
+ iV(α) [Q(α)(1− u
−1)− δ(α)]δ˙(α)
Q(α)(1− u−1)
− C1 δ(α)δ˙(α)
Q(α)(1− u−1) + t˙(α)
and applying the IC constraint (4.31) yield
t˙(α) = {D(α) + i[Q(α)(1− u
−1)− δ(α)]2
2Q(α)(1− u−1) }V˙(α)
+
[C1 + iV(α)]δ(α)− i(1− u−1)V(α)Q(α)
Q(α)(1− u−1) δ˙(α) (4.36)
where D(α) = kKKα
[
1−K− 1
α
V(α)+AbQ−1(α)
]α(1−K)
by referring to equations (4.25) and (4.26).
Note that equation (4.36) describes a relationship between the contract variables and
order quantity under the IC constraint.
We next consider the individual rationality (IR) constraint which is
Πb(α) ≥ 0 (4.37)
where we have assumed that the buyer will accept the contract and participate in the
game only if her profit is nonnegative.
Based on the Revelation Principle and truth-telling, the seller has to solve the following
optimization problem for an optimal contract:
max
V,δ,t,Q
E(Πs(α)) =
∫ α¯
α
Πs(α)f(α)dα (4.38)
subject to (4.36) IC constraint
(4.37) IR constraint
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where in addition, all the variables in this problem are constrained to be nonnegative.
The seller’s problem can be treated as optimal control problem which is solved by
introducing a Hamiltonian system and applying the Pontryagin maximum principle (c.f.
Bryson and Ho [13], Kamien and Schwartz [80], Corbett [32], O¨zer and Wei [116] and
Taylor and Xiao [146]) resulting in the following proposition:
Proposition 4.3. The seller’s optimal contract based on the buyer’s demand type is
obtained by solving the following nonlinear system of first order differential equations
based on the initial condition given by the buyer’s announced type:
[C1 + iV(α)]δ(α)
Q2(α)(1− u−1)
∂Q(α)
∂V(α) δ˙(α)
=
f(α)
1− F (α){
i[Q(α)(1− u−1)− δ(α)]2
2Q(α)(1− u−1) −
∂D(α)
∂V(α) [V(α)− Cs − AsQ
−1(α)]
−
[
(C2 + iCs)δ
2(α)− iCsQ2(α)(1− u−1)2
2Q2(α)(1− u−1) +
AsD(α)
Q2(α)
]
∂Q(α)
∂V(α)}
− D(α)
[
1
α
ln
(
D(α)
k
)
+
1−K
α−Kα− 1
]
(4.39)
[
∂D(α)
∂δ(α)
+
i[Q2(α)(1− u−1)2 − δ2(α)]
2Q2(α)(1− u−1)
∂Q(α)
∂δ(α)
]
V˙(α)
=
f(α)
1− F (α){
∂D(α)
∂δ(α)
[V(α)− Cs − AsQ−1(α)] + i[Cs + V(α)]
+
[
(C2 + iCs)δ
2(α)− iCsQ2(α)(1− u−1)2
2Q2(α)(1− u−1) +
AsD(α)
Q2(α)
]
∂Q(α)
∂δ(α)
− [C1 + C2 + iCs + iV(α)]δ(α)
Q(α)(1− u−1) } (4.40)
t˙(α) = {D(α) + i[Q(α)(1− u
−1)− δ(α)]2
2Q(α)(1− u−1) }V˙(α)
+
[C1 + iV(α)]δ(α)− i(1− u−1)Q(α)V(α)
Q(α)(1− u−1) δ˙(α) (4.41)
Q2(α) =
2Ab (1− u−1)D(α) + [C1 + iV(α)]δ2(α)
i(1− u−1)2V(α) (4.42)
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where α ∈ [α, α¯], and
∂D(α)
∂V(α) = D(α)
[
α(1−K)AbQ−2(α)
V(α) + AbQ−1(α)
∂Q(α)
∂V(α) −
α(1−K)
V(α) + AbQ−1(α)
]
∂Q(α)
∂V(α) =
2αAb (1−u−1)(1−K)D(α)
V(α)+AbQ−1(α) + i[Q
2(α)(1− u−1)2 − δ2(α)]
2αA2b (1−u−1)(1−K)Q−2(α)D(α)
V(α)+AbQ−1(α) − 2i(1− u−1)2V(α)Q(α)
∂D(α)
∂δ(α)
=
α(1−K)AbQ−2(α)D(α)
V(α) + AbQ−1(α)
∂Q(α)
∂δ(α)
∂Q(α)
∂δ(α)
=
[C1 + iV(α)]δ(α)
i(1− u−1)2V(α)Q(α)− αA2b (1−u−1)(1−K)Q−2(α)D(α)V(α)+AbQ−1(α)
.
Proof To solve the seller’s problem (4.38), we follow Laffont and Tirole [87] by con-
structing a Hamiltonian system considering only constraint (4.36). The IR constraint
will be verified later based on the result of the optimal contract. We will write V˙(α) =
v(α), δ˙(α) = s(α), with λt(α), λV(α) and λδ(α) denote the Pontryagin multiplier. Thus,
problem (4.38) can be solved as an optimal control problem.
The Hamiltonian system can be written as:
H(V , δ, t, v, s, λt λV , λδ)
= {D(α)[V(α)− Cs − AsQ−1(α)]
− i Cs [Q(α)(1− u
−1)− δ(α)]2
2Q(α)(1− u−1) −
C2 δ
2(α)
2Q(α)(1− u−1) − t(α)}f(α)
+ λt(α) {
[
D(α) +
i[Q(α)(1− u−1)− δ(α)]2
2Q(α)(1− u−1)
]
v(α)
+
[C1 + iV(α)]δ(α)− i(1− u−1)Q(α)V(α)
Q(α)(1− u−1) s(α)}
+ λV(α)v(α) + λδ(α)s(α) (4.43)
The first order condition with respect to control variables v, s and state variables V , δ, t
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yield the following equations:
∂H
∂t
= −λ˙t(α) (4.44)
∂H
∂V = −λ˙V(α) (4.45)
∂H
∂δ
= −λ˙δ(α) (4.46)
∂H
∂v
= 0 (4.47)
∂H
∂s
= 0 (4.48)
keeping in mind thatD(α) = kKKα
[
1−K− 1
α
V(α)+AbQ−1(α)
]α(1−K)
andQ(α) depends on α,V(α), δ(α)
and is constrained by condition (4.42), so that order quantity Q(α) will be obtained by
incorporating conditions (4.44) to (4.48) given above.
Since the boundary at α = α¯ is unconstrained, the transversality condition on λt(α)
implies that λt(α¯) = 0. From equation (4.44), we obtain λ˙t(α) = f(α) and integrating
from α to α¯ yields
λt(α) = F (α)− 1. (4.49)
From equation (4.47), we obtain:
∂H
∂v
= λt(α)
[
D(α) +
i[Q(α)(1− u−1)− δ(α)]2
2Q(α)(1− u−1)
]
+ λV(α) = 0
and combining this with (4.49) gives
λV(α) = [1− F (α)]
[
D(α) +
i[Q(α)(1− u−1)− δ(α)]2
2Q(α)(1− u−1)
]
. (4.50)
Differentiating both side of equation (4.50) with respect to α to obtain λ˙V(α), then
substituting this into (4.45) will give equation (4.39).
Similarly, equation (4.49) combined with equation (4.48) gives
λδ(α) = [1− F (α)] [C1 + iV(α)]δ(α)− i(1− u
−1)Q(α)V(α)
Q(α)(1− u−1) (4.51)
and taking derivative with respect to α and substituting this into equation (4.46) will give
us equation (4.40).
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Equation (4.41) is the IC constraint (4.36) which has to be satisfied by the optimal
contract. Furthermore, (4.42) is just equation (4.27) which must also be satisfied by the
optimal contract. The partial derivative ∂D(α)
∂V(α) and
∂D(α)
∂δ(α)
stated in Proposition 4.3 are
derived from the demand function (4.22), and ∂Q(α)
∂V(α) and
∂Q(α)
∂δ(α)
from (4.42).
Next, we note that the system of first order differential equations generated by equa-
tions (4.39), (4.40), (4.41) and (4.42), defined in the region [α, α¯], where α, α¯ > 0 satisfy
the conditions for the existence and uniqueness of solution as given, for example, in Cod-
dington [29]. For any given point α ∈ [α, α¯], the right hand side of every equations in the
system are continuous. Furthermore, it is easy to check that the derivative of right hand
side of each equation in the system are also continuous. Therefore, with initial condition
given by the buyer’s announced type of α0 ∈ [α, α¯], the solutions exist and are unique.
Finally, the proof will be completed by verifying that the IR constraint is satisfied
by the optimal contract. We set V(α¯), δ(α¯) and t(α¯) such that the IR constraint (4.37)
is binding for α = α¯. We only need to check that for any given α < α¯, the IR con-
straint (4.37) is satisfied, and this follows because Πb(α) is decreasing in α under this
optimal contract.
4.4.2 Mechanism design – MC case
In order to determine the appropriate shortage size, the seller would like to acquire infor-
mation on the unit shortage cost that the buyer is facing. In this section, we consider a
mechanism design based on buyer’s type being her unit shortage cost C1, and assuming
that the seller offers an incentive contract [V(C1), δ(C1), t(C1)], where V(C1) is the selling
price, δ(C1) the shortage size and t(C1) a side payment for sharing marketing cost all
based on the buyer’s type C1. The seller’s uncertainty of the buyer’s type is encapsu-
lated by a probability density function f(C1) over [C1, C¯1] with cumulated probability
function F (C1). Again, we assume the single – crossing property holds by requiring that
Q(C1), δ(C1) are non-increasing in C1, and V(C1) is non-decreasing in C1, implying that
demand D(C1) is non–increasing in C1 where based on type C1, the demand becomes a
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function of C1, and can be expressed as
D(C1) = kP
−α(C1)Mβ(C1) (4.52)
A proof of demand is non-increasing in C1 will be provided later in the context.
Given the buyer’s true type of C1, and her announced type Cˆ1, by referring (4.8) the
seller’s profit function is
Πs(Cˆ1) = D(Cˆ1)
[
V(Cˆ1)− Cs − AsQ−1(Cˆ1)
]
− i Cs [Q(Cˆ1)(1− u
−1)− δ(Cˆ1)]2
2Q(Cˆ1)(1− u−1)
− C2 δ
2(Cˆ1)
2Q(Cˆ1)(1− u−1)
− t(Cˆ1). (4.53)
If the buyer’s true type is C1, and her announced type is Cˆ1, then replacing Cˆ1 by C1 in
the decision variables of the buyer in equation (4.1), she will realize her profit function
as
Πb(Cˆ1, C1) = D(C1)
[
P (C1)− V(Cˆ1)−M(C1)− AbQ−1(C1)
]
− iV(Cˆ1) [Q(C1)(1− u
−1)− δ(Cˆ1)]2
2Q(C1)(1− u−1)
− C1 δ
2(Cˆ1)
2Q(C1)(1− u−1) + t(Cˆ1). (4.54)
If the buyer accepts the contract, her optimal strategy will be the solution obtained
by maximizing her profit function based on truth-telling. Applying Proposition 3.1 in
Chapter 3, we therefore obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3. If the buyer accepts the contract and truthfully announces her type C1, then
her optimal strategy can be derived by solving the following equations simultaneously:
P (C1) =
α [V(C1) + AbQ−1(C1)]
α− β − 1 (4.55)
M(C1) =
β [V(C1) + AbQ−1(C1)]
α− β − 1 (4.56)
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and
2Ab (1− u−1)kα−αββ
[
α− β − 1
V(C1) + AbQ−1(C1)
]α−β
= i(1− u−1)2Q2(C1)V(C1)− [C1 + iV(C1)]δ2(C1). (4.57)
Thus, the demand function D(C1) is a non-increasing function in C1 can be proved as
following:
Proof If buyer’s type based on unit shortage cost, demand will depend on C1, so as
buyer’s selling price P (C1) and marketing effort M(C1). Based on truth-telling, we obtain
buyer’s optimal selling price and marketing expenditure from Lemma 4.3 described by
equations (4.55) and (4.56), respectively. Thus, the demand function becomes:
D(C1) = kα
−αββ
[
α− β − 1
V(C1) + AbQ−1(C1)
]α−β
(4.58)
The derivative of lnD(C1) gives
D˙(C1)
D(C1)
= −(α− β) V˙ (C1)− AbQ
−2(C1)Q˙(C1)
V(C1) + AbQ−1(C1) (4.59)
Since V(C1) + AbQ−1(C1) is positive, then V˙ (C1) − AbQ−2(C1)Q˙(C1) > 0. Due to
assumption α > β + 1 and D(C1) > 0, will implies D˙(C1) < 0. Complete the proof.
Following a similar approach to the MD case, a type C1 buyer claiming to be of type
Cˆ1 would lead to the following seller’s optimization problem:
Max
V,δ,t,Q
E(Πs(C1)) =
∫ C¯1
C1
Πs(C1)f(C1)dC1 (4.60)
Subject to Πb(C1, C1) ≥ Πb(Cˆ1, C1) (4.61)
Πb(C1) ≥ 0 (4.62)
where (4.61) and (4.62) are the IC and IR constraints respectively. Again, we assume
that all variables are nonnegative in this maximization problem.
Similar to the MD case, a necessary condition of the IC constraint (4.61) is
∂ Πb(Cˆ1, C1)
∂ Cˆ1
|Cˆ1=C1 = 0 (4.63)
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which yields
t˙(C1) = {D(C1) + i[Q(C1)(1− u
−1)− δ(C1)]2
2Q(C1)(1− u−1) }V˙(C1)
+
[C1 + iV(C1)]δ(C1)− iV(C1)Q(C1)(1− u−1)
Q(C1)(1− u−1) δ˙(C1) (4.64)
where D(C1) = kα
−αββ
[
α−β−1
V(C1)+AbQ−1(C1)
]α−β
.
We note here that using a similar proof to that given in MD case, we can show that the
condition (4.63) is also sufficient for the IC constraint (4.61).
Constructing a Hamiltonian system as we did in the MD case, the seller’s prob-
lem (4.60) can be solved as an optimal control problem. We summarize the result in
the next proposition:
Proposition 4.4. The seller’s optimal contract based on the buyer’s unit shortage cost
type is obtained by solving the following nonlinear system of first order differential equa-
tions based on the initial condition given by the buyer’s announced type:
[C1 + iV(C1)]δ(C1)
Q2(C1)(1− u−1)
∂Q(C1)
∂V(C1) δ˙(C1)
=
f(C1)
1− F (C1){
i[Q(C1)(1− u−1)− δ(C1)]2
2Q(C1)(1− u−1)
−
[
(C2 + iCs)δ
2(C1)− iCs(1− u−1)2Q2(C1)
2Q2(C1)(1− u−1) +
AsD(C1)
Q2(C1)
]
∂Q(C1)
∂V(C1)
− ∂D(C1)
∂V(C1) [V(C1)− Cs − AsQ
−1(C1)]} (4.65)
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[
∂D(C1)
∂δ(C1)
+
i[Q2(C1)(1− u−1)2 − δ2(C1)]
2Q2(C1)(1− u−1)
∂Q(C1)
∂δ(C1)
]
V˙(C1)
=
f(C1)
1− F (C1){
∂D(C1)
∂δ(C1)
[V(C1)− Cs − AsQ−1(C1)]
+
[
(C2 + iCs)δ
2(C1)− iCs(1− u−1)2Q2(C1)
2Q2(C1)(1− u−1) +
AsD(C1)
Q2(C1)
]
∂Q(C1)
∂δ(C1)
− [C1 + C2 + iCs + iV(C1)]δ(C1)
Q(C1)(1− u−1) + i[Cs + V(C1)]}
+
δ(C1)
Q(C1)(1− u−1) (4.66)
t˙(C1) =
[
D(C1) +
i[Q(C1)(1− u−1)− δ(C1)]2
2Q(C1)(1− u−1)
]
V˙(C1)
+
[C1 + iV(C1)]δ(C1)− i(1− u−1)V(C1)Q(C1)
Q(C1)(1− u−1) δ˙(C1) (4.67)
Q2(C1) =
2Ab (1− u−1)D(C1) + [C1 + iV(C1)]δ2(C1)
i(1− u−1)2V(C1) (4.68)
for any C1 ∈ [C1, C¯1]. where
∂D(C1)
∂V(C1) = −
(α− β)D(C1)
V(C1) + AbQ−1(C1) +
(α− β)AbQ−2(C1)D(C1)
V(C1) + AbQ−1(C1)
∂Q(C1)
∂V(C1)
∂Q(C1)
∂V(C1) =
2(α−β)Ab (1−u−1)D(C1)
V(C1)+AbQ−1(C1) + i[Q
2(C1)(1− u−1)2 − δ2(C1)]
2(α−β)A2b(1−u−1)Q−2(C1)D(C1)
V(C1)+AbQ−1(C1) − 2i(1− u−1)2V(C1)Q(C1)
∂D(C1)
∂δ(C1)
=
(α− β)AbQ−2(C1)D(C1)
V(C1) + AbQ−1(C1)
∂Q(C1)
∂δ(C1)
∂Q(C1)
∂δ(C1)
=
[C1 + iV(C1)]δ(C1)
i(1− u−1)2Q(C1)V(C1)− (α−β)A
2
b(1−u−1)Q−2(C1)D(C1)
V(C1)+AbQ−1(C1)
Proof Following Laffont and Tirole [87], we construct a Hamiltonian system to solve the
seller’s problem (4.60) with buyer’s type based on unit shortage cost C1. We consider only
the IC constraint (4.64) and write V˙(C1) = v(C1), δ˙(C1) = s(C1), with λt(C1), λV(C1)
and λδ(C1) denoting the Pontryagin multipliers. The IR constraint (4.62) can be verified
using the same idea as in the MD case.
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The Hamiltonian equation can be written as:
H(V , δ, t, v, s, λt λV , λδ)
= {D(C1)
[V(C1)− Cs − AsQ−1(C1)]
− i Cs [Q(C1)(1− u
−1)− δ(C1)]2
2Q(C1)(1− u−1) −
C2 δ
2(C1)
2Q(C1)(1− u−1) − t(C1)}f(C1)
+ λt(C1) {
[
D(C1) +
i[Q(C1)(1− u−1)− δ(C1)]2
2Q(C1)(1− u−1)
]
v(C1)
+
[C1 + iV(C1)]δ(C1)− i(1− u−1)V(C1)Q(C1)
Q(C1)(1− u−1) s(C1)}
+ λV(C1)v(C1) + λδ(C1)s(C1) (4.69)
where D(C1) = kP
−α(C1)Mβ(C1) and Q(C1) depends on C1, V(C1), δ(C1) according to
equation (4.57).
The first order condition applied to the Hamiltonian system yield the following equa-
tions:
∂H
∂t
= −λ˙t(C1) (4.70)
∂H
∂V = −λ˙V(C1) (4.71)
∂H
∂δ
= −λ˙δ(C1) (4.72)
∂H
∂v
= 0 (4.73)
∂H
∂s
= 0. (4.74)
Since the boundary at C¯1 is unconstrained, the transversality condition therefore implies
that λt(C¯1) = 0. Incorporating this condition with equation (4.70) implies
λt(C1) = F (C1)− 1 (4.75)
Equation (4.75) and equation (4.73) now yield
λV(C1) = [1− F (C1)]
[
D(C1) +
i[Q(C1)(1− u−1)− δ(C1)]2
2Q(C1)(1− u−1)
]
(4.76)
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Taking derivative of (4.76) with respect to C1 and incorporating this with equation (4.71)
will give equation (4.65). Similarly, using equation (4.75) in combination with equa-
tion (4.74) yield
λδ(C1) = [1− F (C1)] [C1 + iV(C1)]δ(C1)− i(1− u
−1)V(C1)Q(C1)
Q(C1)(1− u−1) (4.77)
Taking derivative of (4.77) with respect to C1, and incorporating this with equation (4.72)
will result in equation (4.66).
Since the seller’s optimal contract must satisfy the IC constraint (4.64), and the
buyer’s optimal order quantity must satisfy equation (4.57), incorporating equations
(4.65), (4.66) with IC constraint (4.64) and equation (4.57) will give us the system of
non-linear first order differential equation described in the proposition. Note that the
derivatives ∂D(C1)
∂V(C1) ,
∂D(C1)
∂δ(C1)
are obtained from demand function (4.52), and ∂Q(C1)
∂V(C1) ,
∂Q(C1)
∂δ(C1)
are obtained from condition (4.57). Finally, by the theorem of existence and uniqueness
stated in the proof of Proposition 4.3, the solutions for the system described in Proposi-
tion 4.4 exist and are unique.
4.4.3 Numerical examples
In this section, we provide numerical examples to illustrate the two mechanism designs and
their solutions. Both seller and buyer’s profits will be compared to those obtained from
the asymmetric games without implementation of these designs. Therefore, the values
of the parameters and type distributions will be the same as those used in Section 4.3.3.
We will also assume that the true types are α = 2.043 and C1 = 0.50 in the MD and
MC case respectively. To solve the system of nonlinear first order differential equations
in order to obtain the optimal contracts, we will need to specify the initial conditions.
For any announced types α0 and C10 , the initial conditions based on these values will be
solutions of the symmetric Seller-Stackelberg model obtained from solving problem (3.20)
presented in Chapter 3. Also, since the side payments t(α0) and t(C10) do not appear in
the problem (3.20), they will be set arbitrarily.
Example 3. Suppose in the MD case, the buyer announces to the seller that her type is
α0 = 2.040. Then solving the symmetric Seller-Stackelberg model, the initial conditions
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are V(α0) = 3.51, δ(α0) = 25, Q(α0) = 966, and we also set t(α0) = 8. Based on these
initial conditions, we display in Table 4.1 the solutions to the system of first order dif-
ferential equations (4.39) to (4.42) for different α values around α0. The corresponding
profit Πs(α) for the seller and Πb(α) for the buyer are displayed in Table 4.2 as well as
the profits obtained from the asymmetric Seller-Stackelberg model which are denoted by
piss and pi
s
b for the seller and buyer respectively.
Table 4.1: Optimal decision variables from MD optimal contract at different α values
α V(α) t(α) δ(α) Q(α) P (α) M(α)
2.035 3.53 7.78 35.86 1059.99 8.48 0.75
2.037 3.52 7.68 31.73 1021.67 8.46 0.74
2.039 3.52 7.82 27.34 984.33 8.44 0.74
2.041 3.52 8.29 22.51 947.85 8.44 0.74
2.043 3.53 9.35 16.83 911.86 8.44 0.74
2.045 3.54 11.95 8.76 875.05 8.48 0.75
Table 4.2: Seller and buyer’s profits from MD optimal contract and asymmetric Seller-
Stackelberg model for different α values
α Πs(α) pi
s
s
Πs(α)−piss
piss
Πb(α) pi
s
b
Πb(α)−pisb
pisb
2.035 63.99 46.12 39% 176.18 176.31 0%
2.037 64.67 46.11 40% 175.67 175.54 0%
2.039 65.15 46.10 41% 175.41 174.76 0%
2.041 65.34 46.09 42% 175.46 173.99 1%
2.043 65.02 46.08 41% 176.06 173.23 2%
2.045 63.38 46.07 38% 178.02 172.47 3%
Average 64.59 46.10 40% 176.13 174.38 1%
Example 4. Suppose the buyer announces in the MC case that her type is C10 = 0.45.
Then, applying the same approach as the previous example, the initial conditions obtained
by solving the symmetric Seller-Stackelberg model are V(C10) = 3.54, δ(C10) = 23 and
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Q(C10) = 522. Letting t(C10) = 8 and solving the system of first order differential
equations given by (4.65) to (4.68) will result in the optimal decision variables displayed
in Table 4.3 for different values of C1. In Table 4.4, we display both seller and buyer’s
profits obtained from the MC contract and asymmetric Seller-Stackelberg model.
Table 4.3: Optimal decision variables from MC optimal contract for different C1 values
C1 V(C1) t(C1) δ(C1) Q(C1) P (C1) M(C1)
0.42 3.36 0.46 29.42 617.11 8.11 0.71
0.44 3.48 5.60 25.07 552.12 8.41 0.74
0.46 3.60 10.31 20.99 493.39 8.71 0.77
0.48 3.71 14.71 17.11 440.40 8.99 0.79
0.50 3.82 18.95 13.33 392.53 9.28 0.82
0.52 3.93 23.26 9.42 348.99 9.58 0.84
Table 4.4: Seller and buyer’s profits from MC optimal contract and asymmetric Seller-
Stackelberg model for different C1 values
C1 Πs(C1) pi
s
s
Πs(C1)−piss
piss
Πb(C1) pi
s
b
Πb(C1)−pisb
pisb
0.42 65.71 45.79 44% 176.78 173.62 2%
0.44 66.29 45.86 45% 189.09 173.52 9%
0.46 66.83 45.94 45% 200.79 173.43 16%
0.48 67.22 46.01 46% 212.01 173.33 22%
0.50 67.37 46.08 46% 222.97 173.23 29%
0.52 62.15 46.16 45% 234.05 173.14 35%
Average 66.76 45.97 45% 205.95 173.38 19%
Discussion
In Table 4.1 and Table 4.3, it can be observed that in both MD and MC contracts, the
seller’s selling price V and side payment t are increasing with buyer’s type, while the
shortage size δ and buyer’s order quantity Q are decreasing. These results are consistent
with the single-crossing property. The results in Table 4.2 and Table 4.4 show that the
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profits obtained by introducing mechanism designs are larger than the corresponding
profits obtained from the asymmetric Seller-Stackelberg game. Furthermore, the shortage
size is less. For example, in the MD case when α = 2.043, the shortage size δ(α) = 16.83,
and in the MC case, when C1 = 0.50, the shortage size δ(C1) = 13.33, both of which
are smaller than S∗ = 18.09 which is the shortage size obtained from Example 1 in
Section 4.3.3.
We next compare the difference between the profits obtained from the mechanism
design games and the Seller-Stackelberg asymmetric information game. This will be
based on the average values in the last lines of Table 4.2 and Table 4.4. In the MD
case, the seller’s profit increased by 40% when compared with the profit obtained in the
asymmetric Seller-Stackelberg game, whereas the buyer’s profit only increased by 1% .
Table 4.4 shows that in the MC case, seller’s profit increased by 45% when compared with
asymmetric Seller-Stackelberg game, while the buyer’s profit increased by 19%, which is
significantly higher than in MD case. Thus, it can be seen that both seller and buyer will
gain more in MC case than in MD case, therefore the former would be preferred to both
players. However, since seller’s profit in the MC case is only slightly higher than in the
MD case, but the order quantity is considerably lower, the seller is faced with the choice
of whether to choose a larger order quantity (in the MD case) or slightly higher profit but
much lower order quantity (in the MC case).
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have investigated the seller-buyer supply chain management problem
under an asymmetric information structure. This approach seeks to discover how the
participants in a supply chain interact in situations where information is incomplete and
asymmetric. In this case, demand is only known to the buyer through price and marketing
elasticity, and the setup and production cost are known only to the seller. The interplay
between the seller and buyer was modeled by a Stackelberg game, where each of the
players took turn being Leader and Follower. This model provides an insight into how
the participants in a supply chain interact in situations where power is not symmetric and
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therefore the standard game–theoretic approach fails. A novel feature is the introduction
of two mechanism design contracts by the seller, when he has more power, to extract
information from the buyer. One of the contract, the MD–case, was aimed at obtaining
information on the demand experienced by the buyer, while another, the MC–case, seek
to elicit information on the buyer’s unit shortage cost.
Numerical results showed that the seller’s profit was less than that of the buyer’s
regardless of whether he assumed the leader or follower role. However, the mechanism
design contracts offered by the seller in exchange for information were shown to improve
the profit of both seller and buyer as well as reducing the size of the shortage. All this
lends support to the opinion that more efficient outcomes can be achieved by both players
using a mechanism design than from simply playing a non-cooperative asymmetric game.
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Chapter 5
Game Theoretical Models of
Two-Level Supply Chain With a
Strategic Consumer
5.1 Introduction
In microeconomic theory, the consumer is a central figure who is usually defined as an
entity who chooses from a given set of feasible options [84]. In a supply chain management
system, the consumer is the terminal point of the chain, and her behavior and preference
will directly affect market demand and total chain performance. Without a proper and
better understanding of consumer’s behavior and preference, orderly trading will be dis-
rupted which can jeopardize the proper functioning of the whole supply chain. Examples
of this abound in recent history, such as the recent collapse of the several film companies
and the shrinking of a media giant company, as the result of consumers shifting from
traditional film and newspaper to digital and internet media, and the loss of traditional
market to competitors. It is therefore crucial to investigate consumer’s behavior and pref-
erence by including her in the supply chain study, and investigate how its performance
can be enhanced or improved through her interaction with other members in the chain.
Motivated by this viewpoint, our objective in this chapter is to provide a comprehensive
study of a supply chain incorporating the supplier, retailer with a strategic consumer as
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a three–person game and investigate the interaction between them and examining the
possibility of forming different coalitions among the three players.
Over the last few decades, most research in supply chain management have mainly
focused on inventory planning, development of various incentive schemes and proper co-
ordination of the supply chain in order to obtain favorable outcomes for chain members.
Among numerous published literature in this area, we have referred some related pa-
pers in Chapter 2 and 3, such as Freeland [48], Abad [1], Weng [165], Viswanathan and
Wang [156], Jaber and Osman [70]. It must be emphasized that all these research were
from the supplier and retailer’s perspective, ignoring totally the consumer’s behavior and
preference in the supply chain.
In recent years, researchers have found that game theory is an essential tool in inves-
tigating the behavior of supply chain members and in modeling the complex interactions
that often occur between them. This has led to a broad application of game theory in sup-
ply chain management. Research which are related to game theoretical approach in supply
chain include but are not limited to, for example, Corbett and deGroote [31], Lau and Lau
[88], Chu and Lee [27], Lau et al. [89], Esmaeili et al. [42], Esmaeili and Zeephongsekul
[43]. Recently, research in this area has been extended into multi–level supply chain which
is more complicated than two-level supply chain due to an increase in a variety of possible
interactions. For instance, Munson and Rosenblatt [107] studied a three-level supply chain
involving a single supplier, manufacturer and retailer. The authors proposed a quantity
discount policy imposed by the manufacturer, who is the most influential player in the
chain, to the supplier in order to decrease the costs among the channel members. Jaber
et al. [71] investigated a three-level supplier-manufacturer-retailer supply chain where an
incentive mechanism has been set up for sharing profit among channel members in order
to maximize supply chain profit. Similar three-level supply chains have been studied by
Lee [91] and Lee and Moon [90]. In addition, Leng and Parlar [95] have also considered a
three-level supply chain using a cooperative game approach via the Shapley value. Zhang
and Liu [172] proposed a game mechanism to coordinate a three-level green supply chain
based on revenue sharing, Shapley values and Nash bargaining.
All the papers mentioned above focused exclusively on investigating the interaction or
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coordination between players who are the upstream members, i.e. supplier and retailer,
of a supply chain. They ignored the consumer who, as the terminal member of the chain,
could influence the decisions made by the upstream members and whose welfare may also
be affected by those decisions. To the best of our knowledge, very little research have been
done in investigating the interaction between the consumer and the upstream members.
Chesnokova [25] and Matsui [104] examined consumer’s welfare based on return policy.
Su and Zhang [144] studied the effect of strategic consumer behavior on supply chain
performance. However, in these papers, the complex interactions that often occurred
between consumer and upstream members were overlooked. Rather than examining the
consumer’s behavior and welfare from the consumer’s viewpoint, these were examined
instead from the perspectives of the upstream members.
In this chapter, we propose a three-person supply chain which consists of a single
supplier, retailer who will interact with a strategic consumer in several non-cooperative
games. In each production cycle, the retailer orders a quantity of product from the
supplier and sells it to the consumer. The supplier will determine the wholesale price and
allowable shortage. The consumer’s decision whether to purchase the product will depend
on her valuation of the product’s quality. In a three-person game, each player may act
individually as a self maximizer or some may form coalitions in an attempt to achieve a
better outcome. The best scenario will be obtained in a grand coalition among all the
participants in the chain, but this is unrealistic in supply chains with three or more players
due to factors such as cost sharing, profit sharing and a variety of strategic considerations.
Therefore, we will limit the scope by investigating a non-cooperative Stackelberg leader–
follower game under two scenarios: (i) no coalition is formed among the players and each
acts non-cooperatively, and (ii) a selection of two players act cooperatively by forming
coalition against the third player. The choice of a Stackelberg game is due to the fact that
it reflect many interactions prevailing in the market place where one or more players may
have more power than the other players. Hence the strategies of the players will depend
on whether they are the leader or follower in the game.
Under the first scenario, we will let each player takes turn as the leader and the other
two players assume the role of the followers. Under the second scenario, we consider two
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types of coalition among players: Supplier– Retailer Coalition (hereafter called SRC) and
Retailer-Consumer Coalition (hereafter called RCC). In each case, the coalition has more
power than the lone player, i.e the coalition is the leader while the lone player the follower.
The effectiveness of leadership and coalition formation to a player’s strategy and profit
will be compared under these two scenarios.
After the introduction, this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 provides as-
sumptions which underlie our models. In Section 5.3, the consumer’s utility model, the
retailer’s and supplier’s profit models are presented. In Section 5.4 and 5.5, we investigate
the interaction between retailer, supplier and consumer using a Stackelberg game, with
and without coalition, respectively. Numerical examples, including a sensitivity analysis,
will be provided in each of these sections to demonstrate and compare the results between
the different scenarios. Section 5.6 concludes this chapter with some suggestions for future
research.
5.2 Assumptions
In this chapter, the supplier and retailer’s decision variables are as same as the seller
and buyer’s decision variables which we defined in Chapter 3, except we now have extra
decision variable related to consumer. All the notations that are used in this chapter can
be found in Appendix A.
Note: In the sequel, the decision variables obtained as solutions to a game model will have
appropriate superscripts on them. For example, the retailer selling price corresponding
to the Retailer-Stackelberg game will be denoted by P rs and the order quantity obtained
as solution to the RCC-Stackelberg game will be denoted by Qrcc.
Assumptions
1. We assume that the quality Xi of products from a lot size Q, i.e. Xi, i = 1, 2, . . . , Q,
are independent and identically distributed with cdf F (·) and pdf f(·) = F ′(·) > 0
over the domain [0, 1]. This is common knowledge to all players.
2. The demand function should capture the consumer’s preferences and choices [85].
It is usually determined by many factors such as price, quality, advertisement and
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warranty. Among these, price P and quality R are the most important factors
that will influence the consumer’s decision to purchase the product. Therefore, in
order to explore consumer’s influence to the demand function, we propose a demand
function, which depends on price P and quality level R, based on the Cobb-Douglas
function given by
D = kP−αRζ (5.1)
where k is a constant and α, ζ are the price and quality level elasticity respectively.
The Cobb-Douglas function is widely used in economics and supply chain (c.f. Lee
and Kim [92], Goyal and Gunasekaran [56], Yu et al. [169], Esmaeili et al. [42]).
3. The hazard function f(R)
1−F (R) >
ζ
R
which, due to the fact that ζ
R
= 1D
∂D
∂R
, imposes
the condition that hazard rate of the quality R is greater than the rate of change in
demand with respect to R and is inversely proportional to the demand.
4. A consumer’s valuation of a product is often highly personal and intrinsic (c.f.Zeithaml
[170]) and reflects her overall assessment of the utility of the product and depends on
her perception of what is received and what should be given back in return. Thus,
we assume that consumer’s valuation function V (X) depends on the perceived qual-
ity X. Referring to Tirole [150], the valuation function V (X) should increases with
decreasing rate with respect to X and has a finite upper bound, that is
dV (x)
dx
> 0,
d2V (x)
dx2
< 0, and lim
x→∞
V (x) = V˜ .
The valuation increases with increasing quality level, but at a decreasing rate and
never reaching the upper threshold value V˜ .
5. This assumption concerns the adverse effect on the consumer’s satisfaction due to
products being rejected after inspection at the point of purchase. These rejected
products will incur a disutility cost, denote by S0, which we will assume to be
proportional to V (X) according to S0 = ξV (X) where 0 ≤ ξ ≤ 1. According to
this condition, the higher is the consumer’s valuation of the product, the higher
disutility will be incurred if the product is rejected. Notice that the bounds on ξ
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indicates that the disutility cost is positive and will not exceed the total valuation
of the product.
6. We will assume that E(V (X))+E(S0)
2
> P , i.e. the average of the expected valuation
and disutility is greater than the price the consumer has to pay for the product. Note
that this assumption is equivalent to E (V (X))−P > P−E(S0), which emphasizes
its reasonableness, since the condition states that the profit to the consumer based
on the valuation of the product is greater that her loss less the disutility.
7. To ensure that the seller has enough margin to refund the buyer, we let Cb, retailer’s
unit lost sale due to unacceptable product, be less than the difference between seller’s
minimum selling price and unit production and setup cost, i.e.
Cb < V0 − Cs − As
Q
where V0 is seller’s minimum selling price.
8. The production rate r is related to the demand rate d by r = ud where u > 1.
5.3 Model formulation for each player
The supply chain evolves in the following pattern: in each production cycle, the retailer
places an order to the supplier who then supply the finished products to the retailer. The
retailer then sells the products to a consumer. The models formulated for the players are
based on this sequence of events.
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5.3.1 Retailer’s model
We itemize the terms that comprise the retailer’s annual profit function after placing an
order Q:
PD : Sales revenue;
VD : Purchase cost;
Ab
D
Q
: Ordering cost;
CbDF (R) : Lost sale cost due to inspection;
iVI : Holding cost;
C1B : Shortage cost.
where I = [Q(1−u
−1)−S]2
2Q(1−u−1) and B =
S2
2Q(1−u−1) are the positive and negative inventory over
a cycle as we derived in Section 3.2.1 of Chapter 3, using the idea developed by Johnson
and Montgomery [78].
The retailer’s profit function can be expressed as
Retailer’s annual profit = Sales revenue - Purchase cost - Ordering cost - Lost
sale cost - Holding cost - Shortage cost.
and using the terms described above, this can be expressed mathematically as
Πr (P,Q) = PD − VD − Ab D
Q
− CbDF (R)− iVI − C1B
= PD − VD − Ab D
Q
− CbDF (R)
−iV [Q(1− u
−1)− S]2
2Q(1− u−1) −
C1 S2
2Q(1− u−1) . (5.2)
where DF (R), defined in Section 5.3.3, is the expected quantity of product which the
consumer will not purchase after inspection due to its failure to reach the desired quality
level, and these will be returned to the supplier for rework.
Lemma 5.1. Retailer’s optimal decision is the solution of the following equations
P =
α [V + AbQ−1 + Cb F (R)]
α− 1 . (5.3)
iV(1− u−1)2Q2 = 2Ab (1− u−1)D + (iV + C1)S2. (5.4)
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Proof Since Πr(P,Q) is strictly Pseudoconcave with respect to P and concave with
respect to Q according to Lemma 3.1, from Chapter 3, the first order condition with
respect to P and Q yield the equations (5.3) and (5.4). Hence, retailer’s optimal decision
variables P ∗ and Q∗ can be obtained by solving equations (5.3) and (5.4) simultaneously.
Proof complete.
Observation: Equation (5.3) implies that retailer’s selling price P is increasing in sup-
plier’s selling price V and consumer’s quality level R, but decreasing in Q.
5.3.2 Supplier’s model
After receiving an order to supply the retailer, the supplier charged a unit selling price of
V and allowed a possible shortage size of S. The supplier’s annual profit function consists
of the following terms:
VD : Sales revenue;
CsD : Production cost;
As
D
Q
: Setup cost;
CrDF (R) : Rework cost;
i Cs I : Holding cost;
C2B : Shortage cost.
and is equal to
Supplier’s profit = Sales revenue - Production cost - Setup cost - Rework cost
- Holding cost - Shortage cost.
Mathematically, this is expressed as
Πs (V ,S) = VD − CsD − As D
Q
− CrDF (R)− i Cs I − C2B
= VD − CsD − As D
Q
− CrDF (R)
− i Cs [Q(1− u
−1)− S]2
2Q(1− u−1) −
C2 S2
2Q(1− u−1) . (5.5)
109
The first order condition with respect to S yields
S∗ = i (1− u
−1)CsQ
iCs + C2
(5.6)
and since ∂
2 Πs
∂S2 = − i Cs +C2(1−u−1)Q < 0, S∗ given by (5.6) is the optimal solution for the supplier.
Substituting S∗ into (5.5) gives the supplier’s corresponding profit as a function of V :
Πs(V) = VD − CsD − As D
Q
− CrDF (R)− i Cs Is − C2Bs (5.7)
where Is =
C22 Q(1−u−1)
2(Cs i+C2)2
and Bs =
C2s i
2Q(1−u−1)
2(Cs i+C2)2
are the positive and negative inventory
respectively corresponding to S∗. Since (5.7) is linear in V , the minimum selling price
charged by the supplier is V0 when Πs(V) = 0, ie., V0 = Cs + AsQ +Cr F (R)+ i Cs IsD−1 +
C2BsD−1. Therefore, supplier can obtain the optimal selling price from
V∗ = WV0 = W (Cs + As
Q
+ Cr F (R) + i Cs IsD−1 + C2BsD−1). (5.8)
for some W > 1, where W is the supplier’s marginal selling price. Thus, the supplier’s
optimal decision variables are given by V∗ and S∗. We summarize the result in the
following lemma.
Lemma 5.2. Supplier’s optimal decision is given by the solution of following equations:
S∗ = i (1− u
−1)CsQ
iCs + C2
(5.9)
V∗ = W (Cs + As
Q
+ Cr F (R) + i Cs IsD−1 + C2BsD−1). (5.10)
for W > 1.
Using the results from Lemma 5.2, substituting S∗ given by (5.9) into Is, Bs, we obtain
Is =
C22S∗
2iCs(iCs +C2)
, and Bs =
iCsS∗
2(iCs +C2)
, then substituting these values into equation (5.10)
will give us
V = W (Cs + As
Q
+
C2S∗Pα
2kRζ
). (5.11)
Observation: From equation (5.11), we observe that the supplier’s selling price V is
decreasing in Q, and increasing in P and S∗.
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5.3.3 Consumer’s model
The consumer’s purchasing decision is arrived at after determining the product quality X
at the point of purchase. This decision is based on her judgment of the product’s overall
excellence or superiority [170]. Although the consumer is aware of the selling price of the
product, its true quality is usually not reveal to her. As we have assumed in Section 5.2,
this uncertainty of the true quality of the product is expressed through a probability
distribution. The decision whether or not to purchase will be based on comparing X
against a fixed quality level R determined by the consumer: if the actual quality X > R,
the consumer will purchase the product; otherwise, the product will not be purchased.
Suppose on each production cycle T , the retailer orders quantity Q of the product
from the supplier and sells it to the consumer. Then, based on the quality Xi, i = 1...Q
of the ith product, we define
Ii =
1, if Xi ≥ R0, if Xi < R.
The quantity which is bought by the consumer is q =
∑Q
i Ii, with expected value
E(q) = Q(1− F (R))
and the expected quantity which is rejected by the consumer is therefore Q − E(q) =
QF (R).
The consumer’s annual utility is given by
Consumer’s annual utility = Consumer valuation - Purchase cost - Disutility
due to unaccepted product - shortage cost
or, expressed mathematically as a function of her decision variable R,
Πc (R) =
D
Q
{[E (V (X))− P ]E(q)− E(S0) [Q− E(q)]− C3 S}
= D{E (V (X))− P − C3 S
Q
− [E (V (X))− P + E(S0)]F (R)}. (5.12)
We note that
dΠc
dR
=
ζ
R
Πc (R)−D [E (V (X))− P + E(S0)] f(R)
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hence the first order condition with respect to R yields
F (R) +
R
ζ
f(R) =
E (V (X))− P − C3 S
Q
E (V (X))− P + E(S0) . (5.13)
Lemma 5.3. Consumer’s utility function Πc (R) is Pseudoconcave in R.
Proof To show Πc (R) is Pseudoconcave in R, we need to show that for any R1 6=
R2,−Πc (R2) ≤ −Πc (R1) implies −∇Πc (R1)(R2 − R1) < 0. That is, if
D2 { [E (V (X))− P + E(S0)]F (R2)−
[
E (V (X))− P − C3 S
Q
]
}
≤ D1 { [E (V (X))− P + E(S0)]F (R1)−
[
E (V (X))− P − C3 S
Q
]
} (5.14)
where Di = kP−αRζi , i = 1, 2, show that
D1 {
[
f(R1) +
ζ
R1
F (R1)
]
[E (V (X))− P + E(S0)]
− ζ
R1
[
E (V (X))− P − C3 S
Q
]
}(R2 − R1) < 0. (5.15)
In order to show (5.15) holds, it is sufficient to prove that (5.14) implies
R2 < R1 (5.16)[
f(R1) +
ζ
R1
F (R1)
]
[E (V (X))− P + E(S0)] − ζ
R1
[
E (V (X))− P − C3 S
Q
]
> 0.
(5.17)
Note that if inequality (5.16) and (5.17) hold, since D1 > 0, then (5.15) must hold.
Based on some of our assumptions, we will first use contradiction to show that (5.14)
implies (5.16), then prove directly that (5.17) is true.
Suppose R2 ≥ R1, then D2 ≥ D1, and F (R2) ≥ F (R1) (assumption 1). Since
E (V (X))− P + E(S0) > 0 (assumption 6), this implies
D2 {[E (V (X))− P + E(S0)]F (R2)−
[
E (V (X))− P − C3 S
Q
]
}
≥ D1 {[E (V (X))− P + E(S0)]F (R1)−
[
E (V (X))− P − C3 S
Q
]
} (5.18)
which contradicts (5.14), hence (5.16) hold.
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By assumption 3, for any fixed point R1 ∈ (0, 1),
f(R1)
1− F (R1) >
ζ
R1
and since 1− F (R1) > 0, we have
f(R1) >
ζ
R1
[1− F (R1)]
which implies
f(R1) +
ζ
R1
F (R1) >
ζ
R1
> 0. (5.19)
Further,
E (V (X))− P + E(S0) > E (V (X))− P − C3 S
Q
hence[
f(R1) +
ζ
R1
F (R1)
]
[E (V (X))− P + E(S0)] > ζ
R1
[
E (V (X))− P − C3 S
Q
]
which proves that (5.17) holds. This completes the proof.
Since Πc (R) is Pseudoconcave in R, therefore the solution to the first order condition
(5.13) will determine the unique R∗ that maximizes the consumer’s utility. Hence, we
have the following lemma.
Lemma 5.4. Consumer’s optimal decision R is the solution of the following equation
F (R) +
R
ζ
f(R) =
E (V (X))− P − C3 S
Q
E (V (X))− P + E(S0) . (5.20)
From equation (5.12), after applying the first order derivative with respect to P,S and
Q, we can also deduce the following observation:
Observation: Consumer’s utility Πc (R) is decreasing in P and S, but increasing in Q.
5.4 Stackelberg games with a single leader and no
coalition
A well known concept in game theory which has been widely applied is that of a Stack-
elberg game [159, 69]. As we described in Section 2.1.2, Chapter 2, for a game with
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two players, this concept involves a hierarchy of decision making where one player, the
leader, holds power and makes the first move while the other player, the follower, replies
by playing the best strategy that is consistent with all the information that are available.
The leader then selects the move which will maximize his return considering all rational
strategies that the follower could adopt. In this section, we will extend the Stackelberg
game concept to three players, i.e. the supplier, retailer and consumer, in a competitive
market. One player will be the leader and the remaining players the followers but they
are not allowed to cooperate and form a coalition against the leader. We will let each
player takes turn as the leader, and depending on who takes on the leadership role, we will
have the Supplier–Stackelberg, the Retailer–Stackelberg and the Consumer–Stackelberg
game respectively. Since the interaction between supplier and retailer has already been
investigated in Chapter 3 and 4, we will focus here on the welfare of the consumer with
respect to her interaction with both the supplier and retailer. Numerical examples will be
provided to compare and contrast between the three games and to demonstrate the effect
that a player’s leadership position has on his optimal strategies and resulting profits.
5.4.1 Supplier–Stackelberg game
In this game, the supplier takes on the role of leader, the retailer and consumer are the
followers. The supplier makes the first move and select V and S ; the consumer then replies
with R which satisfies (5.20) and the retailer with P,Q which satisfy (5.3) and (5.4), i.e.
their best responses to the supplier’s first move. Finally, the supplier’s final decision is
obtained by selecting the optimal strategy among the best responses by the consumer and
retailer. Therefore, the optimal solutions V∗ and S∗ to this game are obtained by solving
the following nonlinear optimization problem with constraints (5.20), (5.3) and (5.4):
max Πs(V ,S) = VD − CsD − As D
Q
− CrDF (R)
− i Cs [Q(1− u
−1)− S]2
2Q(1− u−1) −
C2 S2
2Q(1− u−1) . (5.21)
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subject to P =
α[V + AbQ−1 + Cb F (R)]
α − 1 (5.22)
iV(1− u−1)2Q2 = 2Ab (1− u−1)D + (iV + C1)S2 (5.23)
F (R) +
R
ζ
f(R) =
E (V (X))− P − C3 SQ−1
E (V (X))− P + E(S0) . (5.24)
In the following, we denote T (R) = F (R) + R
ζ
f(R) to simplify the notation, where
T (R) is the right hand side of equation (5.24), which implies that 0 < T (R) < 1, since
E (V (X))− P − C3SQ−1 < E (V (X))− P + E(S0). Solving equation (5.22) and (5.24)
simultaneously give
P =
α
α− 1{V + Cb F (R)
+ Ab
(α − 1)[E (V (X)) (1− T (R))− E(S0)T (R)]− α [1− T (R)][V + Cb F (R)]
αAb [1− T (R)] + (α − 1)C3 S }
(5.25)
Q =
αAb [1− T (R)] + (α − 1)C3 S
(α − 1)[E (V (X)) (1− T (R))− E(S0)T (R)]− α [1− T (R)][V + Cb F (R)](5.26)
Using equation (5.23) in combination with equation (5.25) and (5.26) will give us
R once f(·) is known. Thus, the optimization problem reduces to a non-constrained
nonlinear optimization problem which can be used to solve for V∗ and S∗ numerically. A
numerical example will be provided at the end of this section.
Since 0 < T (R) < 1 and α > 1, equation (5.25) and (5.26) also provide us with the
following observations:
Observation: when supplier is the leader, the retailer’s selling price is increasing in V ,
and the order quantity Q is increasing in S. Thus, consumer’s utility is dependent on
P,Q,V and S.
5.4.2 Retailer-Stackelberg game
In this game, the retailer is the leader, and the supplier and consumer assume the role
of followers. The game sequence proceeds in a similar manner outlined in Section 5.4.1
but with the leadership role assumed by the retailer. Thus, the retailer would seek to
determine her most profitable selling price and order quantity, based on the supplier and
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consumer’s best responses, so that her profit would be maximized. Therefore, the retailer’s
optimization problem can be expressed as
max Πr(P,Q) = PD − VD − Ab D
Q
− CbDF (R)
− iV [Q(1− u
−1)− S]2
2Q(1− u−1) −
C1 S2
2Q(1− u−1) . (5.27)
subject to S = i (1− u
−1)CsQ
iCs + C2
(5.28)
V = W
(
Cs +
As
Q
+ Cr F (R) + i Cs IsD−1 + C2BsD−1
)
(5.29)
F (R) +
R
ζ
f(R) =
E (V (X))− P − C3 SQ−1
E (V (X))− P + E(S0) . (5.30)
where equations (5.28) and (5.29) is the supplier’s optimal decision given by Lemma 5.2,
and equation (5.30) is consumer’s optimal decision given by Lemma 5.4.
Substituting equation (5.28) into (5.30) gives
F (R) +
R
ζ
f(R) =
(iCs + C2)(E (V (X))− P )− iC3Cs (1− u−1)
(iCs + C2)(E (V (X))− P + E(S0)) (5.31)
and then equation (5.29) and (5.31) into (5.27) to yield an objective function without the
constraints. An application of the first order condition with respect to P and Q give
P =
α
α − 1
[
V + Ab
Q
+ Cb F (R)
]
− α
α − 1
[
V −W (Cs + As
Q
+ Cr F (R))
]
(1 + i IsD−1)
− P [WCr (1 + i IsD
−1) + Cb]
α − 1
F (R) + R
ζ
f(R)− 1
E (V (X))− P + E(S0) (5.32)
Q =
(Ab +WAs)D + iWAs Is
(iVIs + C1Bs) +W (iCs Is + C2Bs)(1 + iIsD−1) . (5.33)
The retailer’s optimal decision variables P ∗ and Q∗ can be obtained by solving equation
(5.32) and (5.33) simultaneously.
From equation (5.31) and consumer’s utility function (5.12), the following lemma
holds:
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Lemma 5.5. In a Stackelberg game where supplier is the follower, the consumer’s quality
level R and hence her utility Πc(R) will depend only on the retailer’s selling price P .
The proof of this lemma is straight forward from equation (5.31), and by substituting
equation (5.28) into consumer’s utility function (5.12), which yield the resulting equation
only depend on P .
Comparing equation (5.32) with (5.22), and using the assumption that E(V (X)) −
P > P − E(S0), Cr < Cb, where Cb is sufficiently small and α > 1, we will have
P rs < P ss. Therefore, incorporating the observations at the end of Section 5.3.1 and 5.3.2,
we obtain Qrs > Qss, Vrs < Vss and Srs < Sss, which implies Srs
Qrs
< S
ss
Qss
. Therefore, in
combination with Lemma 5.5, we also obtain Πrsc > Π
ss
c . All this is summarized in the
following result:
Proposition 5.1. In a three-person game where there is no coalition among the players,
the consumer’s utility is greater in the Retailer–Stackelberg game than in the Supplier–
Stackelberg game.
5.4.3 Consumer-Stackelberg game
In this game, consumer has the role of leader, and the supplier and retailer assume the
role of followers. The consumer’s decision will be based on inspection of products at the
point of purchase to determine the quality level which is acceptable to her. Proceeding as
in the previous games, the consumer’s optimization problem based on the followers’ best
responses is:
max Πc(R) = D{E (V (X))− P − C3 S
Q
− [E (V (X))− P + E(S0)]F (R)} (5.34)
subject to P =
α [V + AbQ−1 + Cb F (R)]
α − 1 (5.35)
S = i (1− u
−1)CsQ
iCs + C2
(5.36)
V = W
(
Cs +
As
Q
+ Cr F (R) + i Cs IsD−1 + C2BsD−1
)
(5.37)
iV(1− u−1)2Q2 = 2Ab (1− u−1)D + (iV + C1)S2 (5.38)
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Substituting equation (5.37) into equation (5.35) and (5.38), will eliminate V from those
equations. The resulting equations can be solved simultaneously to obtain P,Q and S.
Substituting these into (5.34) will produce a nonlinear optimization problem with no
constraints which can be solved numerically for the optimal decision variable R∗.
Applying the same reasoning as in the Retailer-Stackelberg game, we obtain P cs >
P rs. Thus, by using the observation in at the end of Section 5.3.3, incorporating Lemma
5.5, it will follow that the consumer’s utility will be less than those obtained from Retailer-
Stackelberg game, ie., Πcsc < Π
rs
c . We summarize this in the following result:
Proposition 5.2. In all three–person Stackelberg games, the consumer’s utility is great-
est when the retailer is the leader.
5.4.4 Numerical examples
We provide numerical examples in this section to demonstrate the preceding Stackelberg
games and reveal some implications due to leadership role. In the examples, we assume
that X is uniformly distributed over interval [0, 1] and we also choose a classical utility
function V (x) = (1 − e−γ x)V˜ , where γ > 0, as the consumer’s valuation function and
therefore the consumer’s disutility function is S0 = ξ V (x). The following parameter
values will be assumed in all examples: k = 3600, α = 1.7, ζ = 0.8, u = 1.1, i = 0.1,W =
1.25, As = 140, Ab = 40, Cs = 1.5, Cb = 0.5, Cr = 0.1, C1 = 2, C2 = 1, C3 = 1, V˜ =
100, γ = 0.5, ξ = 0.01.
Example 1. Consider the Supplier-Stackelberg game where the supplier is leader. Solving
problem (5.21) constrained by equations (5.22) to (5.24), give V = 4.03,S = 25.79, and a
profit of Πs = 70.39. The corresponding retailer and consumer’s optimal decision variables
are obtained by solving (5.22) to (5.24) simultaneously giving P = 10.43, Q = 744.09
and R = 0.4232, yielding a retailer’s profit of Πr = 191.17 and consumer’s utility of
Πc = 64.57.
Example 2. Consider next the Retailer-Stackelberg game, where the retailer is leader.
Solving the problem (5.27), we obtain retailer’s selling price P = 5.62, order quantity
Q = 1143.86, resulting in a profit of Πr = 304.78. Using equations (5.28) and (5.29), we
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obtain the supplier’s selling price as V = 2.17 and shortage size S = 13.56. From equation
(5.30), we obtain the consumer’s quality level as R = 0.4362. The corresponding supplier’s
profit and consumer’s utility are Πs = 42.71 and Πc = 453.52 respectively.
Example 3. Finally, when the consumer is the leader in the supply chain, we solve (5.34)
constrained by equations (5.35) to (5.38) resulting in consumer’s quality level R =
0.4056 with utility Πc = 360.39. The retailer’s and supplier’s decision variables obtained
from (5.35) to (5.38) are P = 6.17, Q = 607.72 and V = 2.27,S = 7.21 respectively, with
corresponding profits Πr = 282.25 and Πs = 36.05.
The numerical results show that consumer’s utility is greater when retailer is the
leader, and smaller when supplier is the leader. This is consistent with the result given in
Proposition 5.2. Also, both the supplier and retailer have a leadership advantage in that
the leader will gain more profit. This observation is consistent with the observation given
in Chapter 3. Moreover, the supplier obtained the least payoff when consumer is leader
and the retailer obtained the least payoff when supplier is leader. These observations
point to the possibility that the supplier will attempt to form a coalition with the retailer
against the consumer, and the retailer will attempt to form a coalition with the consumer
against the supplier, given that an alliance against a third player will usually give the
coalition more power and confer more advantages. We will explore and investigate these
types of games in the next section.
5.5 Stackelberg games with coalitions
In a three-person game, two players may form a coalition at the expense of the third player
to gain an edge in the market. Coalition between supplier and retailer is quite common
in supply chain management, and it is usually achieved by implementing some incentive
schemes such as discount policy, credit option and buyback policy, but may seem less so
between retailer and consumer. However, cooperation between consumer and retailer is
quite common; for example, a coalition between the retailer and consumer could manifest
itself in sharing of information, negotiation for suitable prices and suitable warranty term.
In this section we will investigate coalitional Stackelberg game under two scenarios:
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(i) The retailer and consumer form a coalition and has more power than the supplier
(RCC).
(ii) The supplier and retailer form a coalition and has more power than the consumer
(SRC).
In other words, the coalition is the leader and the remaining single player the follower of
the Stackelberg game.
A justification for the above coalitions is seen in the phenomena which often occur in
practise where the consumer may negotiate the warranty and return term with the retailer
against the supplier, and the retailer and supplier may coordinate their inventory planning
and selling price against the consumer.
5.5.1 RCC-Stackelberg game
In the RCC-Stackelberg game, retailer and consumer cooperate with each other against
the supplier. The coalition jointly acts as leader and the supplier as follower. The coalition
first selects a strategy and the supplier responds with his best strategy. The coalition then
replies by selecting the cooperative Pareto optimum solution among the best responses
offered by supplier through carrying out the joint optimization of the weighted sum of
their profit functions:
Zrc = τ Πr(P,Q) + (1− τ)Πc(R)
where 0 < τ < 1. Thus, the RCC’s problem becomes:
max Zrc (5.39)
subject to argmax Πs (V ,S) (5.40)
or
max Zrc = τ
[
PD − VD − Ab D
Q
− CbDF (R)− iV [Q(1− u
−1)− S]2
2Q(1− u−1) −
C1 S2
2Q(1− u−1)
]
+ (1− τ)D{E (V (X))− P − C3 S
Q
− [E (V (X))− P + E(S0)]F (R)} (5.41)
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subject to S = i(1− u
−1)CsQ
iCs + C2
(5.42)
V = W
(
Cs +
As
Q
+ Cr F (R) + i Cs IsD−1 + C2BsD−1
)
. (5.43)
Substituting equations (5.42) and (5.43) into equation (5.41), reduces the problem to an
unconstrained nonlinear optimization problem.
It would be interesting here to compare the results between the RCC-Stackelberg game
and Consumer-Stackelberg game, where the consumer holds a leadership position, to see
whether she gains any advantage by forming a coalition with the retailer.
To further explore the effect of coalition game to consumer’s welfare compare those
games without coalition, we obtain the following equation by using first order condition
with respect to P as:
P =
α
α − 1
[
V + Ab
Q
+ Cb F (R)
]
− α
α − 1
[
V −W (Cs + As
Q
+ Cr F (R))
]
(1 + i IsD−1)
− 1− τ
τ(α − 1)[αΠc(R)D
−1 + (1− F (R))P ] (5.44)
Notice that in both Consumer-Stackelberg game and RCC-Stackelberg game, consumer
has the same position, ie., in the leadership position, and the supplier is the follower.
Thus, by Lemma 5.5, consumer’s utility will only depend on retailer’s selling price P .
Compare equation (5.44) with equation (5.35), since F (R) < 1, 0 < τ < 1 and V >
W (Cs +
As
Q
+ Cr F (R)), with assumption that α > 1, we obtain P
rcc < P cs. Hence,
incorporating Lemma 5.5 and observation in at end of Section 5.3.3, we conclude that
Πrccc > Π
cs
c . Thus, based on the above discussion, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 5.3. The consumer’s utility is greater when she is in coalition with the
retailer than on her own as a leader.
5.5.2 SRC-Stackelberg game
In SRC-Stackelberg game, supplier and retailer form a coalition against consumer. The
game flow is similar to the RCC game of the previous section. We will investigate the
121
conflict between SRC and consumer, and let SRC acts as a leader. The SRC designed
based on concept of Pareto efficient solution as weighted sum of supplier and retailer’s
profit function, so that the supplier and retailer work together to determine their decision
variables. SRC will make the first move, and maximize their Pareto profit function based
on consumer’s best strategy. The SRC’s problem become:
max Zsr = λΠs(V ,S) + (1− λ)Πb(P,Q). (5.45)
subject to F (R) +
R
ζ
f(R) =
E (V (X))− P − C3 SQ−1
E (V (X))− P + E(S0) . (5.46)
Substituting equation (5.46) into (5.45), reduce the problem as a non-constrained nonlin-
ear optimization problem. The first order condition with respect to V ,S, P and Q, yield
the following equations:
λ =
2DQ(1− u−1) + i[Q(1− u−1)− S]2
4DQ(1− u−1) + i[Q(1− u−1)− S]2 (5.47)
Note that 0 < λ < 1, as it desired.
P =
α
α − 1
[
V + Ab
Q
+ Cb F (R)
]
− α
α − 1
[
V − Cs − As
Q
− Cr F (R)
]
(1 + i ID−1)
− P [Cr (1 + i I D
−1) + Cb]
α − 1
F (R) + R
ζ
f(R)− 1
E (V (X))− P + E(S0) (5.48)
Q2 =
2D
[
λAs + (1− λ)Ab − C3 S[λCr +(1−λ)Cb]E(V (X))−P−E(S0)
]
(1− u−1)[λ iCs + (1− λ)iV ]
+
[λ(i Cs + C2) + (1− λ)(iV + C1)]S2
(1− u−1)[λ iCs + (1− λ)iV ] (5.49)
S =
(1− u−1)
[
Q[λ iCs + (1− λ)iV ] + C3D[λCr +(1−λ)Cb]E(V (X))−P+E(S0)
]
λ(i Cs + C2) + (1− λ)(iV + C1) (5.50)
Once pdf f(x) is given, solve the above equations simultaneously and combining this with
the equation obtained by the first order condition with respect to λ, we can obtain the
optimal strategy for supplier-retailer coalition.
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It is worthwhile to investigate what is the effect of supplier-retailer coalition to con-
sumer’s welfare. By compare equation (5.48) with equation (5.32) which obtained from
Retailer-Stackelberg game, since both α > 1,W > 1 (by assumption in Section ??),
we have α
[
V − (Cs + AsQ + Cr F (R))
]
> α
[
V −W (Cs + AsQ + Cr F (R))
]
, thus result
P src < P rs, which implies Qsrc > Qrs (by observation in at end of Section 5.3.1). Fur-
ther, compare equation (5.50) with equation (5.28), we see that Ssrc is not only depend
on supplier’s cost Cs, Cr and C2, but also depend on retailer’s unit shortage cost C1 and
lost sale cost Cb, and consumer’s cost C3, thus, it is not obverse that whether Ssrc will
exceed Srs or not. However, we notice that Cr and Cb are sufficient small, so that the
term which involving Cr and Cb in equation (5.50) will not make much contribution to
Ssrc, thus, we would expect that if retailer’s unit shortage cost C1 is lager than supplier’s
unit shortage cost C2, ie., C1 >
V
Cs
C2, then Ssrc < Srs. A similar result has been con-
cluded in Chapter 3. Therefore, by the observation in Section 5.3.3, we may obtain that
Πsrcc > Π
rs
c . These results have been confirmed by our numerical example. Since Π
rs
c
is the best utility that the consumer can get from games without coalition among the
players, hence, we conclude the following proposition based on the above discussions:
Proposition 5.4. The consumer’s utility is greatest when supplier and retailer form
a coalition when compare to those games where there is no formation of coalition among
the players.
Proposition 5.3 and 5.4 therefore highlight the advantages of cooperation between the
supply chain members to consumer’s welfare. Proposition 5.4 also emphasizes the impor-
tance of cooperation and coordination among the upstream member of supply chain, which
will not only improve the supply chain efficiency, but also will enhance the consumer’s
welfare.
5.5.3 Numerical examples and discussion
We provide the following examples to demonstrate SRC-Stackelberg game and RCC-
Stackelberg game. We will use the same assumption regarding to the actual quality X,
consumer’s valuation V (X) and disutility S0 as we applied in the previous examples. Also,
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the parameters are as same as in the preceding examples. These numerical examples will
illustrate the interaction between players when two of the players form a coalition against
the third player. The results will reveal players advantage/disadvantage in the games
regarding to their leadership position.
Example 4. This example deals with SRC-Stackelberg game. Following the solution
procedure, we obtain supplier and retailer’s optimal Pareto efficient profit Zsr = 175.87.
Supplier’s strategy is V = 2.94,S = 13.51 with corresponding retailer’s strategy P =
4.53, Q = 1215.78, and the weight parameter λ = 0.5073. This yields consumer’s quality
level R = 0.4374 with utility Πc = 743.35.
Example 5. In RCC-Stackelberg game, according to the solution procedure results the
optimal Pareto efficient profit Zrc = 435.58. The retailer’s optimal strategy is P =
4.63, Q = 1696.82, consumer’s quality level R = 0.7702 and the corresponding weight
parameter τ = 0.8209. This yields the supplier’s optimal strategy V = 2.13,S = 20.12,
and corresponding profit Πs = 92.15.
Numerical results show that consumer’s utility in SRC-Stackelberg game is larger than
in Retailer-Stackelberg game, and the utility in RCC-Stackelberg game is larger than in
Consumer-Stackelberg game. These results are consistence with the results concluded in
Proposition 5.3 and 5.4. We also observed that consumer’s utility in RCC-Stackelberg
game is less than in Retailer-Stackelberg game. Thus, from consumer’s perspective, in
the coalition game, she is more favorite the SRC-Stackelberg game rather than RCC-
Stackelberg game. This perhaps when supplier and retailer working together to deter-
mine their decisions, the inventory will be well organized, ie., the shortage size is quite
lower, and the retailer’s selling price also is lower than when retailer working with con-
sumer, therefore, results consumer receiving higher utility even she is the follower in
SRC-Stackelberg game.
We also observed that supplier’s profit is better in coalition games rather than in
those games without coalitions, and the best profit which the supplier will get is from
SRC-Stackelberg game, which is the game that the retailer will get the worst payoff.
This indicate that the supplier will prefer to form a coalition with retailer to improve
his profit. In opposite of the supplier, the retailer is more likely to form a coalition with
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Table 5.1: Sensitivity analysis of Non-cooperative Stackelberg model with respect to α
SS game RS game CS game
α Πs Πb Πc Πs Πb Πc Πs Πb Πc
1.7 70.39 191.17 64.57 42.71 304.78 453.52 36.05 282.25 360.39
1.8 63.70 154.77 81.59 41.05 254.46 455.49 34.43 235.27 360.99
1.9 57.09 127.93 97.56 39.14 213.56 448.23 32.54 197.06 351.92
2.0 50.91 107.02 110.16 37.07 179.95 434.56 30.29 162.85 334.49
2.1 45.27 90.20 119.15 34.92 152.08 416.55 28.38 139.66 316.40
2.3 35.59 65.0 128.07 30.60 109.24 373.13 24.13 99.74 269.59
consumer rather than with supplier, since in RCC-Stackelberg game, she will gain more
than in SRC-Stackelberg game. However, as we indicated before, the consumer is more
preferable to a cooperation between supplier and retailer. Thus, in this three-person game,
the relationship between players are conflict with their preferences of interest. However,
among these complex relationships, we observed that the retailer plays a crucial role in
this three-person game, she can cooperate with either the supplier or the consumer. This
may provide a opportunity for the retailer to coordinate the supply chain, so that an
efficient outcome will be achieved among the players.
5.5.4 Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we carry out sensitivity analysis on the parameters α and ζ . These
two parameters directly affect the demand function and hence each player’s profit. We
compute each player’s profit for all non–cooperative and cooperative games discussed in
Section 5.4 and 5.5 by varying α (for a fixed ζ) and ζ (for a fixed α). All the other
parameters are kept the same as in previous examples. The results are displayed in
Table 5.1 and 5.2 for non–cooperative games and in Table 5.3 and 5.4 for coalition games.
From the results in Table 5.1 and 5.2, regardless of the values of α and ζ, both
supplier and retailer have the leadership advantage insofar as profit is concerned, whereas
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Table 5.2: Sensitivity analysis of Non-cooperative Stackelberg model with respect to ζ
SS game RS game CS game
ζ Πs Πb Πc Πs Πb Πc Πs Πb Πc
0.4 88.17 229.77 104.98 52.95 371.02 761.84 45.08 341.03 632.34
0.5 82.18 216.44 90.15 49.42 348.45 653.16 41.82 319.61 535.73
0.6 77.45 206.14 79.31 47.63 330.75 587.76 39.39 303.76 462.70
0.7 73.61 197.91 70.96 44.50 316.55 505.66 37.52 291.68 405.81
0.8 70.39 191.17 64.57 42.71 304.78 453.52 36.05 282.25 360.39
0.9 67.66 185.53 59.31 41.22 294.86 410.78 34.86 274.74 323.41
Table 5.3: Sensitivity analysis of Coalition Stackelberg model with respect to α
SRC game RCC game
α Πs Πb Πc Πs Πb Πc
1.7 175.87 175.87 743.35 92.15 435.58 435.58
1.8 150.36 150.36 754.94 83.15 370.86 370.86
1.9 129.31 129.31 753.94 75.14 315.97 315.97
2.0 111.74 111.74 743.63 67.99 269.34 269.34
2.1 96.93 96.93 726.60 61.56 229.67 229.67
2.3 73.57 73.57 679.52 50.53 166.99 166.99
Table 5.4: Sensitivity analysis of Coalition Stackelberg model with respect to ζ
SRC game RCC game
ζ Πs Πb Πc Πs Πb Πc
0.4 215.12 215.12 1258.16 85.19 493.43 493.43
0.5 201.71 201.71 1076.36 87.44 476.68 476.68
0.6 191.25 191.25 938.32 89.29 461.67 461.67
0.7 182.82 182.82 830.18 90.83 448.06 448.06
0.8 175.87 175.87 743.35 92.15 435.58 435.58
0.9 170.03 170.03 672.22 93.29 424.06 424.06
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the consumer’s is better off when the retailer is leader and worse off when the supplier
is leader. By examining Table 5.3 and 5.4, consumer will gain more from the supplier-
retailer coalition game than from a retailer-consumer coalition game. Moreover, supplier
will do better in a supplier-retailer coalition game whereas the retailer will do better in a
retailer-consumer coalition game.
Compare between Tables 5.1, 5.2 and Tables 5.3, 5.4, we see that contrary to expec-
tation, the consumer’s utiliy from supplier-retailer coalition game is larger than those
obtained from games without coalition. Similarly, the supplier will gain more profit when
he enters into a coalition with the retailer and the retailer when she enters into a coalition
with the consumer. All these observations are consistent with the results obtained in
Section 5.4 and 5.5.
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we investigated a three-person supply chain game comprising a supplier
and a retailer interacting with a strategic consumer. We also considered the interaction
between the participants of the supply chain using the concept of a Stackelberg game,
with and without formation of a coalition. Consequently, several game models were
presented and numerical examples for these games provided. Without coalition, both
analytical results and numerical examples indicated that the supplier and retailer have
the leadership advantage whereas the consumer is better off when the retailer is the leader.
In games with coalition, both supplier and consumer would prefer game where there is
coalition between supplier and retailer, but the retailer will prefer to cooperate with the
consumer. This shows that the retailer holds the key in these three-person games, since
both supplier’s profit and consumer’s utility will rely on retailer’s preference whether to
work alone or enter into a coalition with the other players. A sensitivity analysis was also
performed on the parameters of the demand function to compare the profits between all
the games discussed when these parameters were varied.
A restriction of games which are discussed in this chapter is that all games considered
were based on the availability of symmetric and complete information between players.
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Further research could investigate three-person supply chain games with asymmetric infor-
mation where some parameters such as demand elasticity or shortage cost and production
cost are not common knowledge among players. This issue will be discussed in Chapter
7.
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Chapter 6
Shapley Value and Other Allocation
Schemes for Three–Person Supply
Chain Games
6.1 Introduction
During the last few decades, game theory has been extensively applied in the field of
supply chain management. Game–theoretic approach has been especially relevant when
players’ behaviors and their interactions play a significant role in determining the perfor-
mances of these supply chains. Therefore, there have been many studies based on applying
various game methodologies and solution concepts. For example, Nash equilibrium and
Stackelberg game have been applied by researchers to investigate the competitive behav-
ior between players in a non-cooperative environment; Pareto optimal solutions have been
used to determine payoffs in cooperative games and the Shapley value has been imple-
mented to obtain an allocation scheme for players who are in a stable coalition [42, 43, 95].
Comprehensive reviews on the application of game theory to supply chain management
by Cachon and Netessine [16] and Leng and Parlar [94] indicates that the majority of the
research focus on the competition and cooperation between the upstream members of the
chain, i.e. manufacturer, supplier and retailer. The interaction and cooperation between
upstream member and the downstream consumer, who is the terminal member of supply
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chain, has not been studied to any great extent. However, as we showed in Chapter 5 that
the consumer’s behavior and preference may influence the upstream members’ decisions,
while the strategies of upstream members may affect the consumer’s welfare. Therefore,
to properly study the performances of the entire chain, it is necessary to include the
consumer as an active member of the chain.
In recent years, applications of game theory to problems involving coordination of
different types of supply chains have increased rapidly. A question that often arise from
these research is whether cooperation between supply chain members will be more efficient
and improve the overall performance of the chain when compare with a non-cooperative
approach. If so, then how will the players share the profits which will accrue from their
cooperative endeavor? This question is directly related to finding a suitable and fair
allocation scheme for dividing players’ profits. One possible solution to this problem
would be to implement the celebrated Shapley value concept.
From the viewpoint of traditional supply chain management, cooperation between
upstream members, i.e. the supplier and retailer, and the consumer appears somewhat
unnatural. However, due to recent advances in technology such as the World Wide Web,
the relationship between organizations and individual consumers has undergone some
fundamental changes [67]. Some consumers can participate in companies production
activities and even provide them with exchange values. There are even evidence showing
that supplier and retailer welcome a cooperative relationship with the consumer [62, 44].
Therefore based on this viewpoint, we would like in this chapter to explore the interaction
between the three members of the supply chain in a non-cooperative and cooperative
manner. In the case of cooperation, we will explore and develop allocation schemes for
supply chain based on different coalitions between the three members, some of which will
include the consumer.
Based on the above considerations, one of the objectives of this chapter is to provide a
comprehensive study of a supply chain which include a supplier, retailer and consumer in a
three-person game. Another important objective is to investigate the differences between
players’ profits achievable under a non-cooperative and cooperative situation. In order to
accomplish these objectives, we will first investigate the noncooperative scenario and use
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as our solution concept the Nash equilibrium [112]. Next we investigate the cooperative
scenario by investigating a coalitional game and implementing the Pareto optimality so-
lution concept. Finally, we will devise an allocation scheme based on the Shapley value
[135]. Although, there are other commonly used solution concepts in cooperative game,
notably the Nash bargaining solution and the core. The Nash bargaining solution was
introduced by Nash [111] and is based on a collection of compelling axioms. But this
solution concept is not widely used for analyzing cooperative game when the number of
players is greater than 2 simply because the possibility of cooperation among players is
ignored [109]. The concept of a core was introduced by Gillies [54] and it provides a stable
allocation set for members in a cooperative game. Unfortunately, the core of a game can
be very large or even empty, and when it exists, is often very difficult to find. This makes
the solution concept based on the core difficult to implement in practice. On the other
hand, Shapley value is a well known allocation scheme which possess attractive properties
based on a set of motivating axioms. It is also especially suited to coalitional game and
reasonably easy to calculate once an appropriate characteristic function has been adopted.
Therefore, based on these considerations, we will apply the Shapley value in this chapter
to come up with a fair allocation scheme for players in our cooperative supply chain.
Literatures in supply chain management by using game theory concept relevant to
this chapter, are including but is not limited to, Anupindi et al. [5], Rudi et al. [127] and
Granot and SoSˇic´ [61] who studied a transshipment problem based on Nash equilibrium
solution concept for ordering decisions, and investigated whether a joint optimal solution
could be achieved in equilibrium. Slikker et al. [140] investigated cooperation between n
retailers who are all facing a news-vendor problem, the authors showed that any general
news-vendor game has a non-empty core. Gjerdrum et al. [55] investigated a two-echelon
supply chain for seeking a fair allocation of system-wide profit based on the Nash Bar-
gaining solution. Also, as we mentioned in Section 2.2.2, Chapter 2, Raghunathan [122],
Rosenthal [125],Leng and Parlar [95] and Zhang and Liu [172] applied Shapley value
method to multiple-echelon/multiple-player supply chain in their papers.
All the aforementioned articles focused on competition and cooperation between up-
stream members of the supply chain, i.e. the supplier and retailer and totally ignored
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the consumer. However, the interactions and cooperation between upstream members
and the consumer would have a significant impact on the efficient running of the whole
supply chain. In this chapter, we will extend the supply chain to include the consumer,
and derive the optimal strategies and corresponding profits for the players in the supply
chain under both a non-cooperative and cooperative scenario. In the case of a coalitional
game, we will implement an allocation scheme based on the Shapley value. Implicit in
this scheme is the construction of the characteristic function to represent the power or
values of the different coalitions.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We provide assumptions underlying
the different models in Section 6.2. Nash solutions for the players in a non–cooperative
game scenario are obtained in Section 6.3. Section 6.4 considers the cooperative game
in coalitional form where Pareto optimal solutions are derived for all possible coalitions.
Section 6.5 is devoted to obtaining Shapley values for each player in the cooperative
game. Numerical examples, including a sensitivity analysis, are provided in Section 6.6
and Section 6.7 concludes the chapter.
6.2 Assumptions and models
In this chapter, players’ decision variables and all the parameters are as same as we defined
in Chapter 5. All the notations that are used in this chapter can be found in Appendix
A.
Assumptions
In addition to the assumptions which we provided in Section 5.2 of Chapter 5, we also
assume that the following condition hold:
Cr
Cb
<
V − Cs − As/Q
P − V − Ab/Q . (6.1)
The left hand side is the ratio of supplier’s unit rework cost and retailer’s unit lost sale
cost, and the right hand side is the ratio of supplier and retailer’s marginal profit excluding
holding cost and shortage cost. This is to ensure that the supplier has enough margin to
refund the buyer.
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6.2.1 Model formulation
In each production cycle, the supplier provides a product to the retailer, who then sells
it to the consumer. Based on inspection at the point of purchasing, the consumer has
to decide the quality level R of the product which is acceptable to her. Depending on
her perceived quality, she may accept or reject the product. Products not accepted will
confer a disutility cost to the consumer as well as a lost sale cost to the retailer. These
unacceptable products will also have to be returned to supplier for rework. The retailer’s
decision variables are the order quantity Q and selling price P charged to the consumer
while the supplier’s decision variables are the selling price V charged to the retailer and
the allowable shortage size S. The models for supplier, retailer and consumer are similar
to those proposed in Chapter 5, and they are briefly described as follows.
Supplier’s model
In each production cycle T = Q/D, the supplier’s annual profit is obtained by subtracting
the following incurred costs from the sale revenue VD:
Product cost : CsD
Setup cost : As
D
Q
Rework cost : CrDF (R)
Holding cost : iCs I
Shortage cost : C2B
where
I =
[Q(1− u−1)− S]2
2Q(1− u−1) (6.2)
and B =
S2
2Q(1− u−1) (6.3)
are the positive and negative inventory incurred respectively (refer Section 3.2.1, Chapter
3). Note that DF (R) are the expected amount returned by retailer to the supplier due
to its unacceptable quality as valued by the consumer. Therefore, the supplier’s annual
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profit is
Πs(V ,S) = VD − CsD − As D
Q
− CrDF (R)− iCs I − C2B
= VD − CsD − As D
Q
− CrDF (R)
− iCs [Q(1− u
−1)− S]2
2Q(1− u−1) −
C2 S2
2Q(1− u−1) . (6.4)
Retailer’s model
In each production cycle T , the retailer will order quantity Q of the product from the
supplier at price V and sell it to consumer at price P per unit. Therefore, based on the
following costs
Purchase cost : VD
Ordering cost : Ab
D
Q
Lost sale cost : CbDF (R)
Holding cost : iVI
Shortage cost : C1B
the retailer’s annual profit is given by
Πr(P,Q) = PD − VD − Ab D
Q
− CbDF (R)− iVI − C1B
= PD − VD − Ab D
Q
− CbDF (R)
− iV [Q(1− u
−1)− S]2
2Q(1− u−1) −
C1 S2
2Q(1− u−1) . (6.5)
Consumer’s model
The consumer’s profit will be expressed as annual utility on account of the valuation of the
product. Firstly, a rational consumer will consume a product only if her expected mone-
tary valuation of the product is greater than what she has to pay for it, ie., E(V (X)) > P .
Secondly, she will purchase the product only if the quality level of the product R, which
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she will accept, is no less than her perceived quality level X, ie., R ≥ X. Therefore, in
each production cycle T , the consumer will purchase an expected amount Q(1 − F (R))
and reject the amount QF (R). The unacceptable products will confer a disutility of S0 to
the consumer. Therefore, the consumer’s annual utility can be expressed mathematically
as:
Πc(R) =
D
Q
{[E(V (X))− P ]Q[1− F (R)]− E(S0)QF (R)− C3 S}
= D{E(V (X))− P − C3 S
Q
− [E(V (X))− P + E(S0)]F (R)}. (6.6)
6.3 Non-cooperative game and Nash equilibrium pro-
file
The Nash equilibrium, introduced by Nash [112], is a standard equilibrium concept widely
accepted as a solution concept in non–cooperative game theory. In this section, we will
obtain the Nash equilibrium for each player in the three–person non–cooperative supply
chain game involving supplier, retailer and consumer described by the models of the
preceding section. We denote the set of players by N = {s, r, c}, with s, r and c represent
the supplier, retailer and consumer respectively. The pure strategies λi for player i, (i =
s, r, c) are identified by their decision variables as:
λs = (V ,S), λr = (P,Q), λc = (R).
Thus, a pure strategy profile set is
λ = {λs, λr, λc}
and the profit functions for players defined on λ are denoted by Πs(λs), Πr(λr) and Πc(λc)
given by equations (6.4), (6.5) and (6.6) respectively.
A pure strategy λ∗ = (λ∗s, λ
∗
r, λ
∗
c) is a Nash equilibrium profile for the players if there
is no incentive for any player to deviate from this profile. Formally, for any player i ∈ N
adopting any strategy λ
′
i
Πi(λ
′
i, λ
∗
−i) ≤ Πi(λ∗i , λ∗−i) (6.7)
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where the symbol −i represents the set of players excluding player i.
Thus, Nash equilibrium profile is a set of strategies such that each player’s Nash equilib-
rium strategy is the best response to other players’ Nash strategies, i.e.
λ∗i ∈ argmax
λi
Πi(λi, λ
∗
−i)
Proposition 6.1. A Nash equilibrium profile for three-person non-cooperative game
between supplier, retailer and consumer is obtained by solving the following equations
simultaneously:
V = W (Cs + As
Q
+ Cr F (R) + iCs IsD−1 + C2BsD−1) (6.8)
S = i(1− u
−1)CsQ
iCs + C2
(6.9)
P =
α[V + AbQ−1 + Cb F (R)]
α− 1 (6.10)
Q2 =
2Ab (1− u−1)D + (iV + C1)S2
iV(1− u−1)2 (6.11)
R =
ζΠc/D
f(R)[E(V (X))− P + E(S0)] (6.12)
where W is supplier’s marginal selling price, D is the demand, and Is and Bs are given
by equations (6.2) and (6.3) respectively.
Proof The supplier will choose his strategy by maximizing his profit function based on
retailer and consumer’s optimal strategy, that is
max Πs(V ,S, P ∗, Q∗, R∗)
= D∗s (V − Cs −
As
Q∗
− Cr F (R))
− iCs [Q
∗(1− u−1)− S]2
2Q∗(1− u−1) −
C2S2
2Q∗(1− u−1) (6.13)
where D∗s = k(P ∗)−α(R∗)ζ . Since ∂
2Πs
∂S2 = − iCs +C2Q∗(1−u−1) < 0, Πs is concave in S. Therefore,
the first order condition with respect to S yields
S∗ = iCsQ
∗(1− u−1)
iCs + C2
(6.14)
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The supplier’s corresponding profit function is obtained by substituting S∗ into (6.13):
Πs(V) = D∗s(V − Cs −
As
Q∗
− Cr F (R))− iCs Is − C2Bs. (6.15)
where Is =
C22 Q(1−u−1)
2(iCs +C2)2
and Bs =
C2s i
2Q(1−u−1)
2(iCs +C2)2
.
The supplier’s minimum selling price is V0, which is the price when he has no profit, ie.,
Πs(V) = 0, with a marginal selling price W > 1, then the supplier can obtain his optimal
selling price as:
V∗ = WV0 = W (Cs + As
Q∗
+ Cr F (R) + iCs Is (D∗s)−1 + C2Bs (D∗s)−1 (6.16)
where V0 = Cs +AsQ +Cr F (R)+iCs Is (D∗s)−1 +C2Bs (D∗s)−1 obtained by solving Πs(V) =
0.
The retailer’s optimal strategy is obtained by maximizing her profit function based on
supplier and consumer’s optimal strategy, and consumer will maximize her utility based
on supplier and retailer’s optimal strategy to obtain her optimal strategy. Thus, the
optimization problems faced by the retailer and consumer are
max Πr(P,Q,V∗,S∗, R∗)
= D∗r
[
P − V∗ − Ab
Q
− Cb F (R∗)
]
− iV∗ [Q
∗(1− u−1)− S∗]2
2Q(1− u−1) −
C1 (S∗)2
2Q(1− u−1) (6.17)
where D∗r = kP−α(R∗)ζ , and
max Πc(R,V∗,S∗, P ∗, Q∗)
= D∗c{E(V (X))− P ∗ −
C3 S∗
Q∗
− [E(V (X))− P ∗ + E(S0)]F (R)} (6.18)
where D∗c = k(P ∗)−αRζ .
Since Πr is Pseudoconcave in P and concave in Q (refer to Lemma 3.1, Chapter 3),
and Πc is Pseudoconcave in R (refer to Lemma 5.3, Chapter 5), hence the first order
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condition with respect to P and Q applied to (6.17) yields
P ∗ =
α[V∗ + Ab(Q∗)−1 + CbF (R∗)]
α− 1 (6.19)
(Q∗)2 =
2Ab(1− u−1)D∗r + (iV∗ + C1)(S∗)2
iV∗(1− u−1)2 (6.20)
and the first order condition with respect to R applied to (6.18) gives
F (R∗) +
R∗
ζ
f(R∗) =
E(V (X))− P ∗ − C3S∗
Q∗
E(V (X))− P ∗ + E(S0) . (6.21)
Since each player will face the same demand in this game, ie., D∗s = D∗r = D∗c , (6.14)
and (6.16) are the supplier’s best responses to retailer’s and consumer’s strategies; sim-
ilarly, (6.19) and (6.20) are the retailer’s best responses to supplier’s and consumer’s
strategies, and (6.21) is the consumer’s best response to supplier’s and retailer’s strate-
gies. Therefore, the Nash equilibrium strategy for this three-person game is obtained by
solving (6.14), (6.16), (6.19), (6.20) and (6.21) simultaneously. This completes the proof
of Proposition 6.1.
6.4 Coalitional game and Pareto optimality
In a coalitional game, cooperation among players who are in a coalition can be evaluated
by using the concept of Pareto optimality. The Pareto optimal solution is obtained by
maximizing a weighted sum of player’s profit function [18, 42]. The grand coalition
consisting of supplier, retailer and consumer is called the SRC-coalition. This grand
coalition seems unnatural in practice, however, as noted in the Introduction, there are
evidence indicating that both the supplier and retailer are sometime willing to cooperate
with the consumer [62, 44], e.g., through joint marketing activities and communications. It
is quite common in practice for the supplier and retailer to form a coalition (hereafter SR-
coalition) against the consumer through some incentive schemes such as quantity discount,
credit option and quantity commitment. However, there are evidence to indicate (c.f.
[62], [44]), somewhat counter–intuitively, that a coalition could also form between retailer
and consumer (hereafter RC-coalition), for example, in a community grocery store, and
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even between supplier and consumer (hereafter SC-coalition), for example, in the clothing
industry, against the remaining member of the supply chain. One plausible reason for this
is the advent of the World Wide Web which provides an open communication forum for
supplier, retailer and consumer to discuss and collaborate, thereby developing cooperative
relationships in ways not thought possible a few generations ago [67].
6.4.1 Pareto solution for the grand coalition
For the grand coalition, referring to the result given in Chankong and Haimes [18] as
we described in Section 2.1.6, Chapter 2, Pareto optimal solution is obtained through
maximizing the weighted sum of supplier, retailer and consumer’s profit functions given
by equations (6.4), (6.5) and (6.6), respectively:
Zsrc = ωsΠs(V ,S) + ωrΠr(P,Q) + ωcΠc(R)
where ωs, ωr, and ωc are positive numbers such that ωs + ωr + ωc = 1. We summarize
the result in the following lemma:
Lemma 6.1. The Pareto optimal solution for the grand coalition is obtained by solving
the following equations simultaneously:
P =
α
α− 1[V +
Ab
Q
+ Cb F (R)]− α
α− 1
ωs
ωr
[V − Cs − As
Q
− Cr F (R)]
− P [1− F (R)]
α− 1
ωc
ωr
− α
α− 1
ωc
ωr
Πc
D (6.22)
Q2 =
2D(ωsAs + ωr Ab + ωcC3 S)
i(1− u−1)(ωsCs + ωr V)
+
[(C1 + iV)ωr + (C2 + iCs)ωs]S2
i(1− u−1)2(ωsCs + ωr V) (6.23)
S = (1− u
−1)[iQ(ωsCs + ωr V)− ωcC3D]
(C2 + iCs)ωs + (C1 + iV)ωr (6.24)
R =
ζ{ωs[V − Cs − AsQ − Cr F (R)] + ωr[P − V − AbQ − Cb F (R)] + ωc ΠcD }
f(R){ωsCr + ωr Cb + ωc[E(V (X))− P + E(S0)]}
(6.25)
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for a fixed V and where ωs, ωr, and ωc are positive numbers such that ωs + ωr + ωc = 1.
Proof: The result is a direct consequence of applying the first order condition to
Zsrc with respect to players’ decision variables.
6.4.2 Pareto solutions for two players coalitions
We will consider all possible two–person coalitions, ie. SR-coalition, RC-coalition and
SC-coalition. The players in the coalition will seek a Pareto optimal solution but we
will assume that the lone player in the counter–coalition will adopt a Nash equilibrium
strategy which was given in Proposition 6.1. The logical consistency of adopting this
assumption can be seen from the fact that if ωs = 0, ωr = 0 and ωc = 1, which is the
situation where the consumer works independently regardless of what the supplier and
retailer does, equation (6.25) reduces to equation (6.12), which is the equation giving
the Nash strategy in Proposition 6.1. A similar situation will prevail in cases where the
supplier and retailer are lone player in the counter-coalition. On the other hand, if the
consumer does not contribute to the grand coalition, then, ωc = 0 and ωs +ωr = 1 which
is equivalent to the situation where supplier and retailer work cooperatively, independent
of what the consumer does. In this situation, equations (6.22), (6.23) and (6.24) reduce
to equations (6.26), (6.27) and (6.28) respectively, which give the Pareto optimal solution
for the SR-coalition. The same situations prevail for the RC and SC coalitions.
The next three lemmas summarize the results for all two–person coalitions with the
lone player in the counter–coalition working non–cooperatively against the other two.
The proofs are straightforward and will not be shown since they are just consequences
of applying the first order condition to each of the following weighted sums of profit
functions:
Zsr = ωsΠs(V ,S) + ωrΠr(P,Q)
Zrc = ωrΠr(P,Q) + ωcΠc(R)
and Zsc = ωsΠs(V ,S) + ωcΠc(R).
We will assume in the following lemmas that when the supplier forms a coalition with
another player in a two-player coalition, his selling price V is determined by imposing a
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marginal price W on the minimum selling price V0 corresponding to the selling price when
his profit is zero. This is because the supplier’s profit function is linear in V , which makes
it unbounded. Thus, to make the selling price bounded and acceptable by both players
in the coalition, a marginal W is introduced after prior consultation among the coalition
members.
Lemma 6.2. The Pareto optimal solution for SR-coalition is obtained by solving the
following equations simultaneously:
P =
α
α− 1[V +
Ab
Q
+ Cb F (R)]− α
α− 1
ωs
ωr
[V − Cs − As
Q
− Cr F (R)] (6.26)
Q2 =
2D(ωsAs + ωr Ab)
i(1− u−1)(ωsCs + ωr V) +
[(C1 + iV)ωr + (C2 + iCs)ωs]S2
i(1− u−1)2(ωsCs + ωr V) (6.27)
S = iQ(1− u
−1)(ωsCs + ωr V)
(C2 + iCs)ωs + (C1 + iV)ωr (6.28)
V = WV0 (6.29)
where W is the supplier’s marginal selling price, and V0 is the solution of Πs(V ,S) = 0
where S is given by equation (6.28). Note that ωs and ωr are positive numbers such
that ωs + ωr = 1 . The consumer will adopt the Nash equilibrium strategy λ
∗
c given in
Proposition 6.1.
Lemma 6.3. The Pareto optimal solution for RC-coalition is obtained by solving the
following equations:
P =
α
α− 1[V +
Ab
Q
+ Cb F (R)]− α
α− 1
ωc
ωr
Πc
D −
P [1− F (R)]
α− 1
ωc
ωr
(6.30)
Q2 =
2D(ωr Ab + ωcC3 S)
ωr iV(1− u−1) +
(C1 + iV)S2
iV(1− u−1)2 (6.31)
R =
ζ{ωr[P − V − AbQ − Cb F (R)] + ωc ΠcD }
f(R){ωr Cb + ωc[E(V (X))− P + E(S0)]} (6.32)
where ωr and ωc are positive numbers such that ωr + ωc = 1. The supplier will adopt the
Nash equilibrium strategy λ∗s given in Proposition 6.1.
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Lemma 6.4. The Pareto optimal strategy for SC-coalition is obtained by solving the
equations:
S = (1− u
−1)[ωs iCsQ− ωcC3D]
ωs(C2 + iCs)
(6.33)
R =
ζ{ωs[V − Cs − AsQ − Cr F (R)] + ωc ΠcD }
f(R){ωsCr + ωc[E(V (X))− P + E(S0)]} (6.34)
V = WV0 (6.35)
where W is supplier’s marginal selling price, and V0 is the minimum selling price corre-
sponding to S in equation (6.33) by solving Πs(V ,S) = 0. ωs and ωc are positive numbers
such that ωs + ωc = 1. The retailer will adopt the Nash equilibrium strategy λ
∗
r.
6.5 Allocation scheme based on Shapley value
According to Section 2.1.5, Chapter 2, a cooperative game between supplier, retailer and
consumer in coalitional form is a pair (N, v), where N = {s, r, c} represent a set of players
consisting supplier, retailer and consumer, and v ∈ R is a characteristic function which
satisfies the following conditions:
1. v(∅) = 0
2. v(A ∪B) ≥ v(A) + v(B)
for A,B ⊆ N, such thatA ∩B = ∅.
The value v(A) represents a joint profit which created by the members of the coalition A,
and it is guaranteed if the members of coalition work together cooperatively regardless
what players in the counter–coalition N − A does. The superadditivity property states
that the joint profit obtained by a larger coalition is guaranteed to be no less than the
sum of the profit of smaller coalitions.
As we discussed in Section 2.1.5, Chapter 2, in a cooperative game, an optimal allo-
cation scheme can be achieved by finding the best set of imputations for the game. As
we mentioned in Section 6.1, among the many available methods that can be used to
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accomplish this task, the Shapley value concept is appealing since it is simple to apply
and is based on a set of reasonable axioms.
The Shapley value assigned to a player i ∈ N is given by
ϕi(v) =
∑
J⊆N−i
|J |!(|N | − |J | − 1)!
|N |! [v(J ∪ i)− v(J)] (6.36)
where |A| refers to the number of players in a coalition A. If v is superadditivity, the
Shapley values are easily shown to be admissible.
In the following sections, three steps will be conducted to develop a fair allocation
scheme for the cooperative game between supplier, retailer and consumer. This scheme
will depend implicitly on the Shapley value concept.
Step 1: Identify all possible coalitions among players and compare the profits obtained
by different coalitions.
Step 2: Derive a characteristic function for the cooperative game and verify its superad-
ditivity property.
Step 3: Apply Shapley value formula (6.36) to obtain a fair allocation to each member
of the supply chain.
6.5.1 Step 1
The possible coalitions in the supply chain can be identified as:
• single player coalition: {s}, {r}, {c};
• two players coalition: ({sr}, c), ({rc}, s), ({sc}, r), where the lone player is in the
counter-coalition;
• grand coalition: {src}.
In the following proposition, the notation Π∗A,i refers to the Pareto optimal profit accrued
to player i in the coalition A.
Proposition 6.2. If the strategies for players who are in a two or three person coalitions
are based on Pareto optimality and the single player adopts a Nash strategy, then the
following properties hold:
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(i) A player in the grand coalition always obtained more profit than acting alone:
Π∗src,s > Π
∗
s,s
Π∗src,r > Π
∗
r,r
Π∗src,c > Π
∗
c,c
(ii) A player in grand coalition always obtained more profit than being a member of a
two player coalition:
Π∗src,s > Π
∗
sr,s, Π
∗
src,r > Π
∗
sr,r
Π∗src,r > Π
∗
rc,r, Π
∗
src,c > Π
∗
rc,c
Π∗src,s > Π
∗
sc,s, Π
∗
src,c > Π
∗
sc,c
(iii) A player in a two player coalition always obtained more profit than acting alone:
Π∗sr,s > Π
∗
s,s, Π
∗
sr,r > Π
∗
r,r
Π∗rc,r > Π
∗
r,r, Π
∗
rc,c > Π
∗
c,c
Π∗sc,s > Π
∗
s,s, Π
∗
sc,c > Π
∗
c,c.
Proof Since players in a coalition adopt the Pareto optimal strategy while the player
in the single–player coalition adopts the Nash equilibrium strategy, Proposition 6.2 can
be proved for the three cases using the results from Section 6.3 and 6.4.
(i) Note that the optimal decision variables for players who are in the grand coalition
are given in Lemma 6.1, and those for a player in a single–player coalition are given by
Proposition 6.1. Comparing (6.22) with (6.10) and since V −Cs− AsQ −CrF (R) > 0, and
α > 1, ωs, ωr, ωc > 0, we have P
∗
src < P
∗
N .
Further, comparing (6.25) with (6.12) and since V −Cs− AsQ > Cr and P −V − AbQ > Cb,
it is easy to confirm that R∗src > R
∗
N . Recall that D = kP−αRζ , and since P > V >
Cs > 1, 0 < R < 1 and α > 1, 0 < ζ < 1, it follows that D∗src > D∗N . Since each player’s
profit increases with demand, we must have Π∗src,i > Π
∗
N,i = Π
∗
i,i for i = s, r, c. Therefore
a player who in the grand coalition always gets more profit than acting alone.
(ii) In the case of a SR-coalition, the optimal decision variables are given in Lemma 6.2.
Comparing equation (6.22) with equation (6.26) gives P ∗src < P
∗
sr. Since the consumer
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in the counter-coalition will adopt the Nash equilibrium strategy R∗N given by equa-
tion (6.12), the same argument given in (i) gives R∗src > R
∗
N , and this will result in
D∗src > D∗sr, and therefore, Π∗src,i > Π∗sr,i for i = s, r.
In the case of the RC-coalition, comparing between equation (6.22) and equation (6.30),
gives P ∗src < P
∗
rc. Furthermore, comparing between equation (6.25) and (6.32), using the
assumption that V−Cs−AsQ
−1
P−V−AbQ−1 >
Cr
Cb
, resulted in R∗src > R
∗
rc. Therefore, using the same
argument as in (i) gives D∗src > D
∗
rc, which implies Π
∗
src,j > Π
∗
rc,j for j = r, c.
A similar argument also gives Π∗src,k > Π
∗
sc,k where k = s, c, in the case of the SC-coalition.
(iii) Here we are considering two– player coalitions against single–player coalitions.
In case of the SR-coalition with consumer in the counter-coalition, the members of SR-
coalition will adopt Pareto optimum decision variables given in Lemma 6.2, while the
consumer will adopt Nash equilibrium strategy given in Proposition 6.1. By comparing
equation (6.26) with equation (6.10) yields P ∗sr < P
∗
N . Furthermore, the consumer’s
optimal decision variable R in SR-coalition will be the same as in single-player coalition,
ie., R∗sr = R
∗
N , which resulted in D∗sr > D∗N , which therefore implies Π∗sr,i > Π∗N,i = Π∗i,i
for i = s, r.
Similarly, in the case of RC-coalition with supplier in the counter-coalition, comparing
equation (6.30) with (6.10), and equation (6.32) with (6.12), we obtain P ∗rc < P
∗
N and
R∗rc > R
∗
N , which implies Π
∗
rc,j > Π
∗
N,j = Π
∗
j,j for j = r, c.
Similarly, in the case of SC-coalition with the retailer in the counter–coalition, we can
show using a similar argument that Π∗sc,k > Π
∗
N,k = Π
∗
k,k for k = s, c. Therefore, a player
who is in a two player coalition always obtained more profit than acting alone.
This completes the proof of Proposition 6.2.
The above results reveal that in the current model setting, each individual will benefit
more belonging to a larger coalition than a smaller one.
6.5.2 Step 2
In a cooperative game, once the players have agreed to cooperate, an allocation scheme
can be negotiated between players through some bargaining process. As Myerson [109]
has pointed out, such allocation scheme resulting from a bargaining process will depend
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on the power structure of the game, rather than on any specific details of the bargaining
process. Such power structure is described by the characteristic function which incor-
porates a summary description of the power structure of the different coalitions. In the
literature of supply chain, the characteristic function is often defined as the profit that
the players could achieve cooperatively under the worst possible conditions [143, 95]. In
this chapter, we will adopt a different approach. We define the characteristic function for
every possible coalitions by incorporating Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimum strategy,
whereby players who are in a coalition will adopt Pareto optimal strategy and the lone
player in the counter-coalition will adopt the Nash equilibrium strategy. This is consistent
with the discussion in previous sections.
Proposition 6.3. The following set value function v(·) defined for all possible coalitions
and imposing v(∅) = 0 ipso facto, has the superadditivity property and is therefore a
characteristic function:
(i) (Grand coalition)
v(src) = max
V,S,P,Q,R
{ωsΠs + ωrΠr + ωcΠc}
where ωs + ωr + ωc = 1 and ωs, ωr, ωc > 0.
(ii) (Two players coalitions)
v(sr) = max
V,S,P,Q
{ωsΠs + ωrΠr}, where ωs + ωr = 1, ωs, ωr > 0
v(rc) = max
P,Q,R
{ωrΠr + ωcΠc}, where ωr + ωc = 1, ωr, ωc > 0
v(sc) = max
V,S,R
{ωsΠs + ωcΠc}, where ωs + ωc = 1, ωs, ωc > 0.
(iii) (Single player coalitions)
v(s) = max
λs
Πs(λs, λ
∗
r, λ
∗
c)
v(r) = max
λr
Πr(λ
∗
s, λr, λ
∗
c)
v(c) = max
λc
Πc(λ
∗
s, λ
∗
r, λc)
Proof To verify the characteristic function defined in Section 6.5.2 satisfying superad-
146
ditive property, we need to show that the following inequalities (6.37) to (6.43) hold.
(i). v(src) ≥ v(s) + v(r) + v(c) (6.37)
(ii). v(src) ≥ v(sr) + v(c) (6.38)
v(src) ≥ v(rc) + v(s) (6.39)
v(src) ≥ v(sc) + v(r) (6.40)
(iii). v(sr) ≥ v(s) + v(r) (6.41)
v(rc) ≥ v(r) + v(c) (6.42)
v(sc) ≥ v(s) + v(c) (6.43)
By applying the results obtained from Proposition 6.2, we have:
v(src) = max
V,S,P,Q,R
{ωsΠs + ωrΠr + ωcΠc}
= Π∗src,s + Π
∗
src,r + Π
∗
src,c (due to Pareto optimum)
≥ Π∗N,s + Π∗N,r + Π∗N,c (due to Proposition 6.2(i))
= max
λs
Πs(λs, λ
∗
r, λ
∗
c) + max
λr
Πr(λ
∗
s, λr, λ
∗
c) + max
λc
Πc(λ
∗
s, λ
∗
r, λc)
= v(s) + v(r) + v(c)
thus, inequality (6.37) hold.
Further
v(src) = max
V,S,P,Q,R
{ωsΠs + ωrΠr + ωcΠc}
= Π∗src,s + Π
∗
src,r + Π
∗
src,c (due to Pareto optimum)
≥ Π∗sr,s + Π∗sr,r + Π∗N,c (due to Proposition 6.2(i),(ii))
= max
V,S,P,Q
{ωsΠs + ωrΠr}+ max
λc
Πc(λ
∗
s, λ
∗
r, λc)
= v(sr) + v(c).
Similarly, we have
v(src) ≥ v(rc) + v(s)
v(src) ≥ v(sc) + v(r).
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Therefore, inequality (6.38) to (6.40) hold.
Moreover,
v(sr) = max
V,S,P,Q
{ωsΠs + ωrΠr}
= Π∗sr,s + Π
∗
sr,r (due to Pareto optimum)
≥ Π∗N,s + Π∗N,r (due to Proposition 6.2 (iii))
= max
λs
Πs(λs, λ
∗
r, λ
∗
c) + max
λr
Πr(λ
∗
s, λr, λ
∗
c)
= v(s) + v(r).
Similarly, we have
v(rc) ≥ v(r) + v(c)
v(sc) ≥ v(s) + v(c)
hence, inequalities (6.41) to (6.43) hold.
This completes the proof of Proposition 3.
6.5.3 Step 3
We can use the characteristic function defined in Step 2 to calculate the Shapley value
for each player in the cooperative game. We will demonstrate this for the supplier, the
values for retailer and consumer can be obtained by symmetry. We first notice for the
calculation that the possible subsets of N excluding the supplier s are
J1 = {r}, J2 = {c}, J3 = {rc}, J4 = ∅.
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Therefore, by applying (6.36), the Shapley value for the supplier is
ϕs(v) =
|J1|!(|N | − |J1| − 1)!
|N |! (v(J1 ∪ s)− v(J1))
+
|J2|!(|N | − |J2| − 1)!
|N |! (v(J2 ∪ s)− v(J2))
+
|J3|!(|N | − |J3| − 1)!
|N |! (v(J3 ∪ s)− v(J3))
+
|J4|!(|N | − |J4| − 1)!
|N |! (v(J4 ∪ s)− v(J4))
=
1!(3− 1− 1)!
3!
(v(rs)− v(r)) + 1!(3− 1− 1)!
3!
(v(sc)− v(c))
+
2!(3− 2− 1)!
3!
(v(src)− v(rc)) + 0!(3− 0− 1)!
3!
(v(s)− v(∅))
which simplifies to
ϕs(v) =
1
6
[v(sr) + v(sc)− v(r)− v(c)] + 1
3
[v(src)− v(rc) + v(s)]. (6.44)
By symmetry, the Shapley values for retailer and consumer are
ϕr(v) =
1
6
[v(rc) + v(sr)− v(c)− v(s)] + 1
3
[v(src)− v(sc) + v(r)] (6.45)
and
ϕc(v) =
1
6
[v(sc) + v(rc)− v(s)− v(r)] + 1
3
[v(src)− v(sr) + v(c)] (6.46)
respectively.
The Shapley value allocation scheme provided above involves many unknown vari-
ables and therefore an investigation into the stability of this scheme is mathematically
intractable. However, we will address the issue of stability in a numerical example in the
next section using real numbers.
6.6 Numerical examples and sensitivity analysis
In this section, we provide numerical examples illustrating the Nash equilibrium solution of
non-cooperative game, Pareto optimal solution for coalitional game and the Shapley value
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allocation scheme for cooperative game. Based on these numerical results, we will examine
and discuss the differences to players’ profits gained under different game scenarios. A
sensitivity analysis with respect to two parameters associated with consumer’s preference
will be preformed to reveal their impact on players’ profits for the different games.
In the following examples, we assume X is uniformly distributed over interval [0, 1]
and choose a classical utility function V (x) = (1 − e−γx)V˜ as the consumer’s valuation
function, with V˜ = 100 and γ = 0.5. The consumer’s disutility function is S0 = ξV (x),
where ξ = 0.01, and the following parameter values will be used in all examples: k =
3600, u = 1.1, α = 1.7, ζ = 0.8, C1 = 2, C2 = 1, C3 = 1, As = 140, Cs = 1.5,M =
1.25, Ab = 40, i = 0.1, Cb = 0.5, Cr = 0.2.
6.6.1 Numerical examples
Example 1. We first consider a non–cooperative game and use Proposition 6.1 to ob-
tain the Nash equilibrium solutions for the three members of the supply chain. Solving
equations (6.8) to (6.12) simultaneously, we obtain the following optimal Nash decision
variables and corresponding profits:
(Supplier) V∗ = 2.33,S∗ = 7.12, with corresponding profit Π∗N,s = 37.25;
(Retailer) P ∗ = 6.35, Q∗ = 600.27, with corresponding profit Π∗N,r = 292.76;
(Consumer) R∗ = 0.4354 with corresponding utility as Π∗N,c = 335.52.
Example 2. We will consider the grand coalition and all two players coalitions in this
example. We also use equal weights to compute the Pareto optima, this is intuitively
equivalent to maximizing the sum of the utilities.
(Grand coalition) Given that V = 2.05, we solve equations (6.22) to (6.25) in Lemma 6.1
obtaining S = 5.41, P = 3.99, Q = 1280.04 and R = 0.6897. The total profit for the grand
coalition is Π∗src = 1214.61, with corresponding profits for supplier, retailer and consumer
being equal to Π∗src,s = 69.01, Π
∗
src,r = 386.70 and Π
∗
src,c = 758.90 respectively.
(SR-coalition) Here, the supplier and retailer cooperate with each other, while the con-
sumer adopts a Nash strategy. Applying Lemma 6.2, we obtain the optimal decision
variables in the SR-coalition as V = 2.21,S = 12.13, P = 5.08 and Q = 1213.45, with
profit Π∗sr = 347.83. The corresponding individual profits for supplier and retailer are
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Π∗sr,s = 51.63 and Π
∗
sr,r = 296.20 respectively. While consumer’s profit is 573.55 with
optimal quality level R = 0.4368.
(SC-coalition) Applying Lemma 6.4, we obtain V = 2.24,S = 35.79 and R = 0.5155. The
profit gained by the SC-coalition is Π∗sc = 398.38, and the corresponding individual profits
for supplier and consumer are Π∗sc,s = 42.01 and Π
∗
sc,c = 356.37 respectively. While the
profit gained by retailer is 332.69 charging a selling price of P = 6.13 to the consumer
and ordering quantity Q = 1385.82.
(RC-coalition) Applying Lemma 6.3, the optimal decision variables obtained by players
on the coalition are P = 4.22, Q = 1732.04 and R = 0.6774. The profit gained by the
coalition is Π∗rc = 1052.32, and the corresponding individual profits for retailer and con-
sumer are Π∗rc,r = 361.60 and Π
∗
rc,c = 690.72 respectively. The lone supplier will achieve
a profit of 100.58 charging a price of V = 2.20 to the retailer and incurring a shortage of
S = 20.54.
Example 3. Here we display the Shapley values for the different coalitions. From
Example 1 and 2, the characteristic values of the different coalitions are as follow:
v(s) = Π∗N,s = 37.25
v(r) = Π∗N,r = 292.76
v(c) = Π∗N,c = 335.52
v(sr) = Π∗sr = 347.83
v(sc) = Π∗sc = 398.38
v(rc) = Π∗rc = 1052.32
and v(src) = Π∗src = 1214.61
Therefore, by applying equations (6.44) to (6.46), the Shapley values for supplier, retailer
and consumer are ϕs(v) = 86.17 , ϕr(v) = 540.89 and ϕc(v) = 587.55 respectively.
Next, we check the stability of the Shapley value based allocation scheme, ie., whether
or not it is in the core of the game, by applying the definition of a core given in Chapter
2.
We notice that v(sr) + v(sc) + v(rc) < 2v(src), therefore, by referring to Corollary 2.1
in Chapter 2, this three-person game has a nonempty core. Furthermore, we can see
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that for every coalition J ⊂ N = {s, r, c}, we have ∑i∈J ϕi(v) ≥ v(J). For example,
ϕs(v) > v(s) and ϕs(v) + ϕc(v) > v(sc). Also, we have ϕs(v) + ϕr(v) + ϕc(v) = v(src).
Therefore, by the definition of the core defined in Section 2.1.5, Chapter 2, the allocation
scheme suggested by the Shapley value is in the core of the game, and therefore stable
and acceptable by all players.
Comparison of numerical results
The results from Example 1 and Example 2 indicate that the players’ profits using the
Nash equilibrium strategies are less than those profits obtained using Pareto optimal
strategies, pointing out that cooperation is more profitable than non–cooperation. This
observation is further supported by the fact that profits obtained by players who are in
a two–player coalition are less than the corresponding profits obtained if they were in
a grand coalition. These results are consistent with the results enunciated in Proposi-
tion 6.2. In a grand coalition, the Shapley value allocation gives more profits to both
supplier and retailer as can be seen from Example 3, whereas the consumer’s profit is
larger when she adopts the Pareto solution. Since the Shapley value allocation is con-
structed by considering each player’s marginal contribution to every possible coalitions,
this observation indicates that the contributions of supplier and retailer to this three-
person cooperative game are more superior than consumer’s, resulting in more utilities
being allocated to the supplier and retailer.
6.6.2 Sensitivity analysis
Since the consumer’s valuation will determine her decision on whether the product’s
quality level is acceptable, any changes in γ, which is in the consumer’s valuation function,
and ζ, which is the quality level elasticity of demand, will result in changes to players’
profits. Therefore, we provide a sensitivity analysis of players’ profit obtained under
a noncooperative game, in coalitional game and applying Shapley allocation scheme, by
varying γ and ζ while holding the other parameters constant. The results are summarized
in Table 6.1 and 6.2 below.
From Table 6.1, we observe that as γ increases, except for the supplier in a grand
coalition, all players’ profits will increase regardless of which type of games has been
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Table 6.1: Profits for each player obtained from non-cooperative game, coalitional game
and Shapley allocation scheme with respect to γ
γ Πs Πr Πc Πsrc,s Πsrc,r Πsrc,c ϕs ϕr ϕc
0.3 36.75 288.36 114.26 72.15 360.10 450.18 73.78 490.55 319.11
0.5 37.25 292.76 335.52 69.01 386.70 758.99 86.17 540.89 587.55
0.7 37.34 293.61 526.98 66.43 397.50 1018.57 98.69 572.60 811.22
0.9 37.38 293.97 692.73 64.59 401.01 1260.76 108.49 609.72 1008.16
1.1 37.41 294.17 836.43 63.20 405.0 1452.52 112.77 634.82 1173.15
Table 6.2: Profits for each player obtained from non-cooperative game, coalitional game
and Shapley allocation scheme with respect to ζ
ζ Πs Πr Πc Πsrc,s Πsrc,r Πsrc,c ϕs ϕr ϕc
0.2 58.24 433.80 925.39 84.61 490.50 1508.11 136.35 715.32 1231.56
0.4 47.15 359.84 599.29 82.45 420.20 1264.11 117.90 692.85 955.99
0.6 41.11 319.10 434.02 84.84 399.20 950.09 104.46 593.17 726.49
0.8 37.25 292.76 335.52 69.01 386.70 758.99 86.17 540.89 587.55
0.9 35.78 282.71 300.12 68.81 370.20 741.50 82.62 536.41 561.47
played. Table 6.2 shows that a player’s profit will decrease as ζ increases for all types of
games. Both tables show that the least profit that a player will receive is to participate
in a non-cooperative game, the best choice for the consumer is to go for the Pareto
optimal solution in a cooperative game and for both supplier and retailer, the Shapley
value scheme works best in allocating profit. Therefore, there is evidence showing that
cooperation among supply chain members will enhance the efficiency of the supply chain
and improve the profit of each chain member. The graphs of players’ profits obtained
under different types of games corresponding to different γ and ζ value are also presented
in Figure 6.1 and 6.2.
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Figure 6.1: The effect of γ on players’ profits received from all types of games
 
 
Figure 6.2: The effect of ζ on players’ profits received from all types of games
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6.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we investigate a three-person supply chain games which comprises of a
supplier, a retailer and a consumer. These games are considered under both a nonco-
operative and cooperative scenarios. The inclusion of the consumer, whose purchasing
decisions and cooperation with other chain members is pivotal to the efficiency of the
chain, is a novel feature of these games. A characteristic function is constructed which
incorporates both Nash and Pareto solution concepts and provide an approach in devel-
oping allocation scheme for members of the chain by way of the Shapley value. Numerical
results indicate that players’ profits are less in noncooperative games than in cooperative
ones. Sensitivity analysis also reveals that consumer’s valuation of the quality level will
affect both supplier and retailer’s profit in both non-cooperative and cooperative situa-
tions. However, the Shapley value allocation to the consumer is less than those obtained
from Pareto optimal solution, suggesting that the contribution to any coalition by the
inclusion of the consumer is less than those from the supplier and retailer.
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Chapter 7
Three-Person Asymmetric Supply
Chain Games Using Copula
Functions
7.1 Introduction
Beginning with Parlar [118] over two decades ago, game–theoretic concepts have been
introduced into various seller–buyer models of supply chain management, especially in
providing various types of coordination between the members of the chain. These mod-
els either assume that the game participants have complete information on each others
operations, the symmetric information case, or that the available information are at best
incomplete, the asymmetric information case. It is well known that introducing asym-
metric information into a supply chain will induce inefficiency as well as increase the
level of difficulty in analyzing players’ behavior. As we discussed in Section 2.2, Chapter
2, research on supply chain games under asymmetric information have been studied by
many researchers, such as Corbett and deGroote [31], Corbett [32], Lau and Lau [88], Lau
et al. [89] and Esmaeili and Zeephongsekul [43]. Also, there have recently been several
attempts at extending supply chain with two players to chains with three or more players,
for instance, Rosenthal [125], Leng and Parlar [95] and Ding et al. [39].
One of the key issues that arises in supply chains with more than two players is the
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possibility that group of players will coalesce into cooperative units, and consideration
given as to how these groups would coordinate their decisions within the group and
compete with other groups also introduce another layer of complexity. We note here that
supply chains with asymmetric information structure containing more than two players
have not been well studied in the research literature. In accordance with the standard
approach to games with incomplete information developed by Harsanyi [65], one hurdle
which must be overcome is how to evaluate a player’s uncertainty over other players’
types. This uncertainty is usually expressed through a joint probability distribution on the
type space. An important question that arises is how to determine this joint probability
distribution, especially when the type variables may be correlated and each may have
different marginal distributions.
Motivated by the above considerations, in this chapter we investigate a three-person
supply chain, which introduced in Chapter 5, involving a single supplier, retailer and
consumer under an asymmetric information structure. Two scenarios will be considered:
(i) the supply chain members are engaged in a non-cooperative game where no coalition
is allowed; (ii) using a Stackelberg game approach [159, 69], a single member of the
chain acts as the leader and the remaining two players form a coalition as the follower.
Due to noncooperation, the first scenario will be analyzed using a Nash equilibrium [112]
approach. In the second scenario, the leader’s uncertainty over coalition members’ types
will be expressed as a joint probability distribution over the type space. A novelty of the
chapter is our choice of a proper and desirable joint probability distribution to assess this
uncertainty. This joint distribution must reflect the possibility that the type variables
are correlated, and also that each is allowed the freedom to assume different marginal
distributions. To achieve these objectives, we apply the Copula method introduced by
Sklar [139].
Following this Introduction, Section 7.2 provides assumptions on the models intro-
duced in this chapter. In Section 7.3, we present a non-cooperative game where no
coalition is allowed to form among players, and provide Nash equilibrium solution for this
game. Section 7.4 is devoted to the investigation of Stackelberg games where formation
of different coalitions is allowed among followers. In order to assess the leader’s belief on
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coalition members’ types, we introduced the concept of a Copula function in this section.
Numerical examples and sensitivity analysis will be provided in Section 7.5 and finally,
this chapter is concluded in Section 7.6.
7.2 Assumption and models
All the notations that are used in this chapter are provided in Appendix A.
Assumptions
In addition to the assumptions which we used in Chapter 5 and 6, we have the following
assumption which related to the private information possessed by each player:
In the noncooperative environment, the supplier’s production cost Cs, the retailer’s
price elasticity α and the consumer’s quality level elasticity ζ are private information held
by the individual player who will not reveal this information to other players. All other
parameters are common knowledge to all players.
7.2.1 Models formulation
Preliminary concepts
To formulate models under an asymmetric game scenario, we will first describe the compo-
nents of a game with incomplete information which we discussed in Section 2.1.3, Chapter
2, based on a series of seminal papers by Harsanyi [65].
• Player’s strategy set: each player’s strategy set consists of their decision variables,
ie.,
supplier: As = {(V ,S) : V > 0, S > 0};
retailer: Ar = {(P,Q) : P > 0, Q > 0}; and
consumer: Ac = {R : 0 < R < 1}.
• Player’s type: each player’s type space are the values of the parameters which they
hold as private information, ie., supplier’s type space Ts consists of the values of
the production cost Cs, the retailer’s type space Tr consists of the values of the
price elasticity α and consumer’s type space Tc consists of the values of the quality
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elasticity ζ.
Note that the players’ decision variables are functions of their types.
• Player k’s uncertainty over player i’s type is expressed as a cdf Fi|k(·) with pdf
fi|k(·), where i, k = s, r, c. For example, supplier’s uncertainty over retailer’s type
α is expressed by the cdf Fr|s(α) with pdf fr|s(α) and consumer’s uncertainty over
retailer’s type α is expressed by the cdf Fr|c(α) with pdf fr|c(α).
• Profit function: each player’s profit function depends on the types of the other
players and on the individual’s decision variables. The following expressions are the
annual profits of supplier, retailer and consumer respectively, suitably abbreviated
so that their arguments contain only each player’s decision variables:
Πs(V ,S, P,Q,R : α, ζ) ≡ Πs(V ,S)
Πr(V ,S, P,Q,R : Cs, ζ) ≡ Πr(P,Q)
Πc(V ,S, P,Q,R : Cs, α) ≡ Πc(R)
Supplier’s expected profit function
By referring Section 5.3.2, Chapter 5, after receiving order Q from the retailer in a pro-
duction cycle T = Q/D, the supplier’s annual profit can be calculated as:
Supplier’s annual profit = Sales revenue - Production cost - Setup cost - Re-
work cost - Holding cost - Shortage cost.
where
Sales revenue = VD
Product cost = CsD
Setup cost = As
D
Q
Rework cost = CrDF (R)
Holding cost = iCs I
Shortage cost = C2B
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the demand function D = kP−αRζ and, I and B are the positive and negative inventory
which can be expressed as
I =
[Q(1− u−1)− S]2
2Q(1− u−1) (7.1)
and B =
S2
2Q(1− u−1) (7.2)
respectively. DF (R) are the expected amount returned by retailer to the supplier due to
its unacceptable quality as valued by the consumer.
Since supplier is uncertain of retailer’s type α and consumer’s type ζ, his profit should
be calculated as expected value with his believe that α follows pdf fr|s(α) and ζ follows
pdf fc|s(ζ). Thus, the supplier’s expected profit can be expressed as
Eα,ζ(Πs(V ,S))
=
∫
Tr
∫
Tc
Πs(V ,S)fr|s(α)fc|s(ζ)dαdζ
=
∫
Tr
∫
Tc
{D[V − Cs − As/Q− Cr F (R)]
− iCs [Q(1− u
−1)− S]2
2Q(1− u−1) −
C2 S2
2Q(1− u−1)}fr|s(α)fc|s(ζ)dαdζ (7.3)
Retailer’s expected profit function
The retailer will order quantity Q of the product in each production cycle T from the
supplier at price V , and sell it to consumer at price P per unit. According to Section
5.3.1, Chapter 5, her annual profit is calculated as:
Retailer’s annual profit = Sales revenue - Purchase cost - Ordering cost - Lost
sale cost - Holding cost - Shortage cost.
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where
Sales revenue = PD
Purchase cost = VD
Ordering cost = Ab
D
Q
Lost sale cost = CbDF (R)
Holding cost = iVI
Shortage cost = C1B
Since retailer is uncertain of supplier’s type Cs and consumer’s type ζ, which described
by pdf fs|r(Cs) and fc|r(ζ) respectively, hence, her expected profit can be expressed as:
ECs,β(Πr(P,Q))
=
∫
Ts
∫
Tc
Πr(P,Q)fs|r(Cs)fc|r(ζ)dCsdζ
=
∫
Ts
∫
Tc
{D[P − V − Ab/Q− Cb F (R)]
− iV [Q(1− u
−1)− S]2
2Q(1− u−1) −
C1 S2
2Q(1− u−1)}fs|r(Cs)fc|r(ζ)dCs dζ (7.4)
Consumer’s expected utility function
The consumer’s annual utility will be based on her monetary valuation of the product
and the accepted quality level of the product as we described in Section 5.3.3, Chapter 5.
That is, the consumer will consume a product only if (i) her expected monetary valuation
of the product is greater than what she has to pay for it, ie., E(V (X)) > P ; and (ii) the
quality level of the product R which she will accept is at least her perceived quality level
X, ie., R ≥ X. Hence, in each production cycle T , consumer will purchase an expected
amount Q(1 − F (R)) and reject the amount QF (R). The unacceptable products will
confer a disutility of S0 to the consumer. The consumer’s annual utility, by referring to
Chapter 5, is given by
Consumer’s annual utility = Consumer valuation - Purchase cost - Disutility
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cost - Shortage cost
with
Consumer valuation = DE(V (X))(1− F (R))
Purchase cost = DP (1− F (R))
Disutility cost = DS0 F (R)
Shortage cost =
D
Q
C3 S
Due to consumer’s uncertainty over supplier’s type Cs and retailer’s type α which ex-
pressed as pdf fs|c(Cs) and fr|c(α), respectively, Therefore, the consumer’s expected utility
can be evaluated as
ECs,α(Πc(R))
=
∫
Ts
∫
Tr
Πc(R)fs|c(Cs)fr|c(α)dCsdα
=
∫
Ts
∫
Tr
D{E(V (X))− P − C3 S/Q
− [E(V (X))− P + E(S0)]F (R)}fs|c(Cs)fr|c(α)dCs dα (7.5)
7.3 Asymmetric non-cooperative game with no coali-
tion
In a non-cooperative situation where coalition among players is not possible, each player
in a supply chain will attempt to maximize their own profit based on the best responses to
other members’ decisions. The Nash equilibrium is a suitable solution concept for players
participating in a non–cooperative game scenario.
Let λ = {λs, λr, λc} denote the set of pure strategy profile for all players, where λs =
{V ,S}, λr = {P,Q} and λc = {R} are the decisions for supplier, retailer and consumer
respectively. Players’ profit functions defined on λ under asymmetric information are
expressed in equations (7.3), (7.4) and (7.5). A pure strategy profile λ∗ = {λ∗s, λ∗r, λ∗c} is a
Nash equilibrium profile for the players if there is no incentive for a player to deviate from
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this profile if the other players stuck to theirs. In other words, Nash equilibrium profile
is a set of strategy that each player’s Nash equilibrium strategy is the best response to
other players’ Nash strategy, ie., for any player i
λ∗i ∈ argmax
λi
Πi(λi, λ
∗
−i)
where −i is the set of players excluding player i.
In the following proposition, we provide the Nash equilibrium solution for supplier,
retailer and consumer in a non-cooperative supply chain with incomplete information:
Proposition 7.1. A Nash equilibrium profile for three-person non-cooperative asymmetric
information game involving supplier, retailer and consumer is obtained by solving the
following equations simultaneously:
P =
α[ECs(V)Eζ(D) + AbEζ(D)/Q+ CbEζ(DF (R))]
(α− 1)Eζ(D) (7.6)
Q2 =
2Ab (1− u−1)Eζ(D) + iECs(VS2) + C1ECs(S2)
i(1− u−1)2ECs(V)
(7.7)
R =
ζ[Eα(D)E(V (X))− Eα(PD)− C3ECs(S)Eα(D/Q)]
f(R)[Eα(D)E(V (X))− Eα(PD) + Eα(D)E(S0)] −
ζF (R)
f(R)
(7.8)
S = iCs(1− u
−1)
(iCs + C2)Eα(1/Q)
(7.9)
V = WV0 (7.10)
where W is supplier’s marginal selling price and V0 is the minimum selling price which
obtained by solving Πs(V ,S) = 0 corresponding to S given by equation (7.9).
Proof Since supplier’s profit function (7.3) is concave in S, thus by applying the
first order condition with respect to S resulted in equation (7.9). Since supplier’s profit
function (7.3) is linear in V , using the same argument provided in Section 3.2.2, Chapter 3
and Section 5.3.2, Chapter 5, where the supplier imposed his marginal selling price W on
the minimum selling price V0 to obtain optimal selling price which yields equation (7.10).
Next, the retailer’s profit function (7.4) is Pseudoconcave in P and concave in Q (referring
Lemma 3.1, Chapter 3), hence, applying the first order condition with respect to P and
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Q resulting equations (7.6) and (7.7) respectively. The consumer’s profit function is also
Pseudoconcave in R (according to Lemma 5.3, Chapter 5), therefore, applying the first
order condition with respect to R on consumer’s profit function gives equation (7.8).
Finally, using the definition of a Nash equilibrium profile, the solutions to equations (7.6)
to (7.10) will yield a pure Nash equilibrium strategy profile λ∗ for all players. This
complete the proof.
7.4 Asymmetric non-cooperative game with coalition
formation
A common scenario prevalent in a market place, where there are multiple players, is the
presence of a dominant player with the remaining players comprising of weaker players.
The former has the power to influence the latter’s decisions, thereby affecting their payoffs.
Such scenario can be modeled by a two–stage hierarchical game known as a Stackelberg
game [159, 69, 93]. In a two–person Stackelberg game, the dominant player, called the
leader is allowed to make the first move; the weaker player called the follower, retaliates
by playing the best move consistent with available information initiated by the leader’s
move. The leader then responds by selecting the best decision based on the follower’s
decision. In the case of one-leader and multiple-followers, for an announced strategy
of the leader, the rational response by the followers could be obtained by adopting the
Nash equilibrium strategy when they want to react non–cooperatively, or, by adopting
the Pareto optimality strategy when they want to react in a cooperative manner (c.f.
Leitmann [93]).
In this section, we will model the interaction between supplier, retailer and consumer
as a Stackelberg game with a single leader and the remaining players forming a coalition as
the followers. In addition, the scenario is one where information is asymmetric: the leader
has no knowledge of some key parameters known to the followers while members of the
coalition share information but are equally unaware of the leader’s type. The solution to
this Stackelberg game will be obtained by treating it as a two–step game using backward
induction:
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Step 1: The leader makes the first move by announcing a strategy and coalition members
then determine their strategies using the Pareto optimality concept based on the leader’s
announced strategy and his type.
Step 2: Taking this Pareto optimal strategy into account, the leader then enforces his
optimal strategy based on the coalition members’ types.
The three scenarios that will be considered here will posit the supplier, retailer and
consumer in turn as leader, and will be referred to as the Supplier–Stackelberg, Retailer–
Stackelberg and Consumer–Stackelberg game respectively.
As in the asymmetric non–cooperative game with no coalition, the leader may quantify
his uncertainty of each of the follower’s type using a probability distribution, but there
remains the inherent problem of how to quantify the joint uncertainty of the followers’
types, especially when this assessment can not be arrived at independently of each others.
In this section, we will introduce Copula functions [139] to solve this problem and a brief
description of these functions is given next.
7.4.1 Copula method concept
Copula is a well known method which is used to describe the joint probability distri-
bution of any set of multivariate random variables based on their individual marginal
distributions. The copula approach for modeling dependence is rooted in a representation
theorem due to Sklar [139], who showed that for any random variables X1, X2, . . . , Xm
with arbitrary marginal distribution functions F1(x1), F2(x2), . . . , Fm(xm) and joint dis-
tribution function F (x1, x2, · · · , xm), a copula function C : [0, 1]m → [0, 1] exists which
joins the marginal distribution functions together through the relationship
F (x1, x2, · · · , xm) = C(F1(x1), F2(x2), · · · , Fm(xm); θ). (7.11)
Here, θ is a parameter of the copula function which measures the dependency between the
variables [151]. Sklar [139] also showed that if the marginal distributions are continuous,
then there is a unique copula representation for each joint distribution function. Therefore,
Sklar’s theorem provide a way of modeling joint distribution with consideration that
dependence may exist among random variables, but with unconstraint on the marginal
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distributions.
If the probability density functions (pdfs) f1(x1), f2(x2), . . . , fm(xm) of random vari-
ables X1, X2, . . . , Xm exits, then the joint pdf of these random variables can be expressed
as
f(x1, x2, · · · , xm) = c(F1(x1), F2(x2), · · · , Fm(xm))f1(x1)f2(x2) · · · fm(xm) (7.12)
where c(x1, x2, · · · , xm) is the copula density defined by
c(x1, x2, · · · , xm) = ∂
mC(x1, x2, · · · , xm)
∂x1 ∂x2 · · · ∂xm
One distinct advantage of using the copula approach is that different joint distributions
can be constructed based on a given set of marginal distributions, hence copulas permit a
huge flexibility in the construction of joint distributions. This is particularly suitable in
modeling situations where the marginal distributions of different variables follow different
but prescribed distributions. Reader can refer to Joe [77] and Nelsen [113] for more
detailed discussions of copulas and their applications.
An important class of copulas for bivariate random variables, the Archimedean family
of copulas, are useful in empirical modeling due to its variety, attractive properties and
flexibility. They are also capable of capturing a wide range of dependency between the
random variables. A copula C(·) is said to be Archimedean if there exists a function
ϕ : (0, 1] → [0,∞) with ϕ(1) = 0 which is convex and decreasing for all 0 < t < 1, ie.,
ϕ
′
(t) < 0 and ϕ
′′
(t) > 0. Furthermore,
C(u, v) = ϕ−1{ϕ(u) + ϕ(v)}
for all u, v ∈ (0, 1) and where ϕ is referred to as the generator function. We refer to Table
4.1 of Nelsen [113] for an extended list of Archimedean copulas.
The Spearman’s rho (ρ) and Kendall’s tau (τ) are two well-known measures of depen-
dence between pairs of random variables. Consider a bivariate random variables (X, Y )
with joint distribution F (·) and marginal distribution functions FX(·) and FY (·) respec-
tively. The Spearman’s rho is defined as
ρ(X, Y ) =
Cov(FX(X), FY (Y ))√
Var(FX(X))
√
Var(FY (Y ))
(7.13)
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(c.f. Spearman [141], Schmid and Schmidt [133]) and the Kendall’s tau defined as
τ(X, Y ) = Pr [(X1 −X2)(Y1 − Y2) > 0]− Pr [(X1 −X2)(Y1 − Y2) < 0] (7.14)
where (X1, Y1) and (X2, Y2) are two independent pairs of random variable from F (·).
The Spearman’s rho is a standard measure of correlation applied to ranks whereas the
Kendall’s tau is the difference between the probability of concordance and the probability
of discordance. Thus, the dependence between X and Y as measured by both ρ and τ
would imply the property that large value of one random variable is associated with large
value of the other and vice versa. Both dependency measures can be estimated using the
ranked data obtained from samples taken from the population (c.f. Genest and Favre
[51]).
Given a joint distribution function defined by a copula, both Spearman’s rho and
Kendall’s tau can be expressed in terms of copula function C(·) as
ρ = 12
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
C(u, v)dudv − 3 (7.15)
τ = 4
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
C(u, v)dC(u, v)− 1 (7.16)
In addition, Genest and MacKay [52] has shown that Kendall’s tau has a direct relation
to the generator of an Archimedean copula given by
τ = 1 + 4
∫ 1
0
ϕ(t)
ϕ′(t)
dt
Three Archimedean copulas, namely the Clayton, Frank and Gumbel copula are used
extensively in many applications. These copulas are popular because they accommodate
different patterns of dependency and have relatively straightforward functional forms.
We display these Archimedean copulas with corresponding densities in Table 7.1. Their
generators and corresponding parameter spaces and Kendall’s tau values are displayed in
Table 7.2.
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Table 7.1: Archimedean copulas: Clayton, Frank and Gumbel with their densities
Copula Copula functionC(u, v) Density function cuv(u, v)
Clayton (u−θ + v−θ − 1)−1/θ (1 + θ)(uv)−θ−1(u−θ + v−θ − 1)−2−1/θ
Frank −1
θ
log
[
1 + (e
−θu−1)(e−θv−1)
e−θ−1
]
−θ(e−θ−1)e−θ(u+v)
[(e−θu−1)(e−θv−1)+(eθ−1)]2
Gumbel e−(u˜
θ+v˜θ)1/θ C(u, v)(uv)−1 (u˜v˜)
θ−1
(u˜θ+v˜θ)2−1/θ
× [(u˜θ + v˜θ)1/θ + θ − 1]
where u˜ = − lnu, v˜ = − ln v
Table 7.2: Generator, parameter space and Kendall’s tau for Clayton, Frank and Gumbel
copulas. Note D1(θ) =
∫ θ
0
(x/θ)/(ex − 1)dx is the first Debye function
Copula Generator Parameter Kendall’s tau
Clayton (t−θ − 1)/θ θ ∈ (0,∞) θ/(θ + 2)
Frank − log ( e−θt−1
e−θ−1 ) θ ∈ < 1− 4/θ + 4D1(θ)/θ
Gumbel (− log t)θ [1,∞) (θ − 1)/θ
7.4.2 Stackelberg games: the three cases
Supplier-Stackelberg game
In the first case, the supplier has more power than both retailer and consumer, with the
latter two players forming a coalition called the RC–coalition. Therefore, the supplier is
the leader, and the RC–coalition the follower. The supplier has no knowledge of coalition
members’ types, although these are common knowledge among members of the coalition.
In return, the coalition is unaware but share the same belief regarding to suppler’s type.
The strategy of the coalition is based on Pareto optimality, which is the solution
obtained by maximizing the convex combination of the retailer’s and consumer’s profit
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functions [18] over supplier’s type:
ECs(Zrc) = r ECs(Πr(P,Q)) + (1− r)ECs(Πc(R)). (7.17)
where r is the weight and 0 < r < 1.
By applying the first order condition with respect to the retailer and consumer’s decision
variables to ( 7.17) resulted in the following lemma, which provides a unique strategy for
the RC–coalition based on the supplier’s type.
Lemma 7.1. The Pareto optimal solution for the RC-coalition between retailer and con-
sumer based on the unknown supplier’s type is obtained by solving the following equations:
P =
α
α− 1 [ECs(V) + Ab/Q+ Cb F (R)]−
1− r
r
αECs(Πc)
(α− 1)D
− 1− r
r
P [1− F (R)]
α− 1 (7.18)
Q2 =
2D [rAb + (1− r)C3ECs(S)]
ri(1− u−1)ECs(V)
+
C1ECs(S2) + iECs(VS2)
i(1− u−1)2ECs(V)
(7.19)
R =
ζr [P − ECs(V)− Ab/Q− Cb F (R)]
f(R){rCb + (1− r) [E(V (X))− P + E(S0)]}
+
ζ(1− r)ECs(Πc)/D
f(R){rCb + (1− r) [E(V (X))− P + E(S0)]} (7.20)
F (R) =
P − [1 + 1
2
Q(1− u−1)/D]ECs(V)− Ab/Q+ iECs(VS)/D
P + Cb − E(V (X))− E(S0)
− E(V (X))− P − C3ECs(S)/Q
P + Cb − E(V (X))− E(S0)
− iECs(VS
2) + C1ECs(S2)
2Q(1− u−1)D [P + Cb − E(V (X))− E(S0)] (7.21)
The supplier’s objective is to seek an optimal selling price V and shortage size S which op-
timize his profit, given the RC-coalition’s Pareto optimal solutions supplied in Lemma 7.1
and his uncertainty over the retailer and consumer’s types. Suppose this uncertainty is ex-
pressed by the marginal distributions Fr|s(α) and Fc|s(ζ), with corresponding pdfs fr|s(α)
and fc|s(ζ) respectively, then the supplier can apply the copula method and postulate the
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joint distribution of α and ζ based on a copula function C(·). Using (7.11), the joint
distribution of retailer and consumer’s type α and ζ can be expressed as
Frc(α, ζ) = C(Fr|s(α), Fc|s(ζ))
further, by using (7.12), the density function of the joint distribution Frc(α, ζ) is
frc(α, ζ) = crc(Fr|s(α), Fc|s(ζ))fr|s(α)fc|s(ζ)
where crc(Fr|s(α), Fc|s(ζ)) is the density of copula C(Fr|s(α), Fc|s(ζ)), and it can be ob-
tained as
cuv(u, v) =
∂2C(u, v)
∂u∂v
(7.22)
The supplier’s optimization problem is therefore expressed as:
maxEαζ(Πs(V ,S)) =
∫ ∫
Tr×Tc
Πs(V ,S)frc(α, ζ)dαdζ
=
∫ ∫
Tr×Tc
{D[V − Cs − As/Q− Cr F (R)]− iCs [Q(1− u
−1)− S]2
2Q(1− u−1)
− C2 S
2
2Q(1− u−1)}crc(Fr|s(α), Fc|s(ζ))fr|s(α)fc|s(ζ)dαdζ (7.23)
subject to (7.18), (7.19), (7.20) and (7.21).
Once the marginal cdfs Fr|s(α) and Fc|s(ζ) are given, the following steps can be used to
solve this problem numerically, which is further simplified by the fact that since supplier
known his own type, the expected value in constraints (7.18) to (7.21) can be simply
ignored.
Solution procedure:
(i) Obtain copula C(·) base on given marginal cdfs;
(ii) Evaluate the double integral in problem (7.23) using approximation method such as
Simpson Rule;
(iii) Solve constraints (7.18) to (7.21) for every decision variables in term of V and S;
(iv) Substituting the solutions into the result obtained from (ii) to select the objective
function in term of V and S;
(v) Using nonlinear optimization software such as the one subroutine in Maple, solve the
unconstrained objective function obtained from (iv).
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Retailer-Stackelberg game
In the second case, the leadership position has shifted to the retailer, with the supplier and
consumer forming a coalition (hereafter SC-coalition) as the follower. The retailer aims
to seek optimal selling price P and order quantity Q, based on uncertainty of supplier and
consumer’s type in order to maximize her profit. Following the same approach applied in
Section 7.4.2, the SC-coalition’s Pareto strategy is obtained by maximizing the expected
weighted sum of supplier and consumer’s profit function over retailer’s type:
Eα(Zsc) = r Eα(Πs(V ,S)) + (1− r)Eα(Πc(R)) (7.24)
where 0 < r < 1. The solution of the SC-coalition is given in the next lemma. We assume
there that since the supplier’s profit function Πs(V ,S) is linear in V , he will impose the
marginal selling price W on his minimum selling price V0 for his optimal selling price V .
Lemma 7.2. The Pareto strategy for SC-coalition based on the unknown retailer’s type
is obtained by solving the following equations:
S = (1− u
−1) [r iCs − (1− r)C3Eα(D/Q)]
r (C2 + iCs)Eα(1/Q)
(7.25)
R =
ζ{r [V − Cs − AsEα(1/Q)− Cr F (R)] + (1− r)Eα(Πc/D)}
f(R){r Cr + (1− r) [E(V (X))− Eα(P ) + E(S0)]} (7.26)
F (R) =
E(V (X))− Eα(P ) + (As − C3 S)Eα(1/Q)− V + Cs
E(V (X))− Eα(P ) + E(S0)− Cr
+
i(1− u−1)Cs [(1− u−1)Eα(Q)− 2S] + (C2 + iCs)S2Eα(1/Q)
2(1− u−1)Eα(D) [E(V (X))− Eα(P ) + E(S0)− Cr] (7.27)
V = WV0 (7.28)
where W is supplier’s marginal selling price, and V0 is the minimum selling price, which
is the solution of Πs(V ,S) = 0 corresponding to S given by equation (7.25).
The retailer’s objective is to seek lot size Q and selling price P which optimize his profit,
given the SC-coalition’s Pareto optimal solutions supplied in Lemma 7.2 and his uncer-
tainty over the supplier and consumer’s types. Assume that this uncertainty is expressed
as marginal distributions Fs|r(Cs) and Fc|r(ζ) with corresponding densities fs|r(Cs) and
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fc|r(ζ) respectively, then using copula, the joint distribution Fsc(Cs, ζ) can be represented
as
Fsc(Cs, ζ) = C(Fs|r(Cs), Fc|r(ζ))
with pdf
fsc(Cs, ζ) = csc(Fs|r(Cs), Fc|r(ζ))fs|r(Cs)fc|r(ζ)
where csc(Fs|r(Cs), Fc|r(ζ)) is the density of copula C(Fs|r(Cs), Fc|r(ζ)), and it can be
obtained by (7.22). Therefore, the retailer’s problem becomes:
maxECs ζ(Πr(P,Q)) =
∫ ∫
Ts×Tc
Πr(P,Q)fsc(Cs, ζ)dCsdζ
=
∫ ∫
Ts×Tc
{D[P − V − Ab/Q− Cb F (R)]− iV [Q(1− u
−1)− S]2
2Q(1− u−1)
− C1 S
2
2Q(1− u−1)}csc(Fs|r(Cs), Fc|r(ζ))fs|r(Cs)fc|r(ζ)dCsdζ (7.29)
subject to (7.25), (7.26), (7.27) and (7.28).
Since the retailer knows her own type, we can dispensed with the expected values with
respect to her type α in constraints (7.25) to (7.28). Once the marginal Fs|r(Cs) and
Fc|r(ζ) are given, by following the similar steps outlined in Section 7.4.2, we can solve this
problem numerically.
Consumer-Stackelberg game
In the final case, consumer is the leader in the game, the supplier and retailer form
a coalition (hereafter SR-coalition) as follower. The problem for consumer here is to
determine the quality level R in order to gain maximum utility based on the uncertainty
of supplier and retailer’s type. The Pareto optimal strategy for the SR-coalition over
consumer’s type is obtained from maximizing the following expected weighted sum:
Eζ(Zsr) = rEζ(Πs(V ,S)) + (1− r)Eζ(Πr(P,Q))
where 0 < r < 1, and the following lemma provides the strategy for the SR-coalition.
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Lemma 7.3. The Pareto strategy for SR-coalition based on the unknown consumer’s type
is obtained by solving the following equations:
P =
α
α− 1 [V + Ab/Q+ Cb F (R)]
− α
α− 1
r
1− r [V − Cs − As/Q− Cr F (R)] (7.30)
Q2 =
2Eζ(D) [rAs + (1− r)Ab]
i(1− u−1) [rCs + (1− r)V ]
+
[r(C1 + iV) + (1− r)(C2 + iCs)]S2
i(1− u−1)2 [rCs + (1− r)V ] (7.31)
S = iQ(1− u
−1) [rCs + (1− r)V ]
r(C2 + iCs) + (1− r)(C1 + iV) (7.32)
V = 2Eζ(D)Q(1− u
−1) [P + Cs + (As − Ab)/Q+ (Cr − Cb)F (R)]
4Eζ(D)Q(1− u−1) + i [Q(1− u−1)− S]2
+
iCs [Q(1− u−1)− S]2 + (C2 − C1)S2
4Eζ(D)Q(1− u−1) + i [Q(1− u−1)− S]2
(7.33)
r =
2Eζ(D)Q(1− u−1) + i [Q(1− u−1)− S]2
4Eζ(D)Q(1− u−1) + i [Q(1− u−1)− S]2
(7.34)
Given consumer’s uncertainty over supplier and retailer’s type expressed by marginal
distributions Fs|c(Cs) and Fr|c(α), with densities fs|c(Cs) and fr|c(α) respectively, then
using copula method, the joint distribution Cs and α can be expressed as
Fsr(Cs, α) = C(Fs|c(Cs), Fr|c(α))
with pdf
fsr(Cs, α) = csr(Fs|c(Cs), Fr|c(α))fs|c(Cs)fr|c(α)
where csr(Fs|c(Cs), Fr|c(α)) is the density of copula C(Fs|c(Cs), Fr|c(α)). Thus, the con-
sumer’s problem is
173
maxECs α(Πc(R)) =
∫ ∫
Ts×Tr
Πc(R)fsr(Cs, α)dCsdα
=
∫ ∫
Ts×Tr
D{E(V (X))− P − C3 S/Q− [E(V (X))− P + E(S0)]
F (R)}csr(Fs|c(Cs), Fr|c(α))fs|c(Cs)fr|c(α)dCsdα (7.35)
subject to (7.30), (7.31), (7.32), (7.33) and (7.34).
Again, the expected value in constraints (7.30) to (7.34) can be ignored due to the con-
sumer is aware of her own type. Thus, for any given marginal distribution Fs|c(Cs) and
Fr|c(α), we can follow the procedure indicated in Section 7.4.2 to solve this problem nu-
merically.
7.5 Numerical examples and sensitivity analysis
In this section, we illustrate the foregoing theory with some numerical examples. We
will assume that each member of a coalition holds the same belief concerning the third
player’s type in a cooperative game as well as when they act individually in a non-
cooperative game. Specifically, the RC–coalition and its individual members, ie., retailer
and consumer, assess the supplier’s type Cs to be distributed under normal distribution
with mean C¯s = 1.5 and standard deviation σCs = 0.5; the SC–coalition and its members,
ie., supplier and consumer, assess the buyer’s type α to be distributed under a gamma
distribution with shape parameter p = 3.60 and rate parameter q = 2.10; and the SR–
coalition and its members, ie., supplier and retailer, assesses the consumer’s type ζ to be
distributed under an exponential distribution with rate λ = 2.5. Under the symmetric
information scenario, we assume that supplier, retailer and consumer will choose their
type parameters as Cs = 1.5, α = 1.7 and ζ = 0.6, respectively. The copulas that join
the type distributions will be the Archimedean copulas displayed in Table 7.1 and we will
adopt the Kendall’s tau as the measure of dependency between variables.
The true quality of the product X is assumed uniformly distributed over [0, 1] and the
consumer’s valuation function is the classical utility function V (x) = (1 − e−γx)V˜ with
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upper bound V˜ = 100, and γ = 0.5. The consumer’s disutility function S0 = ξV (x) with
ξ = 0.01. The following parameters will be used in all examples: k = 3600, u = 1.1, C1 =
2, C2 = 1, C3 = 1, As = 140,M = 1.25, Ab = 40, i = 0.1, Cb = 0.5, Cr = 0.2.
7.5.1 Numerical examples
Example 1. In this example we obtain the Nash equilibrium solution for the supplier,
retailer and consumer when there is an asymmetric information structure, and where each
player’s beliefs of other players’ types are given by the probability distributions described
as above. Solving equations (7.6) to (7.10), we obtain supplier’s optimal decision variables
V = 2.16,S = 16.77, with corresponding supplier’s expected profit of Eαζ(Πs) = 47.18
from equation (7.3). The retailer’s optimal decision variables P = 5.61, Q = 1414.01, and
her expected profit is ECsζ(Πr) = 416.13 from equation (7.4). Finally, the consumer’s
optimal strategy R = 0.3683, with the expected utility of ECsα(Πc) = 450.54 from equa-
tion (7.5).
Example 2. In this example, we will provide solutions for the Stackelberg games formu-
lated in Section 7.4.2 using the copulas listed in Table 7.1 and the data given above. The
Kendall’s tau value used is 0.05.
In Supplier-Stackelberg game, the density of copula is based on retailer’s and con-
sumer’s marginal distributions which assessed by the supplier, ie., Fr|s(α) and Fc|s(ζ).
By following the steps described in Section 7.4.2, we solve supplier’s problem (7.23) and
summarize the results in Table 7.3.
Table 7.3: Optimal solution of asymmetric information Supplier-Stackelberg game based
on different copulas with τ = 0.05
Copulas V S P Q R r Eαζ(Πs) ECs(Zrc)
Clayton 3.33 43.29 6.26 1425.06 0.6739 0.7613 168.49 594.48
Frank 3.99 39.72 6.94 1209.11 0.6437 0.7195 64.45 484.43
Gumbel 3.46 44.73 6.40 1435.13 0.6683 0.7529 177.72 569.39
In Retailer-Stackelberg game, we derive the density of copula based on retailer’s as-
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sessment regarding to supplier and consumer’s marginal distributions Fs|r(Cs) and Fc|r(ζ).
By solving retailer’s problem (7.29), we obtain the optimal results and summarize in Ta-
ble 7.4.
Table 7.4: Optimal solution of asymmetric information Retailer-Stackelberg game based
on different copulas with τ = 0.05
Copulas V S P Q R r ECs ζ(Πr) Eα(Zsc)
Clayton 2.31 15.87 6.55 1356.97 0.9185 0.9811 481.07 113.50
Frank 2.31 15.85 6.56 1354.24 0.9183 0.9811 144.66 113.11
Gumbel 2.31 15.88 6.55 1356.97 0.9185 0.9811 481.15 113.50
In Consumer-Stackelberg game, the density of the copula is based on supplier and
retailer’s marginal distributions Fs|c(Cs) and Fr|c(α) according to consumer’s belief. Solve
consumer’s problem (7.35), resulting the optimal solutions which summarized in Table 7.5.
Table 7.5: Optimal solution of asymmetric information Consumer-Stackelberg game based
on different copulas with τ = 0.05
Copulas V S P Q R r ECs α(Πc) Eζ(Zsr)
Clayton 2.93 13.94 4.40 1192.50 0.2865 0.5074 719.12 461.98
Frank 2.93 13.96 4.41 1193.72 0.2880 0.5074 214.85 462.39
Gumbel 2.93 13.94 4.40 1192.51 0.2865 0.5074 719.18 461.98
Discussion numerical results
Comparing the results from Example 1 and 2 reveal that under asymmetric information
structure, the leader in a Stackelberg game does have an advantage over the follower,
but this is not always the case. For example, in Retailer-Stackelberg and Consumer-
Stackelberg game under the Frank copula, both leader, ie., retailer and consumer, gained
less expected profit compare with the expected profit when Nash equilibrium strategy
was employed. This perhaps suggests that due to the incomplete information, expected
profits are sensitive to the choice of copula function, whereas this is less so in the case of
coalition’s gain.
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7.5.2 Sensitivity analysis
We perform a sensitivity analysis in order to assess the effect of dependency between the
type variables, by varying the Kendall’s tau from small to large, on the leader’s profit
using different copulas, for each of those Stackelberg game proposed in previous sections.
The results are summarized in Table 7.6 to 7.8 for Supplier-Stackelberg game, Retailer-
Stackelberg game and Consumer-Stackelberg game, respectively.
Table 7.6: Supplier’s expected profit in Supplier-Stackelberg game for different τ values
using three different copulas
Copulas Clayton Frank Gumbel
τ E(Πs) E(Πs) E(Πs)
0.05 168.49 64.45 177.72
0.1 177.59 21.34 182.33
0.3 186.58 0.20 204.16
0.5 191.68 0.00 219.25
0.7 196.07 0.00 208.16
0.9 352.49 0.00 261.03
Table 7.7: Retailer’s expected profit in Retailer-Stackelberg game for different τ values
using three different copulas
Copulas Clayton Frank Gumbel
τ E(Πr) E(Πr) E(Πr)
0.05 481.07 144.66 481.15
0.1 481.20 47.49 481.26
0.3 481.60 0.47 481.56
0.5 480.90 0.00 481.78
0.7 443.12 0.00 481.40
0.9 263.66 0.00 406.78
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Table 7.8: Consumer’s expected profit in Consumer-Stackelberg game for different τ values
using three different copulas
Copulas Clayton Frank Gumbel
τ E(Πc) E(Πc) E(Πc)
0.05 719.12 214.85 719.18
0.1 719.37 69.89 719.37
0.3 719.85 0.60 719.93
0.5 720.01 0.00 720.37
0.7 698.95 0.00 720.49
0.9 383.94 0.00 606.70
These results are also displayed in Figure 7.1 to Figure 7.3, respectively.
 
 
Figure 7.1: The effect of τ on supplier’s expected profit for different copulas
Discussion
From Figure 7.1, we see that in Supplier-Stackelberg game, with Clayton and Gumbel
copula, the leader’s expected profit increases as τ increases. By contrast, Figure 7.2 and
7.3 indicate that with Clayton and Gumbel copulas, the leaders’ profits remain relatively
stable and then decline as τ increases. In the case of Frank copula, whose τ values have
a limited range not exceeding 1/3, the decline in profit to 0 is steep. All this seems to
suggest that for supply chains with asymmetric information, the leader’s expected profit
will be affected not only by the choice of copula function, but also by the dependence
between the players’ types.
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Figure 7.2: The effect of τ on retailer’s expected profit for different copulas
 
 
Figure 7.3: The effect of τ on consumer’s utility for different copulas
7.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have investigated a three person supply chain game involving a supplier,
a retailer and a consumer under an asymmetric information structure. The interactions
between the players have been formulated under two game scenarios, where (i) there is no
coalition among players, and (ii) two (any two) of three players form a coalition against
the remaining player. In the first scenario, each player’s strategy was obtained using the
Nash equilibrium solution concept. In the second scenario, a Stackelberg type game was
implemented with the single player as the leader, and the remaining two players forming a
coalition as the follower. Under asymmetric information, a copula function was employed
to model the leader’s uncertainty over the followers’ type. The use of copula function is
a novel approach introduced in this chapter and it allows the dependency, due to coop-
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eration between coalition members, to be incorporated into this measure of uncertainty.
Numerical results seem to suggest that due to asymmetric information, the leadership ad-
vantage may not prevail in all situations, and a noncooperative situation could be just as
advantageous as assuming a leadership position. Furthermore, the leader’s expected profit
appears to depend on the choice of copula function as well as the dependency between
coalition members’ type parameters. Therefore, it is recommended that when applying
this theory to practice, an appropriate copula function be chosen to represent the joint
distribution of unknown parameters. This could be achieved by using real data to esti-
mate the copula parameters using any one of several methods suggested for example, in
Nelsen [113] and Joe [77].
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Chapter 8
Applications of Game Theory to
Supply Chain Management
8.1 Introduction and literature review
Two applications of game theory in supply chain management will be discussed in this
chapter:
(i) Seller-Buyer supply chain models with credit option and asymmetric information;
(ii) Product quality in Newsvendor supply chain model using a game theory approach.
Both of these models will be investigated under symmetric information as well as asym-
metric information structure.
As we mentioned in Chapter 2, there have been various supply chain policy discussed
in the literature with an aim of enhancing supply chain members’ profit, hence improve
the performance of whole chain. Among these existing policies, trade credit option policy
has been studied by many researchers, such as Haley and Higgins [64], Goyal [58], Shinn
[137], Abad and Jaggi [2], Chen and Kang [20], Zhong and Zhou [173] and more. Un-
like these studies, where information regarding to supply chain operation have been as-
sumed symmetric among supply chain members, we will investigate credit option policy
by considering interaction between supply chain members under asymmetric information
structure. This will be presented in Section 8.2.
During the last few decades, numerous research papers have appeared in the area
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of supply chain management under various assumptions and from different perspective
of the participants in the chain, and by applying different methodologies. One of the
main objectives of these papers is to obtain supply chain policies which will improve
coordination between the various channels in the supply chain, as well as achieving the
best outcomes efficiently and effectively among the channel members. One of the means
of achieving this objective is to implement a trade credit policy and this has attracted
many researchers’ attention since Haley and Higgins [64] studied the buyer’s lot-sizing
problem under a trade credit contract. Subsequently, other studies have appeared in the
literature which are related to this problem. Goyal [58] considered the buyer’s problem
under trade credit agreement under the assumption that related to interest rate. Kim
et al. [82] proposed a model from the seller’s perspective to determine the optimal credit
period under a fixed selling price. Shinn [137] showed that if demand is price sensitive,
then the order quantity of the buyer is not invariant with respect to the length of the
credit period. Related to this, Aggarwal and Jaggi [3], Chung [28] and Jamal et al. [72]
studied the deteriorating item problem with permissible delay in payment under constant
demand. Jaber and Osman [70] studied a two-level supply chain model where the players
coordinate their orders in order to minimize local cost. We also refer to Thangam and
Uthayakumar [148], Ouyang et al. [114], Chen and Kang [20] and Zhong and Zhou [173]
for more recent papers which are related to the work reported in this application.
All the aforementioned papers studied the credit period with permissible delay in
payment policy purely from an inventory management viewpoint, totally ignoring the
interaction between players and the consequences of this interaction. In recent years,
game theory has emerged as an essential tool in investigating the interaction between
players in a seller–buyer supply chain. Abad and Jaggi [2] who proposed a joint approach
of seller-buyer channel to determine the unit price and length of credit period for the
seller using a game–theoretic approach. They investigated a leader-follower relationship
based on Stackelberg game where seller is the leader and the buyer the follower. They also
present a Nash bargaining solution with the Stackelberg game solution as a fixed threat.
In their paper, the rate of the opportunity cost of capital for the seller is assumed linear
to the credit period, and the buyer will settle the payment immediately after the credit
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period. Similarly, in a recent work by Zhou et al. [175], the authors studied two-echelon
supply chain by implementing Stackelberg game to design a trade credit policy for the
supplier to achieve optimal annual profit. However, in both of these papers, the models
are based on the assumption that the information about certain parameters in the supply
chain, such as demand and interest rate, are common knowledge to both players, i.e. they
are symmetric. However, in reality, these information are private to each individual player
who may not be willing to reveal them to the other player.
In this application, we investigate two scenarios regarding credit period policy by
extending the model in Abad and Jaggi [2] to the asymmetric information case. In the
first scenario, the seller offers a credit period to the buyer as an incentive strategy to
entice the latter to increase the order quantity. During the credit period, the seller will
carry the inventory cost for the buyer, while the latter can enjoy capital gain. The seller’s
capital cost rate is assumed linearly related to the length of the credit period as in Abad
and Jaggi [2]. We assume that demand is sensitive to both selling price and marketing
expenditure as we defined in Chapter 3, and known to the buyer, while the seller is
unaware of this demand. The seller will determine the optimum length of credit period
based on the uncertainty of the demand. It is obvious that in this scenario, if the buyer
does not settle the payment immediately after the credit period, the seller will end up
losing capital. In the second scenario, the buyer seeks to extend the length of the credit
period by offering to share the inventory cost incurred by the seller. The buyer would like
to extend the length of the credit period by a certain multiplier factor with an offer of
accepting charges from the seller with interest rate linearly related to the extension period.
All relevant information concerning the interest rate are only known to the seller, but the
buyer determines the multiplier factor based on her uncertainty concerning this interest
rate. We will investigate the interaction between seller and buyer as a non-cooperative
Stackelberg game, where each player take turn as leader and follower. One of the main
reason for applying Stackelberg game to our supply chain is due to observation prevailing
in the market place where in some situations, some players have more power then the
others. So the strategies of players would depend on their leadership position in the
game.
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In Chapter 5, we introduced a three-person game model concerning the quality level
of product from consumer’s viewpoint. However, the quality of the product can be de-
termined by the manufacturer who will consider all the relevant costs which are incurred
during the production process, so that he can achieve an optimal outcome. Among many
existing models, the Newsvendor problem is a classic model, which characterised by fixed
selling price and random demand for single-item perishable product, and it has been
studied by researchers from different perspectives using various methodologies, for in-
stance, Slikker et al. [140], Chen and Liu [23], Li and Liu [98], Darwish [35], Sarkar et al.
[130], Jeang [75] and Turken et al. [154]. However, the decision making process regarding
the product quality has not been well studied in this model. Therefore, in the second
application of this chapter, we investigate a Newsvendor model which involves making
decision regarding to the quality of the product from the manufacturer’s viewpoint. This
is accomplished by considering interaction among supply chain members under different
information structure. This will be presented in Section 8.3.
A properly functioning supply chain system is important for industry in order to
obtain a mutually beneficial situation for both manufacturer and buyer (or retailer) who
comprise the main players of the system. The manufacturer’s objective function would
include, among other things, sales revenue, manufacturing and management cost, and the
buyer’s objective function would consider the order quantity, holding cost, loss of goodwill
cost due to the quality of the product supplied by the manufacturer. Since their objectives
would often conflict, it is therefore essential to study and solve the problem of how to get
a good trade-off between the objectives of the two participants in a supply chain.
Over the last three decades, much work has been done towards a better understanding
on how to improve the output and benefits to members of different supply chains. Goyal
[57] first proposed an integrated inventory model based on the total cost of the producer
and purchaser, obtaining the optimum production quantity and order cycle in the process.
Lu [101] considered the problem of an integrated inventory model with a single producer
and multiple purchasers and presented a heuristic method for obtaining the model’s opti-
mal solution. Goyal and Nebebe [60] proposed an optimum production and transportation
policy with a minimum cost to the producers and the purchasers. Chen and Liu [24] pro-
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posed an optimal consignment policy considering a fixed fee and a per-unit commission.
Their model produces a higher profit for the manufacturer than the traditional produc-
tion system and provides a means for the retailer to obtain a larger supply chain profit.
Darwish [35] proposed the optimum process mean setting for a single-vendor, single-buyer
supply chain where in addition to the optimum process mean, the shipment quantity of
product and number of shipments that is required were also determined from his model.
Chen and Huang [22] addressed the problem of how a retailer could hedge the risk of
demand uncertainty by purchasing their products from options and online spot markets.
Some recent supply chain models which integrated quality and production with inventory,
and supply chain management can also be found in Jeang [73, 74, 75, 76], Darwish and
Odah [38], Darwish and Goyal [37], Sana [129], Darwish and Abdulmalek [36], Roy et al.
[126].
In this application, we investigate the Newsvendor supply chain model with products
which may not satisfy the required quality standard. The optimum profit models are
obtained by utilizing non–cooperative games, and are considered under both a symmetric
and asymmetric information pattern scenarios.
The organisation of this chapter as follows. For the first application, assumptions
and model formulations, from both the seller’s and buyer’s perspectives, are provided in
Section 8.2.1. In Section 8.2.2, we present the Seller-Stackelberg game (the first scenario),
where the seller is leader, and determine the optimum length of the credit period. In
Section 8.2.3, we investigate the Buyer-Stackelberg game (the second scenario), where
the buyer is leader, and determine the optimum multiplier factor of the extended length
of credit period. In Section 8.2.4, we provide numerical examples to compare between the
different models and discuss the effects that incomplete information have on the players’
decisions and profits. We also provide a sensitivity analysis on players’ decisions based
on different pdfs assumed by them. Finally, we conclude this application in Section 8.2.5.
For the second application, in Section 8.3.1, we review the Newsvendor problem and
discuss the manufacturer’s and buyer’s expected profits. In Section 8.3.2, we consider
the non–cooperative Stackelberg games with symmetric information, where members of
the chain have complete information on each others operations. This is then repeated in
185
Section 8.3.3 for non–cooperative Stackelberg games with asymmetric information, where
the available information are at best incomplete. Numerical examples will be provided in
Section 8.3.4 and concludes the application in Section 8.3.5.
8.2 Seller-Buyer supply chain models with credit op-
tion and asymmetric information
8.2.1 Assumptions and model formulation
The following assumptions will be used in our models, which comprise the profit functions
from both the perspectives of the buyer and seller. All the notations that used in this
application are listed in Appendix A.
Assumptions
1. Planning horizon is infinite.
2. The annual demand is sensitive to both selling price and marketing expenditure
according to
D(P,M) = kP−αMβ. (8.1)
3. Shortage are not permitted.
4. Buyer’s capital gain rate Ip during the credit period equal to the capital cost rate
Ic after the credit period, ie., Ip = Ic.
5. Capital cost rate Is for the seller during the credit period is linear in L according
to Is = a+ b L (c.f. Abad and Jaggi [2]).
6. Capital rate Ix charged by the seller to the buyer for the extension of credit period
(κ− 1)L given by Ix = a+ b κL.
7. The buyer has knowledge of the values of α and β and therefore is aware of the
demand function. However, she is unaware of the parameters a and b which are
known to the seller. All other parameters are common knowledge to both players.
This is therefore a two–person game with asymmetric information [124].
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Model formulation
We will formulate a general model for both buyer and seller based on the second scenario
described in Section 8.1, the model used in first scenario is a special case of this general
model.
(a) The buyer’s model:
In the second scenario, in order to ease financial pressure such as cash flow problem, the
buyer would like to extend the length of credit period and in return offers to share the
seller’s inventory cost at an interest rate of Ix. This extension could also improve the
profit of both the buyer and the seller. The buyer’s problem is to determine the selling
price, marketing expenditure, order quantity and multiplier factor κ such that her net
profit will be maximized. With capital gain [2] in the credit period, the buyer’s profit is
calculated as:
Buyer’s Profit = Sales revenue - Purchase cost - Marketing cost - Ordering
cost + Capital gain due credit period - Storage cost excluding financing cost
- Inventory financing cost for the extended credit period.
There are three cases for the buyer’s model which are described in Figure 8.1 below.
 
 
Inventory Level Inventory Level Inventory Level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L ?L T Time L T ?L Time T L ?L Time 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
Figure 8.1: Time span for buyer’s model
The shaded areas refer to the capital gain for the buyer and [0, L] is the credit period
offered by the seller where the buyer would like to extend to [0, κ L].
In Case 1, the buyer will have a capital gain during the extended credit period of
0.5Ip V D(κL)2, and the inventory cost for the same period is 0.5Ic V D(T − κL)2.
In Case 2 and 3, the capital gain during the extended credit period is 0.5IpV DT 2 +
Ip V DT (κL− T ), but there is no inventory cost for both cases.
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In all three cases, the compensation for seller’s inventory cost put up by the buyer during
the extended credit period is Ix V DT (κL− L).
By using assumptions Ic = Ip and T = Q/D, it can be shown that the buyer’s profit
function in all three cases have the same mathematical expression. The proof is provided
as following:
Proof of a generalized expression for the buyer’s model
Referring to the graph for all the three cases displayed in Figure 8.1.
For Case 1, the buyer’s profit function includes the following terms:
Sales revenue per cycle: PDT ;
Purchase cost per cycle: VDT ;
Marketing expenditure cost: MDT ;
Ordering cost per cycle: Ab;
Storage cost excluding financing cost per cycle: 0.5Ib VDT 2;
Capital gain on [0, κ L]: 0.5Ip VD(κL)2;
Financing inventory cost on [κL, T ]: 0.5Ic VD(T − κL)2;
Inventory financing cost for extended credit period: Ix VD(κL− L)2.
Using the assumption Ic = Ip (refer Section 8.2.1), the sum of capital gain, storage cost
and financing inventory cost is equal to
0.5Ip VD(κL)2−0.5Ib VDT 2−0.5Ic VD(T−κL)2 = Ic VDTκL−0.5Ib VDT 2−0.5Ic VDT 2.
Using the assumption T = Q/D, the buyer’s annual profit function is:
Πb(P,M,Q, κ) = PD − VD −MD − AbDQ−1 + Ic VDκL
− 0.5Ib VQ− 0.5Ic VQ− Ix VD(κL− L). (8.2)
For Case 2 and 3, the first five terms and the last term in buyer’s profit function are the
same as in Case 1, and the financing inventory cost is not present. Also, the capital gain
on [0, κ L] is:
0.5Ip VDT 2 + Ip VDT (κL− T ) = Ip VDTκL− 0.5Ic VDT 2
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So the buyer’s annual profit function is:
Πb(P,M,Q, κ) = PD − VD −MD − AbDQ−1 + Ip VDκL
− 0.5Ib VQ− 0.5Ic VQ− Ix VD(κL− L). (8.3)
Since Ic = Ip, it follows that equation (8.2) and (8.3) are equal. Therefore, the buyer’s
profit functions have the same expression in all three cases. This complete the proof.
Therefore, the buyer’s annul profit function is:
Πb(P,M,Q, κ) = PD − VD −MD − AbDQ−1 − 0.5Ib VQ+ Ip VDκL
− 0.5Ip VQ− Ix VD(κL− L)
= D[P − V(1 + (Ix − Ip)κL− Ix L)−M − AbQ−1]
− 0.5VQ(Ib + Ip). (8.4)
Since the buyer’s profit function is strictly Pseudoconcave in P and concave in M,Q (refer
to Lemma 3.1, Chapter 3), also it is easy to show that Πb(P,M,Q, κ) is concave in κ.
Therefore, the first order condition with respect to κ, P,M and Q, yield the following
equations:
κ =
b L− a+ Ip
2bL
(8.5)
P =
α{(V + AbQ−1) + VL[(κ− 1)(a+ bLκ)− Ip κ]}
α− β − 1 (8.6)
M =
β{(V + AbQ−1) + VL[(κ− 1)(a+ bLκ)− Ip κ]}
α− β − 1 (8.7)
and
Q2[(V + AbQ−1) + VL((κ− 1)(a+ bLκ)− Ip κ)]α−β = 2kAb β
β (α− β − 1)α−β
ααV(Ib + Ic) . (8.8)
For a given V and L, the buyer’s optimal decision variables can be obtained by solving
the above equations simultaneously.
(b) The seller’s model:
The seller’s objective is to determine the selling price and the length of credit period such
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that his profit will be maximized. The seller’s profit function can be expressed as:
Seller’s profit = Sales revenue - Production cost - Setup cost - Capital cost in
credit period + Capital gain during extended credit period.
According to the assumptions, the seller will incur the capital rate Is for the cost of
financially carrying inventory for the buyer during the credit period, and impose the rate
Ix for extending the credit period. Hence, the capital cost during period [0, L] is Is VDL,
and the capital gain in period [L, κL] is Ix VD(κL − L) and the seller’s profit can be
expressed mathematically as
Πs(V , L) = VD − CsD − AsDQ−1 − Is VDκL+ Ix VD(κL− L). (8.9)
Since ∂
2 Πs
∂ L2
< 0, the first order condition with respect to L, yields:
L∗ =
a
2bκ(κ− 2) . (8.10)
Notice that Πs(V , L) is linear in V , so the seller’s selling price is unbounded. Using the
same argument in Section 3.2.2, Chapter 3, it is reasonable for seller to set the selling
price as:
V∗ = WV0 = 4Wbκ(Cs + AsQ
−1)(κ− 2)
4bκ(κ− 2)− a2 . (8.11)
where
V0 = 4bκ(Cs + AsQ
−1)(κ− 2)
4bκ(κ− 2)− a2
is the minimum selling price when there is no profit, and W > 1 is seller’s marginal selling
price, and it can be obtained through negotiation with the buyer.
8.2.2 Credit period: the first scenario
In this scenario, the seller offers a credit period to the buyer with the aim of inducing
the buyer to increase her order quantity. We assume here that the demand is unknown
to the seller, ie., he has no knowledge of α and β in the demand function. The seller’s
problem is to determine the selling price V and the length of credit period L such that his
profit will be maximized. Adhering to the classical approach in games with incomplete
information pioneered in Harsanyi [65], we identify the buyer’s type space as TR = {α, β},
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where α > β + 1 and 0 < β < 1 and denote a typical member of TR by r. We let the
probability density function (pdf) fR(r) denotes the seller’s uncertainty over the buyer’s
type. We will present a Seller-Stackelberg game, ie, seller is the leader and buyer the
follower, under an asymmetric information structure. We also give solution for the game
under a symmetric information structure, i.e. when there is no uncertainty regarding the
demand.
Asymmetric Seller-Stackelberg game
Under this scenario, the buyer’s profit function is obtained by setting κ = 1 in equa-
tion (8.4), resulting in
Πb(P,M,Q) = PD − VD −MD − AbDQ−1 + Ip VDL− 0.5Ib VQ− 0.5Ic VQ (8.12)
and the seller’s profit function is
Πs(V , L) = VD − CsD − AsDQ−1 − Is VDL. (8.13)
which obtained from (8.9) by setting κ = 1.
The seller’s objective, when he is the leader, is to seek the optimal V and L based on
the buyer’s optimal decision variables which are given by equations (8.6), (8.7) and (8.8)
when κ = 1. Since the seller is uncertain of the buyer’s type, he will seek to maximize
his expected profit with respect to the pdf fR(r) over the buyer’s type space. Hence, the
seller’s problem becomes:
Max Er(Πs(V , L)) =
∫
TR
(VD − CsD − AsDQ−1 − Is VDL)fR(r)dr. (8.14)
Subject to P =
α (V + AbQ−1 − Ip V L)
α− β − 1 (8.15)
M =
β (V + AbQ−1 − Ip V L
α− β − 1 (8.16)
Q2 =
2kAb β
β (α− β − 1)α−β
αα V(Ib + Ic)(V + AbQ−1 − Ip V L)α−β (8.17)
191
Substituting P and M given by (8.15) and (8.16) respectively into the objective func-
tion (8.14), reduces the problem to:
Max Er(Πs(V , L)) =
∫
TR
[kα−αββ(α− β − 1)α−β(V + AbQ−1 − Ip VL)−α+β
(V − Cs − AsQ−1 − Is VL)]fR(r)dr (8.18)
with equation (8.17) as constraint. Using any nonlinear programming search tool, it is
straightforward to obtain the optimal solution once fR(r) is given. A numerical example
will be presented in Section 8.2.4.
Symmetric Seller-Stackelberg game
Under symmetric information, both seller and buyer’s information regarding to their oper-
ation are common knowledge. Therefore, we can ignore the expectation in equation (8.18),
expressing seller’s problem for a symmetric Seller-Stackelberg game as following:
Max Πs(V , L)) = kα−αββ(α− β − 1)α−β(V + AbQ−1 − Ip VL)−α+β
(V − Cs − AsQ−1 − Is VL) (8.19)
Subject to (V + AbQ−1 − Ip V L)α−β Q2 = 2kAb β
β (α− β − 1)α−β
αα V(Ib + Ic) (8.20)
To solve this problem, we obtain the largest positive root from equation (8.20), substi-
tuting into objective function (8.19), reduce the problem as a non-constrained nonlinear
optimization problem. Using any nonlinear optimization search tool, we can solve this
problem numerically.
8.2.3 Credit period: the second scenario
In the second scenario, the buyer seeks to extend her credit period in order to alleviate
her financial pressure and improve profit. The credit period will be extended by a factor
κ, i.e. the length of credit period will be extended by (κ − 1)L. In return, the buyer will
reimburse the seller for this extension by allowing the seller to charge her an interest rate
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Ix on the inventory cost that is incurred. In this scenario, the buyer becomes the leader
since she determines the factor κ. We will investigate the Buyer-Stackelberg game, i.e.
when she is leader and seller is the follower, under a symmetric as well as an asymmet-
ric information structure. The buyer’s objective is to determine the κ, selling price P ,
marketing expenditure M and order quantity Q, based on the seller’s best strategy which
would maximize his profit.
Symmetric Buyer–Stackelberg game
Suppose information is symmetric, the buyer will maximize her profit based on seller’s
best strategy V and L which is given by equation (8.10) and (8.11). The buyer’s problem
becomes:
Max Πb(P,M,Q, κ) = D[P − V(1 + (Ix − Ip)κL− Ix L)−M − AbQ−1]
− 0.5VQ(Ib + Ip) (8.21)
Subject to V = 4Wbκ (Cs + AsQ
−1)(κ− 2)
4bκ (κ − 2)− a2 (8.22)
L =
a
2bκ (κ− 2) (8.23)
κ > 2. (8.24)
To solve this problem, we substituting equation (8.22) and (8.23) into (8.21), and the
problem reduces to a nonlinear optimization problem with constraint (8.24). The numer-
ical solutions for P ∗,M∗Q∗ and κ∗ can be obtained by using a nonlinear optimization
routine.
Asymmetric Buyer-Stackelberg game
Suppose the buyer is unaware of a and b, which are the parameters associated with the
interest rate Ix, and the buyer will have to determine her optimal strategy based on this
uncertainty. The seller’s type space is TS = {a, b}, where a > 0 and b > 0. We denote a
typical member of TS by s. We let the pdf fS(s) denotes the buyer’s uncertainty over the
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seller’s type. The buyer seeks optimal P,M,Q and κ based on the seller’s best decision
variables, which are given by equation (8.10) and (8.11). Since the buyer is not aware of
the seller’s type, she will maximize her expected profit with respect to pdf fS(s), and the
buyer’s problem becomes:
Max Es(Πb(P,M,Q, κ))
=
∫
TS
D[P − V(1 + (Ix − Ip)κL− Ix L)−M − AbQ−1]fS(s)ds
−
∫
TS
[0.5VQ(Ib + Ip)]fS(s)ds (8.25)
Subject to V = 4Wbκ (Cs + AsQ
−1)(κ− 2)
4bκ (κ − 2)− a2 (8.26)
L =
a
2bκ (κ− 2) (8.27)
κ > 2. (8.28)
Once fS(s) is given, substituting equations (8.26) and (8.27) into the buyer’s objective
function (8.25) will result in a nonlinear programming problem constrained by equa-
tion (8.28).
8.2.4 Numerical examples
In this section, we will present several numerical examples to illustrate the proposed
models. In the examples, we will assume that the following parameters are common
knowledge to both players, i.e. k = 36000,W = 1.8, K = 0.088, Ab = 38, As = 140, Cs =
1.5, Ib = 0.1, Ic = Ip = 0.15. In the symmetric game we let α = 1.7, β = 0.15, a = 0.08
and b = 0.05.. In the Seller-Stackelberg asymmetric game, in order to facilitate our
presentation, we will follow Sethuraman and Tellis [134] by letting α and β be related
by β = Kα. We also assume that α is uniformly distributed with mean α¯ = 1.7 and
standard deviation σα = 0.1. In the Buyer-Stackelberg asymmetric game, we assume that
parameters a and b are independent and uniformly distributed with mean a¯ = 0.08, b¯ =
0.05 and corresponding standard deviation σa = 0.05, σb = 0.05. Based on the numerical
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results, the effect of asymmetric information on players’ decisions and profits will be
discussed as well as the results obtained from the two scenarios. In the following examples,
the first two deal with the first scenario and the last two with the second scenario.
Numerical examples
Example 1. This example deals with the Seller-Stackelberg symmetric game. Solving
problem (8.19) constrained by equation (8.17), we obtain the seller’s optimal profit as
Π∗s = 862.70 with optimal selling price V∗ = 4.85 and the length of credit period L∗ =
0.5520. The buyer’s optimal selling price P ∗ = 14.48, marketing expenditure M∗ = 1.27
and order quantity Q∗ = 157.77, yielding the buyer an optimal profit Π∗b = 3285.63 using
equation (8.12).
Example 2. In the Seller-Stackelberg asymmetric game, by incorporating the given
pdf fR(r) into equation (8.18) and solving the resulting problem constrained by equa-
tion (8.17), we obtained the seller’s expected profit as Er(Π
∗
s) = 858.63 with optimal
selling price V∗ = 4.89 and length of credit period L∗ = 0.5516. The corresponding
buyer’s optimal profit is Π∗b = 3270.13 obtained using equation (8.12); equations (8.15)
to (8.17) give P ∗ = 14.60,M∗ = 1.28 and Q∗ = 156.09.
Example 3. In the Buyer-Stackelberg symmetric game using the second scenario, the
buyer takes the lead by offering to extend the credit period and the seller acquiesce.
Solving problem (8.21) constrained by equations (8.22) to (8.24), we obtain the buyer’s
optimal profit as Π∗b = 4116.23 with optimal selling price P
∗ = 8.86, marketing expendi-
ture M∗ = 0.78, order quantity Q∗ = 821.05 and multiplier factor κ∗ = 2.51. Also, from
equations (8.10) and (8.11), we obtain the seller’s optimal selling price V∗ = 3.08 and the
length of credit period L∗ = 0.6247, resulting in the seller’s optimal profit of Π∗s = 1136.94
using equation (8.9).
Example 4. For the Buyer-Stackelberg asymmetric game, incorporating pdf fS(s) into
equation (8.25), and solving this problem under the constraints (8.26) to (8.28), we obtain
the buyer’s optimal selling price as P ∗ = 9.29, marketing expenditure M∗ = 0.82, order
quantity Q∗ = 812.76, and multiplier factor κ∗ = 3.20 giving the buyer’s expected profit
Es(Π
∗
b) = 4064.69. The corresponding seller’s profit Π
∗
s = 1056.67 can be obtained from
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equation (8.9) using V∗ = 3.04 and L∗ = 0.2091 obtained from equation (8.10) and (8.11)
respectively.
Discussion
Comparing the results obtained from symmetric and asymmetric information game in
the first scenario, the seller’s selling price in the first game is less than the second game,
but with a longer credit period; on the other hand, the buyer’s order quantity in the
symmetric game is larger than the asymmetric game, but the selling price and marketing
expenditure are less. Thus, both seller and buyer’s profit in the symmetric game are
larger than in the asymmetric game. The same results prevail in the second scenario,
although the multiplier factor κ in the asymmetric game is larger than in the symmetric
game. These observations tend to lend credence to the fact that asymmetric information
will affect both seller and buyer’s decisions, resulting in a less profitable solution as a
consequence.
In the following figures, Figure 8.2 and 8.3 illustrate the solutions for both seller and
buyer obtained from symmetric game versus those obtained from asymmetric game for
both Seller-Stackelberg game and Buyer-Stackelberg game, respectively.
 
 
Figure 8.2: Solutions of symmetric Vs asymmetric game in first scenario
We next compare the results obtained from the two scenarios. Comparing the Buyer-
Stackelberg symmetric game in the second scenario with the Seller-Stackelberg asymmetric
game in the first scenario indicates that the buyer’s profit increased by 25.87% and the
seller by 32.41%. Comparison with the Seller-Stackelberg symmetric game indicate that
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Figure 8.3: Solutions of symmetric Vs asymmetric game in second scenario
the buyer’s profit increased by 25.28%, and the seller’s profit by 31.79%. Comparing the
Buyer-Stackelberg asymmetric game in the second scenario with the Seller-Stackelberg
asymmetric game in the first scenario indicates an increase in profit of 24.3% for the
buyer and 23.06% for the seller. Comparing with the Seller-Stackelberg symmetric game
shows an increase in profit of 23.71% for the buyer and 22.48% for the seller. Therefore,
irrespective of the information status of the buyer or seller, their profits have improved
in the second scenario. This points to the benefit of extending the length of the credit
period by the buyer irrespective of the information status of the players.
Figure 8.4 and 8.5, demonstrate the solution obtained from the first scenario versus those
obtained from the second scenario for both symmetric game and asymmetric game.
 
 
Figure 8.4: Solutions of first scenario Vs second scenario for symmetric game
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Figure 8.5: Solutions of first scenario Vs second scenario for asymmetric game
Solutions sensitivity to the choice of pdf
Under asymmetric information, player’s belief or uncertainty over other player’s type
may affect their decisions and profit by choosing different pdf. In order to gain a better
understanding what is the effect to the outcome will be caused by the choice of pdf, we
provide the following sensitivity analysis based on different pdf chosen by players in both
scenarios. The chosen pdf will be Uniform, Exponential and Normal distribution within
same interval. In the first scenario, Seller-Stakelberg game, we assume that buyer’s type
α has mean α¯ = 1.7 and standard deviation σα = 0.1 for all three distributions; Similarly,
in the second scenario, Buyer-Stackelberg game, with respect to seller’s type a and b,
in the chosen distributions, a and b are independent with mean a¯ = 0.08, b¯ = 0.05 and
corresponding standard deviation σa = 0.05, σb = 0.05. All other parameters are same as
we defined in the preceding examples. The numerical results for both Seller-Stakelberg
game (first scenario) and Buyer-Stackelberg game (second scenario) regarding different
pdf are summarized in the following table.
From Table 8.1, with respect to buyer’s type α, when seller beliefs that α is Normal
distributed, the seller’s selling price V will be smaller and the length of credit period L will
be larger compare those from Uniform and Normal distribution. Also, buyer’s selling price
P and marketing effort M are smaller, but order quantity Q is larger. Thus, resulting a
larger profit for both seller and buyer if buyer’s type α believed to be Normal distributed
rather than Uniform or Exponential distributed.
Table 8.2 shows that when buyer beliefs that a and b are Exponential distributed,
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Table 8.1: Sensitivity analysis of Seller-Stackelberg game with respect to pdf
PDF Uniform Exponential Normal
V 4.89 4.91 4.85
L 0.5516 0.5513 0.5520
P 14.60 14.68 14.48
M 1.28 1.29 1.27
Q 156.09 155.05 157.77
κ 1 1 1
Πb 3270.13 3260.62 3285.58
Πs 858.63 862.62 862.70
Table 8.2: Sensitivity analysis of Buyer-Stackelberg game with respect to pdf
PDF Uniform Exponential Normal
V 3.04 3.08 3.07
L 0.2092 0.6323 0.5230
P 9.29 9.22 9.04
M 0.82 0.81 0.80
Q 812.76 822.82 817.75
κ 3.20 2.51 2.59
Πb 4064.69 4113.22 4112.71
Πs 1056.67 1066.56 1102.43
the buyer will result larger order quantity Q with smaller multiplier factor κ, and the
seller results larger selling price V and the length of credit period L compare with other
distribution. If a and b are believed to be Uniform distributed, then buyer’s order quantity
Q will be smaller, but the multiplier will be larger, since the length of credit period L
offered by the seller will be smaller compare with Exponential and Normal distribution.
The buyer will gain more when seller’s type following Exponential distribution, whereas,
seller will gain more when buyer belief that seller’s type follows Normal distribution.
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The following graphs provide intuitive insight of both seller and buyer’s decisions and
profits will differ according to their choice of pdf.
 
 
Figure 8.6: Solutions regarding to choice of pdf in first scenario
 
 
Figure 8.7: Solutions regarding to choice of pdf in second scenario
8.2.5 Conclusion
In this application, we present two scenarios of seller–buyer supply chain under both
asymmetric and symmetric information structure. The interactions between the players
are modeled as a two–person Stackelberg game. In the first scenario, the seller offers a
credit option to the buyer, and determines the length of credit period based on the buyer’s
best strategies; in the second scenario, based on the pre–existing credit period offered by
the seller, the buyer imposes a multiplier factor extending the length of the credit period
and compensate for this by offering to share his inventory cost. The numerical examples
show that in both scenarios, both seller and buyer’s profits obtained from symmetric game
are larger than those obtained from asymmetric information game. Furthermore, both
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buyer and seller’s profits in the second scenario are larger than those obtained from the
first scenario. We also observed that under asymmetric information, solutions for both
seller and buyer are sensitive to player’s belief over other player’s type.
8.3 Product quality in Newsvendor supply chain model
using game theory approach
8.3.1 Models formulation
In this section, we formulate our models from both the manufacturer and buyer’s per-
spective. All the notations that are used in this application are provided in Appendix
A.
The Newsvendor problem
According to Turken et al. [154], the single-item Newsvendor problem is one of the classical
problems in inventory management. At the beginning of a single period, a buyer is
interested in determining a stocking policy involving purchasing of a quantity Q of a
product to satisfy the customer demand and this is therefore his decision variable. The
customer demand is assumed to be stochastic and characterized by a random variable X
which is uniformly distribution over the interval [µX − (σX /2), µX + (σX/2)], a subset
of the semi–infinite half line [0,∞). The quantity Q is purchased by the buyer for a fixed
price per unit PM . Assuming no capacity restriction on the purchase quantity and zero
purchasing lead time, an order which is placed by the buyer with the supplier at the
beginning of a period is immediately filled. Sales of the product occurs during or at the
end of the single period: (a) if Q ≥ X , then Q−X units which are left over at the end of
the period are salvaged for a per unit revenue of S; and (b) if Q < X , then X −Q units
will contribute “lost” sales cost of G per unit. Assuming a fixed market price of PR, then
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the end of period profit for the buyer stemming from the sales is:
pi =
PRX − PM Q+ S(Q−X ), if X < Q;PRQ− PM Q−G(X −Q), if X ≥ Q.
Since the buyer cannot observe the actual end-of-period profit when making his decision at
the beginning of the period, the traditional approach of analyzing the problem is based on
assuming a risk neutral buyer who makes the optimal quantity decision at the beginning
of the period by maximizing the total expected profit.
The manufacturer’s expected profit
Assume that the quality characteristic of product Y is normally distributed with un-
known process mean µY but known standard deviation σY and let g(y) be its pdf. The
mean µY is the decision variable by the manufacturer to improve his profit. Note that
P (Y ≤ y) = Φ(y−µY
σY
) and g(y) = 1
σY
φ(y−µY
σY
) where Φ(·) is the cumulative distribution
function (cdf) of the standard normal random variable with pdf φ(·). Furthermore, let
LY and UY are the lower and upper process quality specification limits respectively where
we will assume that LY < µY < UY .
Assume that the manufacturer inspect 100% of all products for their quality before ship-
ping them to the buyer. If a product is in conformance to the required quality standard,
then its selling price per unit is PM and if it is not, then it is sold at a lower price Sp,
where Sp < PM . The manufacturer’s profit per unit sold is given by
piM1 =
PM − C0 − c Y − In, if LY ≤ Y ≤ UY ;Sp − C0 − c Y − In, if Y < LY orY > UY . (8.29)
In (8.29), C0 is the constant production cost per unit, c is the variable production cost
per unit and In is the inspection cost per unit. Hence, the manufacturer’s expected profit
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per unit is
E(piM1) =
∫ UY
LY
(PM − C0 − c y − In)g(y)dy
+
∫
{y<LY }∪{y>UY }
(Sp − C0 − c y − In)g(y)dy
= P (LY < Y < UY )
[
PM − C0 + cµY + In
P (LY < Y < UY )
]
+ Sp [1− P (LY < Y < UY )]. (8.30)
The manufacturer needs to produce Q units of the product to satisfy the buyer’s order
requirement and hence his total expected profit is
E(piM) = QE(piM1)
= Q
(
(Sp − C0 − cµY − In) + (PM − Sp)(Φ
(
UY − µY
σY
)
− Φ
(
LY − µY
σY
)
)
)
.
(8.31)
Buyer’s expected profit
We now apply Newsvendor problem by considering the cost to customer based on the sold
product. The buyer’s profit function based on this sale is given by
piB =
PRX − PM Q+ S(Q−X )−X · Loss(Y ), if X < Q, LY ≤ Y ≤ UY ;PRQ− PM Q−G(X −Q)−Q · Loss(Y ), if X ≥ Q, LY ≤ Y ≤ UY . (8.32)
In (8.32), Loss(Y ) is the quality loss per unit sold and we assume it takes the form
Loss(Y ) = l(Y − y0)2
where l is the quality loss coefficient and y0 is the target value of product.
We will also assume that the consumer demand quantity X (uniformly distributed) and
quality characteristic Y (normally distributed) are independent random variables with
joint pdf f(x, y) = 1
µX
I[µX −(σX /2), µX +(σX /2)](x) g(y) where IA refers to the indicator func-
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tion of the set A. Hence, the buyer’s expected profit is
E(piB(Q)) =
∫ UY
LY
∫ Q
µx−σx2
[PR x− PM Q+ S(Q− x)]f(x, y)dx dy
−
∫ Q
µx−σx2
∫ UY
LY
x · Loss(y)f(x, y)dy dx
+
∫ UY
LY
∫ µx +σx2
Q
[(PR − PM)Q−G(x−Q)]f(x, y)dx dy
−
∫ µx +σx2
Q
∫ UY
LY
Q · Loss(y)f(x, y)dy dx
= {Q(S − PM)(Q− µx + σx
2
) +
1
2
(PR − S)
[
Q2 − (µx − σx
2
)2
]
}
[
Φ
(
UY − µy
σy
)
− Φ
(
LY − µy
σy
)]
1
σx
− 1
2σx
[
Q2 −
(
µx − σx
2
)2] ∫ UY
LY
Loss(y)g(y)dy
+ {Q(PR − PM +G)
(
µx +
σx
2
−Q
)
− 1
2
G
[(
µx +
σx
2
)2
−Q2
]
}
[
Φ
(
UY − µy
σy
)
− Φ
(
LY − µy
σy
)]
1
σx
− 1
σx
(
µx +
σx
2
−Q
)
Q
∫ UY
LY
Loss(y)g(y)dy (8.33)
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where the integration of loss function on interval [LY , UY ] can be calculated as∫ UY
LY
Loss(y)g(y)dy
=
∫ UY
LY
l(y − y0)2g(y)dy
=
∫ UY −µy
σy
LY −µy
σy
l(µy + z σy − y0)2 φ(z)dz
= l{[(µy − y0)2 + σ2y] [Φ(UY − µyσy
)
− Φ
(
LY − µy
σy
)]
+ σy
[
(µy − 2y0 + LY )φ
(
LY − µy
σy
)
− (µy − 2y0 + UY )φ
(
UY − µy
σy
)]
}(8.34)
In a competitive market where both manufacturer and buyer have complete symmetric
information on each others parameters and modus operandi, the manufacturer the buyer
determine their optimum process mean µ∗y and order quantity Q
∗ by maximizing the
expected profit functions (8.31) and (8.33) respectively. We next make the following
reasonable assumption:
Assumption 1
PR − S > E(Loss(Y )|LY < Y < UY ) (8.35)
i.e. the difference between the per unit market price and price of scrapped product is
greater than the expected quality loss given that the latter is under statistical control.
Let A =
∫ UY
LY
Loss(y)g(y)dy and B = Φ
(
UY −µy
σy
)
− Φ
(
LY −µy
σy
)
then applying the first
order condition with respect to Q to equation (8.33) yields
Q∗ = µx +
σx
2
+
B(PM − S)σx
A+B(S − PR −G) . (8.36)
This is indeed the optimal purchase quantity for the buyer since it can be shown that
∂2E(piB)
∂Q2
< 0 (8.37)
if Assumption 1 holds.
Similarly, we note that
∂2E(piM)
∂µ2Y
=
Q(PM − Sp)
σ2Y
[
φ′
(
UY − µy
σy
)
− φ′
(
LY − µy
σy
)]
< 0
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since LY < µY < UY . Hence to obtain where the manufacturer should achieve the mean
level of quality variable µY to maximize his profit, we solve the first order condition
involving (8.31) which yields
(PM − Sp)
[
φ
(
UY − µ∗y
σy
)
− φ
(
LY − µ∗y
σy
)]
+ cσy = 0. (8.38)
8.3.2 Non-cooperative Stackelberg game with symmetric infor-
mation
In a non–cooperative competitive situation involving two players, one of the player is
sometime more dominant than the other player. This can be modeled as a two–stage
hierarchical game known as a Stackelberg game [159]. The dominant player, called the
leader is allowed to make the first move; the weaker player called the follower, retaliates
by playing the best move consistent with available information initiated by the leader’s
move. The leader then responds by selecting the best decision based on the follower’s
decision.
In this and subsequent sections, we investigate the Newsvendor’s supply chain where
the manufacturer dominate the buyer, i.e. the Manufacturer–Stackelberg model and the
buyer dominate the manufacturer, i.e. the Buyer–Stackelberg model. Note that the
decision variables of the manufacturer and buyer are µY and Q respectively.
Manufacturer-Stackelberg model
Consider the manufacturer as the leader and buyer as follower. The objective of the
manufacturer is to design his strategy in such way that his expected profit E(piM) is
maximized after considering all rational moves that the buyer can devise to maximize
his expected profit E(piB(Q)). Hence, to solve the Manufacturer-Stackelberg game with
symmetric information using Definition 2.2 of Stackelberg equilibrium defined in Chapter
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2, the following nonlinear constraint problem must be solved:
Maximize E(piM(µY ))
= Q
(
(Sp − C0 − cµY − In) + (PM − Sp)(Φ
(
UY − µY
σY
)
− Φ
(
LY − µY
σY
)
)
)
.
(8.39)
Subject to Q = µX +
σX
2
+
B(PM − S)σX
A+B(S − PR −G) (8.40)
where A and B are as defined in Section 8.3.1 and are functions of µY .
Buyer-Stackelberg model
Consider the buyer as the leader and manufacturer as follower. The objective of the buyer
is to design her strategy so that his expected profit will be maximized by considering all
rational decisions that the manufacturer can make. Hence, using Definition 2.2, the
solution to the following problem solves the Buyer-Stackelberg model:
MaximizeE(piB(Q))
= {Q(S − PM)(Q− µx + σx
2
) +
1
2
(PR − S)
[
Q2 − (µx − σx
2
)2
]
}B
σx
+ {Q(PR − PM +G)
(
µx +
σx
2
−Q
)
− 1
2
G
[(
µx +
σx
2
)2
−Q2
]
}B
σx
−
[
Q2 −
(
µx − σx
2
)2] A
2σx
−
(
µx +
σx
2
−Q
)
Q
A
σx
(8.41)
Subject to (PM − Sp)
[
φ
(
UY − µy
σy
)
− φ
(
LY − µy
σy
)]
+ cσy = 0. (8.42)
Since A and B are function of µY defined in Section 8.3.1, we solve constrain (8.42) to
obtain optimal µ∗y, substituting into buyer’s objective function (8.41) and solve it as an
unconstrained nonlinear optimization problem.
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8.3.3 Non-cooperative Stackelberg game with asymmetric in-
formation
In many supply chain situations, some information is only known to one member of the
chain and completely or partially unknown to other members. Thus, supply chain partic-
ipants may have private information which is not divulge to other participants. Using the
standard nomenclature for games of incomplete information pioneered by Harsanyi [65],
each player of a game belongs to a type space containing her private information. Since
quality is a key issue in modern supply chain management, we will assume here that the
buyer is better informed about l, the quality loss coefficient she has set on the product
and the manufacturer’s variable production cost per unit c is known only to himself, and
there is no reason for them to reveal this information to each other. Therefore the man-
ufacturer’s type is c and the buyer’s type is l. If the players’ types are independent and
each is considered a random variable by the player who is not privy to the information,
then a player’s uncertainty of the other player’s type can be represented by a probability
density function (pdf). For the manufacturer, this pdf is denoted by f1(l) and for the
buyer, it is denoted by f2(c).
We note that here, the decision variables Q ≡ Q(l) and µY ≡ µY (c) are functions
of the players’ types. Due to the buyer’s uncertainty about c, her assessment about her
profit function is an expected value based on the manufacturer’s type:
Ec[E(piB(Q))] =
∫
T2
E(piB(Q))f2(c)dc (8.43)
where T2 is the domain of f2(c).
Similarly, the manufacturer’s uncertainty about l will lead to his assessment of his profit
function based on the buyer’s type as:
El[E(piM(µY ))] =
∫
T1
E(piM(µY ))f1(l)dl (8.44)
where T1 is the domain of f1(l).
• Manufacturer-Stackelberg model
Consider the manufacturer as the leader and buyer as follower. Since the manu-
facturer knows his type but is uncertain about the buyer’s type, and he makes the
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first move, then arguing as in the symmetric case, the solution to the Manufacturer-
Stackelberg game is obtained by solving the following problem:
Maximize El[E(piM(µY ))] (8.45)
Subject to argmaxQ E(piB(Q)). (8.46)
• Buyer-Stackelberg model
Similarly, if we consider the buyer as leader and manufacturer as follower, then we
will have to solve the following problem:
Maximize Ec[E(piB(Q))] (8.47)
Subject to argmaxµY E(piM(µY )). (8.48)
We remark that the constraint (8.46) is just equation (8.40) with decision variable Q as a
function of l and constraint (8.48) is just equation (8.42) with a solution µY as function
of c.
8.3.4 Numerical examples
In the following examples, we will assume that in symmetric information case, the values
of the parameters are:
PR = 120, PM = 50, S = 20, Sp = 30, G = 5, µX = 250, σX = 500, y0 = 6, C0 = 0.3, c =
2.5, In = 1, l = 2, LY = 2, UY = 12 and σY = 1.2. Note that Assumption 1 will be
satisfied based on the above parameters setting.
In the asymmetric case, based on incomplete information, the manufacturer assumes l
is uniformly distributed over the interval (0, 4) and the buyer assumes c is uniformly
distributed over the interval (0, 6).
Example 1. In the Manufacturer-Stackelberg symmetric game, by solving problem
(8.39), constrained by equation (8.40), the manufacturer’s expected profit is E(piM) =
12939.42 with optimal decision variable µY = 4.09. The buyer’s expected profit is then
E(piB) = 9659.12 with optimal decision variable Q = 343.58.
Example 2. In the Buyer-Stackelberg symmetric game, solving the buyer’s objective
function (8.33), constrained by equation (8.42) yields the buyer’s expected profit E(piB) =
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8316.44 with optimal decision variable Q = 337.60. The manufacturer’s expected profit
is then E(piM) = 12776.19 with optimal decision variable µY = 3.51.
Example 3. In the Manufacturer-Stackelberg asymmetric game, the manufacturer’s
problem (8.45) constrained by (8.46) yields the manufacturer’s expected profit as El(E(piM)) =
12922.19 with optimal decision variable µY = 4.12. The buyer’s expected profit E(piB) =
9716.29 with optimal decision variable Q = 343.86.
Example 4. In the Buyer-Stackelberg asymmetric game, the buyer’s problem (8.47)
constrained by equation (8.48) gives the buyer’s expected profit Ec(E(piB)) = 7805.47
with optimal decision variable Q = 335.49. The manufacturer’s expected profit E(piM) =
12647.13 with optimal decision variable µY = 3.33.
Discussion
Compare the results obtained from Example 1 and 2, under symmetric information struc-
ture, the manufacturer’s expected profit is greater when he is leader but this is achieved
by imposing a slightly larger mean quality target value. The buyer’s expected profit is
smaller as leader but the order quantities are similar in both cases. However, the manu-
facturer seems to have the leadership advantage but this is not the case with the buyer,
who does worse as leader.
Compare the asymmetric case with the symmetric case, the former gives a similar set
of results with those obtained in the later case, although it should be observed that the
expected profits of the leaders in asymmetric case are smaller than in the symmetric case,
which is consistence with the conclusions drawn from the first application where players
will achieve better outcomes in symmetric information environment rather than in an
asymmetric information environment.
8.3.5 Conclusion
In this application, we studied a Newsvendor problem involving a manufacturer and a
buyer, where the former determines the process mean of the quality of the product, and
the latter determines the ordering quantity. A loss function has been incorporated in
buyer’s profit function for reflecting the lose of goodwill from consumer. Two Stackelberg
game scenarios have been investigated under both symmetric and asymmetric information
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structure, where the manufacturer and the buyer takes turn as the leader and the follower.
Numerical results reveal that under symmetric information structure, the manufacturer
seems to have the leadership advantage since his expected profit is greater when he is
the leader. In contrast, the buyer does worse when she is the leader. Furthermore, the
expected profits for leaders obtained from asymmetric information games are smaller than
those obtained from symmetric information games. This observation is consistence with
the conclusions resulted in the first application.
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Chapter 9
Conclusions and Future Works
9.1 Conclusions
This thesis focuses on the study of several game theoretical approaches in supply chain
management. Due to competition and cooperation that exist among supply chain mem-
bers, game theory is an essential tool in analyzing supply chain members behaviors and
the interaction between them. In this thesis, we have proposed and investigated several
supply chain models in non-cooperative and cooperative situations. We have also con-
sidered these models under symmetric and asymmetric information scenarios. In order
to make subsequent chapters clearer with regard to utilizing a game theoretical approach
in analyzing competition and cooperation in supply chains, we have provided some pre-
liminary concepts of game theory in Chapter 2. This chapter also contains a substantial
literature review of relevant supply chain and related game theoretical papers.
In Chapter 3, we studied a seller-buyer supply chain model where shortage is permitted
as a decision variable for the seller. Shortages will inevitably occur in practice, it is
therefore important from a managerial viewpoint to obtain some insights into the effects
shortages have on supply chain members’ strategies and profits. Both non-cooperative and
cooperative games involving the seller and buyer have been investigated in this chapter. In
the non-cooperative situation, two Stackelberg games have been studied with the seller and
buyer taking turn as leader and follower. In the cooperative situation, the Pareto solution
concept has been employed to obtain the joint optimal decisions by players. Analytical
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results indicate that the buyer’s selling price and marketing expenditure are less, and the
order quantity is larger in a cooperative game than in a non-cooperative game. Also, the
size of the shortage is smaller in a cooperative game than in a non-cooperative game.
This indicates that both the seller and buyer will prefer the cooperative relationship to
the noncooperative one. Furthermore, from the numerical results, we observed that both
players have the leadership advantage under a symmetric information scenario. However,
when the seller is the leader, shortages have a negative impact on the buyer’s profit,
but when the buyer is the leader, both players actually benefitted from the presence of
shortages.
In Chapter 4, we considered seller-buyer supply chain games under an asymmetric
information structure, where each player belongs to a type space that contains informa-
tion of certain parameters regarding a player’s operation. These information are private,
known only to one player but not to the other player. We investigated two non-cooperative
Stackelberg games, where the seller and buyer take turn assuming the leadership posi-
tion. The results indicate that the seller has no advantage being a leader due to the
uncertainty regarding buyer’s demand and unit shortage cost. In order to improve the
seller’s profit, we designed a mechanism where the seller offers a contract to the buyer as
an incentive, conditioned on the buyer’s unknown type, in order to extract information
from the latter. Two contracts were proposed, one based on buyer’s demand type through
the price elasticity α, ie. the MD-case, and the other on buyer’s unit shortage cost C1,
ie. the MC-case. To obtain an optimal contract, we have formulated the seller’s problem
as an optimization problem which involves maximizing the seller’s expected profit func-
tion constrained by the incentive-compatibility and individual-rationality conditions. This
problem was solved as an optimal control problem by introducing a Hamiltonian system
and applying the Pontryagin maximum principle. Numerical results show that both the
seller and buyer’s profits improved from the asymmetric Seller-Stackelberg game using
both incentive contracts. It was also observed that the buyer will prefer the MC contract
since she will gain more, whereas the seller’s preference depends upon whether or not
he wants a larger order quantity from the buyer. In the MD-case, he obtained a larger
order quantity but slightly less profit than in MC-case, while in MC-case, he received a
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considerably smaller order quantity compared with the MD-case.
In Chapter 5, we introduced the consumer into our supplier-retailer supply chain
model resulting in a three-person game. To the best of our knowledge, the consumer
has not been included and studied in supply chain model as a strategic player of the
chain in any significant way. However, as the consumer is the terminal member of supply
chain, her preference and purchasing behavior will directly influence market demand,
which will affect both the supplier and retailer’s decisions and profits. Therefore, her
presence should not be ignored. Conversely, the supplier and retailer’s decisions will have
impact on the consumer’s welfare. Therefore, to gain a better understanding of how the
consumer interacts with the supplier and retailer, and how these interactions affect the
consumer’s welfare, it is necessary to include the consumer as a strategic player in the
supply chain model. In this chapter, we considered the interactions between supply chain
members under two scenarios using a non-cooperative Stackelberg game with symmetric
information. In the first scenario, a single player acts as the leader with no coalition
forming among the remaining players acting as the followers; in the second scenario, a
selection of two players form a coalition as the leader against the remaining player of
the trio. We studied two cases under the second scenario, i.e. SRC-Stackelberg game
where the supplier and retailer form a coalition against the consumer, and the RCC-
Stackelberg game where the retailer and consumer form a coalition against the supplier.
Both analytical and numerical results indicate that under the first scenario, the consumer
will obtain the largest profit when the retailer is the leader, whereas in the second scenario,
she will benefit more from the cooperation between the supplier and retailer. This again
highlights the importance of the cooperation between upstream members which not only
improve upstream members’ profits, but also enhanced the consumer’s welfare.
In Chapter 6, we investigated the three-person supply chain introduced in Chapter 5
under a completely cooperative situation using coalitional game. Under this situation, we
have allowed for the cooperation between the consumer and upstream members, ie. the
supplier and retailer. This cooperation may seem unnatural, however there are evidence
indicating that under some circumstances, the supplier and retailer voluntarily cooperate
with the consumer in order to achieve better outcomes. Based on this possibility, it
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is worthwhile to explore and develop an allocation scheme for player who participate
in the coalition game. One major contribution of this chapter is the construction of
a characteristic function which incorporates both Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimal
solution. Based on this function, a Shapley value was developed as an allocation scheme for
each supply chain member. Numerical examples show that the Shapley value allocated to
the consumer is less than those obtained from the Pareto optimal solution. This suggests
that contribution to any coalition that the consumer participated in as a member is less
than when either the supplier or retailer is a member of that coalition.
In Chapter 7, we extended the previous three-person supply chain game to an asym-
metric information setting. As far as we are aware, supply chain games involving three
or more players under this setting has not been previously investigated in the literature.
One challenge that has to be overcome is how to assess one player’s uncertainty over other
players types when these types are correlated random variables with different marginal
distributions. To solve this problem, we applied the copula method to construct a joint
probability distribution which allows for dependency between players’ types and place
no restriction on the marginal distributions of these types. Two scenarios were investi-
gated, the first allows no coalition formation among players and in the second scenario,
a single player acts as leader with the two remaining players forming a coalition as the
follower. Three copula functions from the Archimedean family were used to demonstrate
our method, and the Kendall tau was used as the measurement of correlation between
players’ types. The results suggest that under asymmetric information, the second sce-
nario may not confer advantages to the leader in all situations. Furthermore, as to be
expected, the leader’s expected profit appears to depend on the choice of copula function
as well as the dependency between types.
Finally in Chapter 8, two applications of game theory to two classical supply chain
problems were investigated. The first application is the credit option problem in seller-
buyer supply chain, and the second is the celebrated Newsvendor problem. Both applica-
tions are studied under a symmetric as well as an asymmetric information structure. In
the first application, two cases were considered. In the first case, the seller offers a credit
option policy to the buyer in order to increase the order quantity from the latter, and in
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the second case, the buyer seeks to extend the existing credit period by offering to share
the inventory cost that was incurred by the seller. Numerical results show that in both
cases, both the seller and buyer’s profits are larger in the symmetric information game
than from the asymmetric information game. In addition, both the seller and buyer’s
profits are also larger in the second case when compare with the first case. For the second
application, a loss function was used in the buyer’s profit function to represent the lost
of goodwill from the consumer due to substandard quality of the product. Through the
investigation of non-cooperative Stackelberg game, numerical results indicate that the
manufacturer seems to have the leadership advantage but the buyer does worse when
she is the leader. Furthermore, it was also observed that asymmetric information has a
negative impact on the leader’s profit, which indicates that players will achieve better
outcomes when information are freely available to both players.
In summary, for the seller-buyer supply chain games studied in Chapter 3 and 4, both
the seller and buyer have leadership advantage in the non-cooperative game, although
both players prefer the cooperative to non-cooperative game. However, once the consumer
joins the supply chain, which we discussed from Chapter 5 to 7, both seller and buyer’s
decision processes changed due to the possibility of various coalition formation among
players. We have seen that in this situation, the retailer would prefer cooperation with the
consumer rather than with the supplier, and the consumer prefers the coalition between
supplier and retailer. Furthermore, in the cooperative game, the Shapley value provides
a stable allocation scheme among supplier, retailer and consumer. Moreover, for games
under asymmetric information pattern, in two-player seller-buyer supply chain game, a
mechanism design as a device to increase both players’ profits is discussed in Chapter 4.
Chapter 7 provides a novel approach of using the Copula method to estimate the different
players’ types. Finally, in Chapter 8, we consider two classical applications of supply
chains which further supports the fact that players will do better when information is
available to all players in a supply chain, an observation which we earlier obtained from
the results of Chapter 3 and 4.
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9.2 Future works
There are several ways the work covered in this thesis could be extended, and the following
are a few avenues for further research.
• Consider the games presented in Chapter 4 where in the asymmetric information
situation, one player’s uncertainty over other player’s type is expressed by a proba-
bility distribution over the type space. However, the uncertainty of a player’s type
may not be adequately described by a probability distribution but instead by a
measure of subjective imprecision which is more commonly modeled by fuzzy sets
(c.f. Wang and Shu [161], Zhou et al. [174]). For example, the buyer may fuzzified
the demand through the elasticity coefficients α or β. Other parameters considered
in the many supply chain models in this thesis can also be fuzzified.
• Another extension from Chapter 4 concerns the mechanism design problem where
the simple contracts considered there can be extended to multi–dimensional con-
tracts involving, say, the seller’s setup cost, production cost and shortage cost. This
can be further extended to include more participants in the supply chain, such as
a multiple number of buyers, to see how the handicaps associated with information
asymmetry in more complex chains can be alleviated through sharing of information
using incentive contracts.
• An important extension based on the three–person games in Chapter 5 and 7 would
be to investigate whether some incentive schemes by either one or more players
might be brought to bear on the system to improve channel performance and thereby
achieve better outcomes for all players. Furthermore, a statistical analysis of the
copula method applied to supply chains is lacking in this thesis. It would be interest-
ing to perform an empirical case study to explore the correlation between players’
types and to identify the copula functions that best fit various type distributions
using real data.
• Finally, in the credit option problem of Chapter 8, the current work can be extended
to situations with multiple players in the supply chain, for example, one seller of-
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fering different credit periods to multiple buyers with different demand functions.
The research may also be extended to look at the consequences of the effects that
different kinds of information asymmetries have on the decisions each player brings
to bear on the decisions they make.
218
Bibliography
[1] Abad, P. L., 1994. Supplier pricing and lot sizing when demand is price sensitive.
European Journal of Operational Research 78 (3), 334–354.
[2] Abad, P. L., Jaggi, C. K., 2003. A joint approach for setting unit price and the length
of the credit period for a seller when end demand is price sensitive. International
Journal of Production Economics 83 (2), 115–122.
[3] Aggarwal, S. P., Jaggi, C. K., 1995. Ordering policies of deteriorating items under
permissible delay in payments. The Journal of the Operational Research Society
46 (5), 658–662.
[4] Albrecht, M., 2010. Supply chain coordination mechanisms: New approaches for
collaborative planning. Vol. 628. Springer.
[5] Anupindi, R., Bassok, Y., Zemel, E., 2001. A general framework for the study of de-
centralized distribution systems. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
3 (4), 349–368.
[6] Arshinder, Kanda, A., Deshmukh, S., 2008. Supply chain coordination: Perspec-
tives, empirical studies and research directions. International Journal of Production
Economics 115 (2), 316 – 335.
[7] Aviv, Y., Pazgal, A., 2008. Optimal pricing of seasonal products in the presence
of forward-looking consumers. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
10 (3), 339–359.
219
[8] Bas¸ar, T., Olsder, G. J., 1999. Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory, second
edition Edition. Classic in Applied Mathematics Series. SIAM, Philadelphia.
[9] Bazaraa, M. S., Sherali, H., Shetty, C., 1993. Nonlinear programming: theory and
algorithms. John Wiely and Sons.
[10] Binmore, K., 1992. Fun and games: a text on game theory. D. C. Heath and Com-
pany, Lexington.
[11] Bondareva, O. N., 1963. Some applications of linear programming methods to the
theory of cooperative games. Problemy Kibernet 10, 119–139.
[12] Borel, E., 1921. La the´orie du jeu et les e´quations inte´grales a` noyau syme´trique.
Comptes Rendus de lAcade´mie des Sciences 173, 1304–1308.
[13] Bryson, A. E., Ho, Y. C., 1975. Applied Optimal Control: Optimization, Estimation
and Control. John Wiley and Sons Inc, New York.
[14] Burnetas, A., Gilbert, S. M., Smith, C. E., 2007. Quantity discounts in single-period
supply contracts with asymmetric demand information. IIE Transactions 39 (5),
465–479.
[15] Cachon, G. P., 2003. Supply chain coordination with contracts. In: Graves, S.,
de Kok, A. (Eds.), Supply Chain Management: Design, Coordination and Op-
eration. Vol. 11 of Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science.
Elsevier, pp. 227 – 339.
[16] Cachon, G. P., Netessine, S., 2004. Game theory in supply chain analysis. In: Simchi-
Levi, D., Wu, S. D., Shen, Z. M. (Eds.), Handbook of Quantitative Supply Chain
Analysis:Modeling in the E-Business Era. Kluwer Academic, pp. 13–66.
[17] Cachon, G. P., Zipkin, P. H., 1999. Competitive and cooperative inventory policies
in a two-stage supply chain. Management science 45 (7), 936–953.
[18] Chankong, V., Haimes, Y. Y., 1983. Multiobjective decision making: theory and
methodology (No. 8). North-Holland.
220
[19] Chatterjee, K., Samuelson, W., 2001. Game theory and business applications.
Vol. 35. Springer.
[20] Chen, L. H., Kang, F. S., 2010. Integrated inventory models considering the two-level
trade credit policy and a price-negotiation scheme. European Journal of Operational
Research 205 (1), 47 – 58.
[21] Chen, M., Chang, H., Huang, C., Liao, C., 2006. Channel coordination and trans-
action cost: A game-theoretic analysis. Industrial Marketing Management 35 (2),
178–190.
[22] Chen, S.-L., Huang, S.-C., 2010. Managing supply chain risk with options and online
spot markets. Journal of Statistics and Management Systems 13 (2), 389–407.
[23] Chen, S.-L., Liu, C.-L., 2007. Procurement strategies in the presence of the spot
marketan analytical framework. Production Planning & Control 18 (4), 297–309.
[24] Chen, S.-L., Liu, C.-L., 2008. The optimal consignment policy for the manufacturer
under supply chain co-ordination. International Journal of Production Research
46 (18), 5121–5143.
[25] Chesnokova, T., 2007. Return policies, market outcomes, and consumer welfare.
Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d’conomique 40 (1), 296–316.
[26] Chiang, W. C., Fitzsimmons, J., Huang, Z., Li, S. X., 1994. A game-theoretic
approach to quantity discount problems*. Decision Sciences 25 (1), 153–168.
[27] Chu, W., Lee, C., 2006. Strategic information sharing in a supply chain. European
Journal of Operational Research 174 (3), 1567 – 1579.
[28] Chung, K. J., 1998. A theorem on the determination of economic order quantity un-
der conditions of permissible delay in payments. Computers & Operations Research
25 (1), 49 – 52.
[29] Coddington, E. A., 2012. An introduction to ordinary differential equations. Courier
Dover Publications.
221
[30] Cooper, M. C., Lambert, D. M., Pagh, J. D., 1997. Supply chain management: more
than a new name for logistics. International Journal of Logistics Management, The
8 (1), 1–14.
[31] Corbett, C., deGroote, X., 2000. A supplier’s optimal quantity discount policy under
asymmetric information. Management Science 46 (3), 444–450.
[32] Corbett, C. J., 2001. Stochastic inventory systems in a supply chain with asym-
metric information: Cycle stocks, safety stocks, and consignment stock. Operations
research 49 (4), 487–500.
[33] Corbett, C. J., Zhou, D., Tang, C. S., 2004. Designing supply contracts: Contract
type and information asymmetry. Management Science 50 (4), 550–559.
[34] Dai, Y., Chao, X., Fang, S., Nuttle, H., 2005. Pricing in revenue management
for multiple firms competing for customers. International Journal of Production
Economics 98 (1), 1–16.
[35] Darwish, M., 2009. Economic selection of process mean for single-vendor single-
buyer supply chain. European Journal of Operational Research 199 (1), 162–169.
[36] Darwish, M., Abdulmalek, F., 2012. An integrated single–vendor single–buyer tar-
geting problem with time–dependent process mean. International Journal of Logis-
tics Systems and Management 13 (1), 51–64.
[37] Darwish, M., Goyal, S., 2010. A single-vendor single-buyer supply chain under con-
ditions of permissible delay in payments. International Journal of Services and Op-
erations Management 6 (1), 57–72.
[38] Darwish, M., Odah, O., 2010. Vendor managed inventory model for single-vendor
multi-retailer supply chains. European Journal of Operational Research 204 (3),
473–484.
[39] Ding, H., Guo, B., Liu, Z., 2011. Information sharing and profit allotment based on
supply chain cooperation. International Journal of Production Economics 133 (1),
70–79.
222
[40] Duffin, R., Peterson, E., Zener, C., 1967. Geometric programming: theory and
application. Wiley, New York.
[41] Engardio, P., 2001. Why the supply chain broke down. Business Week 19 (2001),
39.
[42] Esmaeili, M., Aryanezhad, M. B., Zeephongsekul, P., 2009. A game theory approach
in seller-buyer supply chain. European Journal of Operational Research 195 (2),
442–448.
[43] Esmaeili, M., Zeephongsekul, P., 2010. Seller-buyer models of supply chain manage-
ment with an asymmetric information structure. International Journal of Production
Economics 123 (1), 146–154.
[44] Etgar, M., 2008. A descriptive model of the consumer co-production process. Journal
of the academy of marketing science 36 (1), 97–108.
[45] Ferdows, K., Lewis, M. A., Machuca, J. A., 2004. Rapid-fire fulfillment. Harvard
business review 82 (11), 104–117.
[46] Fiestras-Janeiro, M. G., Garc´ıa-Jurado, I., Meca, A., Mosquera, M. A., 2011. Coop-
erative game theory and inventory management. European Journal of Operational
Research 210 (3), 459–466.
[47] Fisher, M. L., 1997. What is the right supply chain for your product? Harvard
business review 75, 105–117.
[48] Freeland, J., 1980. Coordination strategies for production and marketing in a func-
tionally decentralized firm. AIIE Transactions 12 (2), 126–132.
[49] Fudenberg, D., Tirole, J., 1991. Game Theory. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
[50] Ganeshan, R., Jack, E., Magazine, M. J., Stephens, P., 1999. A taxonomic review
of supply chain management research. In: Quantitative models for supply chain
management. Springer, pp. 839–879.
223
[51] Genest, C., Favre, A.-C., 2007. Everything you always wanted to know about copula
modeling but were afraid to ask. Journal of Hydrologic Engineering 12 (4), 347–368.
[52] Genest, C., MacKay, R. J., 1986. Copules archime´diennes et families de lois bidi-
mensionnelles dont les marges sont donne´es. Canadian Journal of Statistics 14 (2),
145–159.
[53] Gilles, R. P., 2010. the cooperative game theory of networks and Hierarchies. Vol. 44.
Springer.
[54] Gillies, D. B., 1959. Solutions to general non-zero-sum games. Contributions to the
Theory of Games 4 (40), 47–85.
[55] Gjerdrum, J., Shah, N., Papageorgiou, L. G., 2002. Fair transfer price and inventory
holding policies in two-enterprise supply chains. European Journal of Operational
Research 143 (3), 582–599.
[56] Goyal, S., Gunasekaran, A., 1995. An integrated production-inventory-marketing
model for deteriorating items. Computers & Industrial Engineering 28 (4), 755 –
762.
[57] Goyal, S. K., 1977. An integrated inventory model for a single supplier-single cus-
tomer problem. International Journal of Production Research 15 (1), 107–111.
[58] Goyal, S. K., 1985. Economic order quantity under conditions of permissible delay
in payments. The Journal of the Operational Research Society 36 (4), 335–338.
[59] Goyal, S. K., Gupta, Y. P., 1989. Integrated inventory models: the buyer-vendor
coordination. European journal of operational research 41 (3), 261–269.
[60] Goyal, S. K., Nebebe, F., 2000. Determination of economic production–shipment
policy for a single-vendor–single-buyer system. European Journal of Operational
Research 121 (1), 175–178.
[61] Granot, D., SoSˇic´, G., 2003. A three-stage model for a decentralized distribution
system of retailers. Operations Research 51 (5), 771–784.
224
[62] Guttman, R. H., Maes, P., 1998. Cooperative vs. competitive multi-agent negotia-
tions in retail electronic commerce. In: Cooperative Information Agents II Learn-
ing, Mobility and Electronic Commerce for Information Discovery on the Internet.
Springer, pp. 135–147.
[63] Ha, A. Y., Tong, S., Zhang, H., 2011. Sharing demand information in competing
supply chains with production diseconomies. Management Science 57 (3), 566–581.
[64] Haley, C. W., Higgins, R. C., 1973. Inventory policy and trade credit financing.
Management Science 20 (4), 464–471.
[65] Harsanyi, J., 1967-1968. Games with incomplete information played by ’bayesian’
players. Management Science 14, 159–189, 320–334, 514–517.
[66] Huang, Y., Huang, G. Q., Newman, S. T., 2011. Coordinating pricing and inventory
decisions in a multi-level supply chain: A game-theoretic approach. Transportation
Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review 47 (2), 115–129.
[67] Humphreys, A., Grayson, K., 2008. The intersecting roles of consumer and producer:
A critical perspective on co-production, co-creation and prosumption. Sociology
Compass 2 (3), 963–980.
[68] Hurwicz, L., 1972. On informationally decentralized systems, in c.b. mcguire and r.
radner Edition. Decision and Organization, North-Holland, Amsterdam.
[69] Intriligator, M. D., 1971. Mathematical Optimization and Economic Theory.
Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey.
[70] Jaber, M., Osman, I., 2006. Coordinating a two-level supply chain with delay in
payments and profit sharing. Computers & Industrial Engineering 50 (4), 385 –
400.
[71] Jaber, M., Osman, I., Guiffrida, A. L., 2006. Coordinating a three-level supply chain
with price discounts, price dependent demand, and profit sharing. International
Journal of Integrated Supply Management 2 (1-2), 28–48.
225
[72] Jamal, A., Sarker, B., Wang, S., 2000. Optimal payment time for a retailer under
permitted delay of payment by the wholesaler. International Journal of Production
Economics 66 (1), 59 – 66.
[73] Jeang, A., 2009. Optimal parameters design and maintenance interval for a product
with quality and cost considerations. Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical
Engineers, Part B: Journal of Engineering Manufacture 223 (6), 737–750.
[74] Jeang, A., 2010. Production order quantity for economical and quality considera-
tion. Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part B: Journal of
Engineering Manufacture 224 (8), 1277–1294.
[75] Jeang, A., 2011. Economic production order quantity and quality. International
Journal of Production Research 49 (6), 1753–1783.
[76] Jeang, A., 2012. Simultaneous determination of production lot size and process
parameters under process deterioration and process breakdown. Omega 40 (6), 774–
781.
[77] Joe, H., 1997. Multivariate models and dependence concepts. Vol. 73. CRC Press.
[78] Johnson, L., Montgomery, D., 1974. Operations research in production planning,
scheduling, and inventory control. Wiley, New York.
[79] Ju¨ttner, U., Christopher, M., Baker, S., 2007. Demand chain management-
integrating marketing and supply chain management. Industrial Marketing Man-
agement 36 (3), 377–392.
[80] Kamien, M. I., Schwartz, N. L., 1991. Dynamic optimization: the calculus of varia-
tions and optimal control in economics and management. North-Holland New York.
[81] Kim, D., Lee, W., 1998. Optimal joint pricing and lot sizing with fixed and variable
capacity. European Journal of Operational Research 109 (1), 212–227.
226
[82] Kim, J., Hwang, H., Shinn, S., 1995. An optimal credit policy to increase supplier’s
profits with price-dependent demand functions. Production Planning & Control
6 (1), 45–50.
[83] Kogan, K., Tapiero, C. S., 2007. Supply Chain Games: Operations Management
and Risk Evaluation. Vol. 113. Springer.
[84] Kreps, D. M., 1990. A course in microeconomic theory. Harvester Wheatsheaf, New
York.
[85] Krishnan, H., 2010. A note on demand functions with uncertainty. Operations Re-
search Letters 38 (5), 436 – 440.
[86] Kurt Salmon Associates & Council, U. C., 1993. Efficient consumer response: En-
hancing consumer value in the grocery industry. Research Department, Food Mar-
keting Institute.
[87] Laffont, J. J., Tirole, J., 1993. A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regula-
tion. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
[88] Lau, A., Lau, H., 2005. Some two-echelon supply-chain games: Improving from
deterministic-symmetric-information to stochastic-asymmetric-information models.
European Journal of Operational Research 161 (1), 203–223.
[89] Lau, A. H. L., Lau, H. S., Zhou, Y. W., 2007. A stochastic and asymmetric-
information framework for a dominant-manufacturer supply chain. European Jour-
nal of Operational Research 176 (1), 295 – 316.
[90] Lee, J. H., Moon, I. K., 2006. Coordinated inventory models with compensation
policy in a three level supply chain. In: Gavrilova, M., Gervasi, O., Kumar, V.,
Tan, C., Taniar, D., Lagan, A., Mun, Y., Choo, H. (Eds.), Computational Science
and Its Applications - ICCSA 2006. Vol. 3982 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science.
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 600–609.
[91] Lee, W., 2005. A joint economic lot size model for raw material ordering, manufac-
turing setup, and finished goods delivering. Omega 33 (2), 163 – 174.
227
[92] Lee, W., Kim, D., 1993. Optimal and heuristic decision strategies for integrated
production and marketing planning. Decision Sciences 24 (6), 1203–1214.
[93] Leitmann, G., 1978. On generalized stackelberg strategies. Journal of Optimization
Theory and Applications 26 (4), 637–643.
[94] Leng, M., Parlar, M., 2005. Game theoretic applications in supply chain manage-
ment: A review. Infor 43 (3), 187–220.
[95] Leng, M., Parlar, M., 2009. Allocation of cost savings in a three-level supply chain
with demand information sharing: A cooperative-game approach. Operations re-
search 57 (1), 200–213.
[96] Leng, M., Parlar, M., 2010. Game-theoretic analyses of decentralized assembly sup-
ply chains: Non-cooperative equilibria vs. coordination with cost-sharing contracts.
European journal of operational research 204 (1), 96–104.
[97] Levin, Y., McGill, J., Nediak, M., 2010. Optimal dynamic pricing of perishable
items by a monopolist facing strategic consumers. Production and Operations Man-
agement 19 (1), 40–60.
[98] Li, J., Liu, L., 2008. Supply chain coordination with manufacturer’s limited re-
serve capacity: An extended newsboy problem. International Journal of Production
Economics 112 (2), 860–868.
[99] Li, S., Huang, Z., Zhu, J., Chau, P., 2002. Cooperative advertising, game theory
and manufacturer-retailer supply chains. Omega 30 (5), 347–357.
[100] Lim, W. S., 2001. Producer-supplier contracts with incomplete information. Man-
agement Science 47 (5), 709–715.
[101] Lu, L., 1995. A one-vendor multi-buyer integrated inventory model. European Jour-
nal of Operational Research 81 (2), 312–323.
[102] Lucchetti, R., Mignanego, F., Pieri, G., 1987. Existence theorems of equilibrium
points in stackelberg. Optimization 18 (6), 857–866.
228
[103] Marler, R. T., Arora, J. S., 2004. Survey of multi-objective optimization methods
for engineering. Structural and multidisciplinary optimization 26 (6), 369–395.
[104] Matsui, K., 2010. Returns policy, new model introduction, and consumer welfare.
International Journal of Production Economics 124 (2), 299 – 309.
[105] Mentzer, J. T., DeWitt, W., Keebler, J. S., Min, S., Nix, N. W., Smith, C. D.,
Zacharia, Z. G., 2001. Defining supply chain management. Journal of Business lo-
gistics 22 (2), 1–25.
[106] Minner, S., 2003. Multiple-supplier inventory models in supply chain management:
A review. International Journal of Production Economics 81, 265–279.
[107] Munson, C. L., Rosenblatt, M. J., 2001. Coordinating a three-level supply chain
with quantity discounts. IIE Transactions 33 (5), 371–384.
[108] Myerson, R. B., 1979. Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem. Econo-
metrica: journal of the Econometric Society 47, 61–73.
[109] Myerson, R. B., 1991. Game theory: analysis of conflict. Harvard University Press,
Cambridge: Massachusetts.
[110] Nagarajan, M., Sosˇic´, G., 2008. Game-theoretic analysis of cooperation among sup-
ply chain agents: Review and extensions. European Journal of Operational Research
187 (3), 719–745.
[111] Nash, J. F., 1950. The bargaining problem. Econometrica 18, 155–162.
[112] Nash, J. F., 1951. Non-cooperative games. The Annals of Mathematics 54 (2), 286–
295.
[113] Nelsen, R. B., 1999. An introduction to copulas. Springer.
[114] Ouyang, L. Y., Ho, C. H., Su, C. H., 2009. An optimization approach for joint pricing
and ordering problem in an integrated inventory system with order-size dependent
trade credit. Computers & Industrial Engineering 57 (3), 920–930.
229
[115] O¨zen, U., Fransoo, J., Norde, H., Slikker, M., 2008. Cooperation between multiple
newsvendors with warehouses. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
10 (2), 311–324.
[116] O¨zer, O¨., Wei, W., 2006. Strategic commitments for an optimal capacity decision
under asymmetric forecast information. Management Science 52 (8), 1238–1257.
[117] Pareto, V., 1896. Cours d’Economie Politique. Rouge, Lausanne, Switzerland.
[118] Parlar, M., 1988. Game theoretic analysis of the substitutable product inventory
problem with random demands. Naval Research Logistics (NRL) 35 (3), 397–409.
[119] Parlar, M., Wang, Q., 1994. Discounting decisions in a supplier-buyer relationship
with a linear buyer’s demand. IIE transactions 26 (2), 34–41.
[120] Peidro, D., Mula, J., Poler, R., Lario, F.-C., 2009. Quantitative models for supply
chain planning under uncertainty: a review. The International Journal of Advanced
Manufacturing Technology 43 (3-4), 400–420.
[121] Quigley, J., Walls, L., 2007. Trading reliability targets within a supply chain using
shapley’s value. Reliability Engineering & System safety 92 (10), 1448–1457.
[122] Raghunathan, S., 2003. Impact of demand correlation on the value of and incentives
for information sharing in a supply chain. European Journal of Operational Research
146 (3), 634–649.
[123] Rao, S., 1987. Game theory approach for multiobjective structural optimization.
Computers & Structures 25 (1), 119–127.
[124] Rasmusen, E., 2007. Games and information: An introduction to game theory,
fourth edition Edition. Balcwell publishing.
[125] Rosenthal, E. C., 2008. A game-theoretic approach to transfer pricing in a vertically
integrated supply chain. International Journal of Production Economics 115 (2),
542–552.
230
[126] Roy, A., Sana, S. S., Chaudhuri, K., 2012. Optimal replenishment order for uncertain
demand in three layer supply chain. Economic Modelling 29 (6), 2274–2282.
[127] Rudi, N., Kapur, S., Pyke, D. F., 2001. A two-location inventory model with trans-
shipment and local decision making. Management science 47 (12), 1668–1680.
[128] Sadjadi, S. J., Oroujee, M., Aryanezhad, M. B., 2005. Optimal production and
marketing planning. Computational Optimization and Applications 30 (2), 195–
203.
[129] Sana, S. S., 2011. A production-inventory model of imperfect quality products in a
three-layer supply chain. Decision Support Systems 50 (2), 539–547.
[130] Sarkar, B., Sana, S. S., Chaudhuri, K., 2010. Optimal reliability, production lot
size and safety stock in an imperfect production system. International Journal of
Mathematics in Operational Research 2 (4), 467–490.
[131] Sarmah, S. P., Acharya, D., Goyal, S. K., 2006. Buyer vendor coordination models in
supply chain management. European journal of operational research 175 (1), 1–15.
[132] Schmeidler, D., 1969. The nucleolus of a characteristic function game. SIAM Journal
on applied mathematics 17 (6), 1163–1170.
[133] Schmid, F., Schmidt, R., 2007. Multivariate conditional versions of spearman’s rho
and related measures of tail dependence. Journal of Multivariate Analysis 98 (6),
1123–1140.
[134] Sethuraman, R., Tellis, G. J., 1991. An analysis of the tradeoff between advertising
and price discounting. Journal of Marketing Research 28 (2), 160–174.
[135] Shapley, L. S., 1953. Value for n-person games. In: Kuhn, H., Tucker, A. (Eds.),
Contributions to the Theory of Games II, Annals of mathematics studies. Vol. 28.
Princeton University Press, pp. 307–317.
[136] Shapley, L. S., 1967. On balanced sets and cores. Naval research logistics quarterly
14 (4), 453–460.
231
[137] Shinn, S., 1997. Determining optimal retail price and lot size under day-terms sup-
plier credit. Computers & Industrial Engineering 33 (3), 717 – 720.
[138] Simchi-Levi, D., Wu, S. D., Shen, Z.-J. M., 2004. Handbook of quantitative supply
chain analysis: modeling in the e-business era. Vol. 74. Taylor & Francis US.
[139] Sklar, A., 1959. Fonctions de re´partition a` n dimensions et leurs marges. Publ Inst
Statist Universite´ Paris 8, 229–231.
[140] Slikker, M., Fransoo, J., Wouters, M., 2005. Cooperation between multiple news-
vendors with transshipments. European Journal of Operational Research 167 (2),
370–380.
[141] Spearman, C., 1904. The proof and measurement of association between two things.
The American journal of psychology 15 (1), 72–101.
[142] Stevens, G. C., 1989. Integrating the supply chain. International Journal of Physical
Distribution & Logistics Management 19 (8), 3–8.
[143] Straffin, P. D., 1993. Game theory and strategy. Vol. 36. MAA.
[144] Su, X. M., Zhang, F. Q., 2008. Strategic customer behavior, commitment, and
supply chain performance. Management Science 54 (10), 1759–1773.
[145] Sucky, E., 2006. A bargaining model with asymmetric information for a single
supplier–single buyer problem. European Journal of Operational Research 171 (2),
516–535.
[146] Taylor, T. A., Xiao, W., 2010. Does a manufacturer benefit from selling to a better-
forecasting retailer? Management Science 56 (9), 1584–1598.
[147] Tayur, S., Ganeshan, R., Magazine, M., 1999. Quantitative models for supply chain
management. Vol. 17. Springer.
[148] Thangam, A., Uthayakumar, R., 2009. Two-echelon trade credit financing for per-
ishable items in a supply chain when demand depends on both selling price and
credit period. Computers & Industrial Engineering 57 (3), 773 – 786.
232
[149] Thomas, D. J., Griffin, P. M., 1996. Coordinated supply chain management. Euro-
pean journal of operational research 94 (1), 1–15.
[150] Tirole, J., 1988. The Theory of Industrial Organizationy. The MIT Press, Cam-
bridge, MA.
[151] Trivedi, P. K., Zimmer, D. M., 2007. Copula modeling: an introduction for practi-
tioners. Now Publishers Inc.
[152] Troyer, C., 1996. Efr: Efficient food service response. In: Conference on Logistics,
GMA, May. pp. 21–23.
[153] Tsay, A. A., Nahmias, S., Agrawal, N., 1999. Modeling supply chain contracts: A
review. In: Quantitative models for supply chain management. Springer, pp. 299–
336.
[154] Turken, N., Tan, Y., Vakharia, A. J., Wang, L., Wang, R., Yenipazarli, A., 2012. The
multi-product newsvendor problem: Review, extensions, and directions for future
research. In: Handbook of Newsvendor Problems. Springer, pp. 3–39.
[155] Viswanathan, S., Piplani, R., 2001. Coordinating supply chain inventories through
common replenishment epochs. European Journal of Operational Research 129 (2),
277–286.
[156] Viswanathan, S., Wang, Q., 2003. Discount pricing decisions in distribution channels
with price-sensitive demand. European Journal of Operational Research 149 (3),
571–587.
[157] von Neumann, J., 1928. Zur theorie der gesellschaftsspiele. Mathematische Annalen
100 (1), 295–320.
[158] von Neumann, J., Morgenstern, O., 1944. Theory of games and economic behavior.
Princeton University Press.
[159] von Stackelberg, H., 1952. The Theory of Market Economy. Oxford University Press,
New York.
233
[160] Wang, H., Guo, M., Efstathiou, J., 2004. A game-theoretical cooperative mech-
anism design for a two-echelon decentralized supply chain. European Journal of
Operational Research 157 (2), 372–388.
[161] Wang, J., Shu, Y.-F., 2005. Fuzzy decision modeling for supply chain management.
Fuzzy Sets and systems 150 (1), 107–127.
[162] Wang, Q., Parlar, M., 1994. A three-person game theory model arising in stochastic
inventory control theory. European Journal of Operational Research 76 (1), 83–97.
[163] Wang, W. Y., Heng, M. S., Chau, P. Y., 2007. Supply chain management: issues in
the new era of collaboration and competition. Igi Global.
[164] Weber, C. A., Current, J. R., Benton, W., 1991. Vendor selection criteria and
methods. European journal of operational research 50 (1), 2–18.
[165] Weng, Z., 1995. Channel coordination and quantity discounts. Management Science
41 (9), 1509–1522.
[166] Wilcox, J. B., Howell, R. D., Kuzdrall, P., Britney, R., 1987. Price quantity dis-
counts: some implications for buyers and sellers. The Journal of Marketing, 60–70.
[167] Wingfield, N., Guth, R. A., 2005. Why shortages of hot gifts endure as a christmas
ritual. Wall Street Journal.
[168] Yang, S., Zhou, Y., 2006. Two-echelon supply chain models: Considering duopolis-
tic retailers different competitive behaviors. International Journal of Production
Economics 103 (1), 104–116.
[169] Yu, Y., Huang, G., Liang, L., 2009. Stackelberg game-theoretic model for optimiz-
ing advertising, pricing and inventory policies in vendor managed inventory (vmi)
production supply chains. Computers & Industrial Engineering 57 (1), 368 – 382.
[170] Zeithaml, V. A., 1988. Consumer perceptions of price, quality, and value: a means-
end model and synthesis of evidence. The Journal of Marketing 52 (3), 2–22.
234
[171] Zermelo, E., 1913. U¨ber eine anwendung der mengenlehre auf die theorie des
schachspiels. In: Proceedings of the Fifth International Congress of Mathemati-
cians. Vol. 2. II, Cambridge UP, Cambridge, pp. 501–504.
[172] Zhang, C.-T., Liu, L.-P., 2013. Research on coordination mechanism in three-level
green supply chain under non-cooperative game. Applied Mathematical Modelling
37 (5), 3369–3379.
[173] Zhong, Y., Zhou, Y., 2012. The model and algorithm for determining optimal
ordering/trade-credit policy of supply chains. Applied Mathematics and Compu-
tation 219 (8), 3809 – 3825.
[174] Zhou, C., Zhao, R., Tang, W., 2008. Two-echelon supply chain games in a fuzzy
environment. Computers & Industrial Engineering 55 (2), 390–405.
[175] Zhou, Y., Zhong, Y., Li, J., 2012. An uncooperative order model for items with trade
credit, inventory-dependent demand and limited displayed-shelf space. European
Journal of Operational Research 223 (1), 76 – 85.
235
Appendix A
Notations
DECISION VARIABLES
P Selling price charged by the buyer to the customer ($/unit) 43
M Marketing expenditure incurred by the buyer ($/unit) 43
V The price charged by the seller to the buyer ($/unit) 44
S The shortage controlled by the seller (units) 44
Q Lot size determined by the buyer (units) 44
t A side payment offered by the seller to the buyer to share marketing
cost
82
δ The shortage size offered by the seller in mechanism design 82
R Quality level determined by the consumer at the point of purchase 106
L Length of credit period offered by the seller to the buyer (year) 186
κ Multiplier factor for the length of the credit period determined by
the buyer, where κ ≥ 1
186
µY Process mean of quality characteristic of product Y 202
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INPUT PARAMETERS
k Scaling constant for demand function (k > 0) 43
u Scaling constant for production (u > 1) 43
α Price elasticity of demand function (α > 1) 43
β Marketing expenditure elasticity of demand (0 < β < 1, β+1 < α) 43
i Percent inventory holding cost per unit per year 44
Ab Buyer’s ordering cost ($/order) 45
As Seller’s setup cost ($/setup) 49
Cs Seller’s production cost including purchasing cost ($/unit) 49
W Seller’s marginal selling price ($/unit), where W > 1 50
V0 Seller’s minimum selling price ($/unit) 50
C1 Buyer’s shortage cost ($/unit) 44
C2 Seller’s shortage cost ($/unit) 49
r Seller’s production rate (units/cycle) 43
d Market demand rate (units/cycle) 43
D Annual demand in two–person supply chain; for notational simplic-
ity we let D ≡ D(P,M)
43
K A constant which related to price elasticity and marketing expen-
diture elasticity
80
ζ Quality level elasticity of demand (0 < ζ < 1) 106
ξ Disutility coefficient, where 0 ≤ ξ ≤ 1 106
Cr Supplier’s unit rework cost for returned product($/ unit), where
Cr < Cb < Cs
109
C3 Consumer’s disutility caused by shortages ($/ unit) 111
X Product quality as perceived by the consumer, a random variable 106
V (x) Consumer’s valuation of product, a function of X = x 106
V˜ Upper bound of the valuation function 106
S0 : Consumer’s disutility function due to unacceptable product 106
D Annual demand in three–person supply chain; for notational sim-
plicity we let D ≡ D(P,R)
106
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Ib Storage cost rate per unit per year excluding the financing inventory
cost
188
Ip Buyer’s capital gain rate during the credit period 186
Ic Buyer’s capital cost rate after the credit period, we assume that
Ip = Ic
186
Is Capital cost rate for the seller during the credit period 186
a Constants specified by the seller related to capital cost rate Is 186
b Constants specified by the seller related to capital cost rate Is 186
Ix Capital rate charged by the seller to the buyer for the extension of
credit period (κ− 1)L
186
X Random demand by a customer; it is assumed that X has a uniform
distribution
201
PR Market price (per unit) of product 201
PM Purchasing price (per unit) of product 201
G Lost sale cost (per unit) due to failure to meet demand 201
S Selling price (per unit) of scrapped product (S < PR) 201
Sp Selling price (per unit) of substandard product (Sp < PM) 202
Y Quality variable; it is assumed that Y has a normal distribution 202
LY Lower specification limit of quality variable 202
UY Upper specification limit of quality variable 202
C0 Constant production cost per unit 202
c Variable production cost per unit 202
In Inspection cost per unit 202
l Quality loss coefficient 203
y0 Target value of product 203
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GENERAL NOTATIONS AND PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS
T Production cycle,T = Q/D 44
I Average positive inventory 44
B Average negative inventory 44
Πb(·) Buyer’s (or retailer’s) profit function 45
Πs(·) Seller’s (or supplier’s) profit function 49
Πr(·) Retailer’s profit function 108
Πc(·) Consumer’s utility function 111
Zij Weighted sum of player i and j’s profit function 54
A1 The set of buyer’s strategy, where A1 = {P,M,Q} 74
A2 The set of seller’s strategy, where A2 = {V ,S} 74
T1 The set of buyer’s type space, where T1 = {α, β, C1} 74
T2 The set of seller’s type space, where T2 = {As, Cs , C2} 74
f1(µ) Probability density function (pdf) of type µ ∈ T1 74
f2(c) Probability density function (pdf) of type c ∈ T2 74
F (·) Cumulative probability distribution function (cdf) 83
f(·) Probability density function (pdf) corresponding to F (·) 83
P rs Decision variable P obtained as solution from Retailer-Stackelberg
game
105
Qrcc Decision variable Q obtained as solution from RCC-Stackelberg
game
105
Π∗N, i Profit based on a Nash equilibrium profile for each player i ∈ N 144
Π∗A, i Pareto optimal profit accrued to player i in the coalition A 143
λi The pure strategies for player i, (i = s, r, c) 135
v(A) A joint utility achieved by coalition A 142
P ∗A Optimal P obtained by coalition A based on Pareto optimal solu-
tion
144
R∗N Optimal R obtained by player based on Nash equilibrium solution 144
Zsrc Weighted sum of supplier, retailer and consumer’s profit function 139
ϕi(v) The Shapley value assigned to a player i ∈ N 143
239
Fi|k(·) Marginal distribution function of player i’s type assessed by player
k
159
fi|k(·) Probability density function of player i’s type assessed by player k 159
Fij(·) Joint distribution function of player i and j’s types 170
fij(·) Probability density function of player i and j’s types 170
Cij(·) Copula function corresponding to Fij(·) 170
cij(·) Density function of copula Cij(·) 170
Ai A strategy set for player i 158
Ti A type space for player i 158
TR Buyer’s type space , where TR = {α, β} 191
TS Seller’s type space, where TS = {a, b} 193
fR(r) Probability density function (pdf) of type r ∈ TR 191
fS(s) Probability density function (pdf) of type s ∈ TS 193
piM1 Manufacturer’s profit per unit sold 202
piM Manufacturer’s total profit 203
piB Buyer’s total profit 203
Loss(Y ) Loss function based on quality variable Y 203
Φ(·) Cumulative distribution function (cdf) of standard normal random
variable
202
φ(·) Probability density function (pdf) of cdf Φ(·) 202
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